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Oregon v. Ashcroft
Ruling: (Oregon v. Ashcroft, D.Or., 192 F. Supp 2d 1077, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6695)
The state of Oregon allowed physician-assisted suicides under the Oregon Death with
Dignity Act. The United States Attorney General issued a directive under the authority of
the Controlled Substances Act that controlled substances could not be used in
physician-assisted suicides because such procedures were not legitimate medical purposes.
The court issued a permanent injunction against the federal government enjoining it from
giving any legal effect to attorney general's directive.
Question Presented: May the federal government, in contradiction of the determination of
a state, issue a directive under the auspices of the Controlled Substances Act determining
what legitimate medical purposes are for the purpose of dispensing controlled substances.
State of OREGON; et al., Plaintiff-Intervenors
V.
John ASHCROFT, in his official capacity as United States Attorney General;
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; et al., Defendants
United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Decided April 17, 2002
JONES, Judge:
INTRODUCTION
After surviving voter and legal challenges,
the 1994 Oregon Death with Dignity Act
("Oregon Act"), O.R.S. 127.800 et seq,
finally went into effect in October 1997.
On November 6, 2001, with no advance
warning to Oregon representatives,
Attorney General John Ashcroft (herein
referred to as "Ashcroft") fired the first
shot in the battle between the state of
Oregon and the federal government over
which government has the ultimate
authority to decide what constitutes the
legitimate practice of medicine, at least
when schedule II substances regulated
under the Controlled Substances Act
("C]SA"), 21 U.S.C. 5 801 et seq, are
involved. Ashcroft began the battle by
issuing the so-called "Ashcroft directive,"
-- a few paragraphs published in the
Federal Register on November 9, 2001, in
which Ashcroft declares, in relevant part,
that
* controlled substances
dispensed to assist
reversing the position
predecessor, Attorney
Reno, in June 1998.
may not be
suicide, thus
taken by his
General Janet
* assisting suicide is not a "legitimate
medical purpose" and that prescribing,
dispensing, or administering federally
controlled substances to assist suicide
violates the CSA.
* prescribing,
administering
substances to
dispensing, or
federally controlled
assist suicide may
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"render [a physician's] registration [...]
inconsistent with the public interest"
and therefore subject to possible
suspension or revocation under 21
US.C. § 824(a)(4).
66 FR 56608 (Nov. 9, 2001).
Through his directive, Ashcroft evidently
sought to stifle an ongoing "earnest and
profound debate" in the various states
concerning physician-assisted suicide.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
735, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997). In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court
was called upon to decide whether the
state of Washington's statutory ban on
assisted suicide violated the Due Process
Clause. In a thoughtful opinion, the Court
acknowledged that "throughout the
Nation, Americans are engaged in an
earnest and profound debate about the
morality, legality and practicality of
physician-assisted suicide." The Court
recounted the various states' "serious,
thoughtful examinations" of the issues in
this difficult debate, including Oregon's
1994 enactment of the Oregon Act. See
521 U.S. at 716-19. The Court declined to
"strike down the considered policy
choice" of the State of Washington,
deferring instead to that state's resolution
of the debate. 521 U.S. at 719, 724, 735.
In her concurring opinion in Glucksberg,
Justice O'Connor further elaborated that
there is no reason to think the democratic
process will not strike the proper balance
between the interests of terminally ill,
mentally competent individuals who
would seek to end their suffering and the
State's interests in protecting those who
might seek to end life mistakenly or under
pressure. * *States are presently
undertaking extensive and serious
evaluation of physician- assisted suicide
and other related issues.* * *In such
circumstances, "the ... challenging task of
crafting appropriate procedures for
safeguarding ... liberty interests is
entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the States
... in the first instance."
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (citations omitted).
As the Court acknowledged in
Glucksberg, the citizens of Oregon,
through their democratic initiative
process, have chosen to resolve the moral,
legal, and ethical debate on physician-
assisted suicide for themselves by voting
not once, but twice in favor of the
Oregon Act. The Oregon Act attempts to
resolve this "earnest and profound
debate" by "striking the proper balance
between the interests of terminally ill,
mentally competent individuals who
would seek to end their suffering and the
State's interests in protecting those who
might seek to end life mistakenly or under
pressure." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
With publication of the Ashcroft directive,
Ashcroft essentially nullified the Oregon
Act and four years of Oregon experience
in implementing it. In response to what it
perceived as an unwarranted and
unauthorized intrusion into the sovereign
interests of Oregon, the medical practices
of Oregon physicians, and the end-of-life
decisions made by terminally-ill
Oregonians, plaintiff state of Oregon
("plaintiff") immediately commenced this
lawsuit to, among other things, enjoin
Ashcroft and the other defendants from
giving the Ashcroft directive any legal
effect. A temporary restraining order,
issued on November 8, 2001, remains in
effect.
Despite the enormity of the debate over
physician-assisted suicide, the issues in
this case are legal ones and, as pertain to
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my disposition, are fairly narrowly drawn.
My resolution of the legal issues does not
require any delving into the complex
religious, moral, ethical, medical,
emotional or psychological controversies
that surround physician-assisted suicide or
"hastened death" (as the parties
sometimes describe it), because in
Oregon, those controversies have been
for now - put to rest.
I now turn to the central substantive issue
in this case, whether the Ashcroft
directive, which declares that prescribing
controlled substances to assist patient
suicide is not a "legitimate medical
purpose," is authorized under the CESA
and its implementing regulations. Having
carefully considered this matter, I
conclude that nothing in the plain
language of the CSA or its legislative
history demonstrates Congress' intent to
grant defendants the authority under the
CESA to determine that prescribing
controlled substances for purposes of
physician-assisted suicide in compliance
with Oregon law is not a "legitimate
medical purpose" under 21 C.F.R 
1306.04(a).
It is undisputed that under the CSA, the
Attorney General and the DEA have
broad authority to regulate controlled
substances. No provision of the CSA,
however, alone (as defendants urge) or
viewed as a "symmetrical and coherent
scheme" demonstrates or even suggests
that Congress intended to delegate to the
Attorney General or the DEA the
authority to decide, as a matter of national
policy, a question of such magnitude as
whether physician- assisted suicide
constitutes a legitimate medical purpose
or practice.
Nor, as defendants propose, did the 1984
amendments to the (SA delegate such
authority. [ ... I
The revocation section, § 824(a)(4), as
amended, includes as a ground for
revocation or suspension "such acts as
would render his registration under
section 823 * inconsistent with the
public interest as determined under such
section." Defendants read these
amendments [...] as supplying evidence
that Congress intended to expand the
Attorney General's and the DEA's
authority to include the power to define
the parameters of legitimate medical
practices. I do not, however, read the CSA
or the 1984 amendments as containing
either explicitly or implicitly such a
remarkable grant of power.
IV. Summary
The determination of what constitutes a
legitimate medical practice or purpose
traditionally has been left to the individual
states. State statutes, state medical boards,
and state regulations control the practice
of medicine. The CSA was never
intended, and the USDOJ and DEA were
never authorized, to establish a national
medical practice or act as a national
medical board. To allow an attorney
general -- an appointed executive whose
tenure depends entirely on whatever
administration occupies the 'White House
-- to determine the legitimacy of a
particular medical practice without a
specific congressional grant of such
authority would be unprecedented and
extraordinary. As stated, the practice of
medicine is based on state standards,
recognizing, of course, national
enactments that, within constitutional
limits, specifically and clearly define what
is lawful and what is not. Without doubt
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there is tremendous disagreement among
highly respected medical practitioners as
to whether assisted suicide or hastened
death is a legitimate medical practice, but
opponents have been heard and, absent a
specific prohibitive federal statute, the
Oregon voters have made the legal, albeit
controversial, decision that such a practice
is legitimate in this sovereign state.
The Ashcroft directive attempts to define
the term "legitimate medical purpose" to
exclude use of controlled substances for
otherwise legal physician-assisted suicide
where Congress failed to do so despite
multiple opportunities. Obviously,
Congress knows how to do so, as
manifested in its abandoned attempts to
restrict assisted suicide nationwide.
Because former Attorney General Reno
concluded that the CSA has no
application to the Oregon Act,
Representative Hyde introduced two bills
in the House of Representatives to
specifically address the Oregon Act. The
first bill, the Lethal Drug Use Prevention
Act of 1998, would have amended the
CSA to directly authorize the suspension
or revocation of a practitioner's DEA
registration if the registrant intentionally
dispensed or distributed a controlled
substance for the purpose of assisting the
suicide or euthanasia of another
individual. The second bill, the Pain Relief
Promotion Act, attempted to clarify the
CSA to provide that the alleviation of pain
is a legitimate medical purpose, but that
the CSA did not permit the use of
controlled substances to cause death or
assist in a suicide. While the second bill
passed the House, neither bill passed the
Senate, and neither was signed into law.
Even though both acts failed in Congress,
certain congressional leaders made a good
faith effort to get through the
administrative door that which they could
not get through the congressional door,
seeking refuge with the newly-appointed
Attorney General whose ideology
matched their views, and this is precisely
what occurred. The Executive Branch
immediately began its efforts to re-write
the law to achieve its goal of abolishing
assisted suicide anywhere. Although
congressional action attempting to control
matters traditionally left to the state may
raise constitutional issues for any future
legislation in this field, suffice it to say that
at this juncture, neither the U.S.
Constitution nor the Bill of Rights speaks
to assisted suicide, neither providing for it
as a personal right nor prohibiting it.
I again emphasize that I resolve this case
as a matter of statutory interpretation, and
my interpretation of the statutory text and
meaning is that the CSA does not prohibit
practitioners from prescribing and
dispensing controlled substances in
compliance with a carefully-worded state
legislative act. Thus, the Ashcroft directive
is not entitled to deference under any
standard n22 and is invalid. I also
emphasize that my task is not to criticize
those who oppose the concept of assisted
suicide for any reason. Many of our
citizens, including the highest respected
leaders of this country, oppose assisted
suicide. But the fact that opposition to
assisted suicide may be fully justified,
morally, ethically, religiously or otherwise,
does not permit a federal statute to be
manipulated from its true meaning to
satisfy even a worthy goal. [... ]
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Agency Won't Back Off Assisted Suicide Ruling
Los Angeles Times
May 25, 2002
The Justice Department said it will fight a
judge's ruling that banned the department
from interfering with an Oregon law that
allows doctors to help terminally ill people
kill themselves
Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft challenged the
law last November but was rebuffed by a
judge who ruled in April that the Justice
Department lacks the authority to
overturn the state law, the only one of its
kind in the nation. Justice Department
lawyers filed paperwork on their plans to
appeal to the San Francisco-based U.S.
9th Circuit Court of Appeals. Jones said in
his decision in April that Oregon voters
twice endorsed the law and "have chosen
to resolve the moral, legal and ethical
debate on physician-assisted suicide for
themselves."
State health officials say at least 91 people,
mostly cancer patients, have killed
themselves using the law.
Copyright © 2002 Los Angeles Times
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Suicide Law Upheld. The Ruling: Ajudge Decides Ashcroft Lacks Authority to
Decide Oregon's Law
The oirgonian
April 18, 2002
Don Colburn
A federal judge Wednesday rejected an
attempt by U.S. Attorney General John
Ashcroft to punish Oregon physicians
who help terminally ill patients end their
lives under the state's landmark assisted
suicide law.
U.S. District Judge Robert E. Jones said
Ashcroft exceeded his authority under the
federal Controlled Substances Act in
November when he said assisted suicide
was not a legitimate medical practice and
threatened to revoke the licenses of
doctors who prescribed lethal doses of
drugs to dying patients.
Jones ruled that Congress never intended
the Controlled Substances Act to be used
to override the traditional authority of
states to regulate the practice of medicine.
"To allow an attorney general -- an
appointed executive whose tenure
depends entirely on whatever
administration occupies the White House
-- to determine the legitimacy of a
particular medical practice without a
specific congressional grant of such
authority would be unprecedented and
extraordinary," wrote Jones, who was
appointed to the federal bench by the
former President Bush in 1990. Assisted
suicide supporters praised the ruling.
"It's a great victory for the people of
Oregon," said Richard Holmes, 72, who
has terminal liver cancer and filled a lethal
prescription of Nembutal Sodium in
December.
Holmes has not decided whether to use
his prescription, but 91 other people have
since the law took effect four years ago.
Opponents promised to fight on.
"We're disappointed with Judge Jones'
ruling, and we respectfully disagree with
his conclusion," said Assistant U.S.
Attorney General Robert D. McCallum Jr.
McCallum, who flew to Portland from
Washington, D.C., for the decision, said
he probably would recommend appealing
to the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, a
move that would draw out the legal battle,
probably for more than a year.
Oregon voters narrowly approved a ballot
measure allowing assisted suicide in 1994,
but a legal challenge kept it from taking
effect until 1997. In response to a letter by
congressional opponents of assisted
suicide, the head of the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration said in 1997
that the Controlled Substances Act
authorized his agency to punish physicians
who prescribed drugs so patients could
end their lives.
Then-U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno,
who oversaw the DEA, overruled the
decision, concluding -- much as Jones did
Wednesday -- that nothing in the law's
language or the legislative history of its
adoption suggested that Congress
intended to allow the DEA to usurp the
traditional authority of state officials in
such matters.
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After George W. Bush took office,
Oregon Attorney General Hardy Myers
wrote to Ashcroft and said he wanted to
comment if he planned to review Reno's
decision.
A Department of justice official wrote
back, saying Myers would be given such
an opportunity. But in November,
without warning, Ashcroft announced
that he had reviewed the issue and
determined that the Controlled
Substances Act gave him the authority to
determine what is a legitimate medical
practice and that assisted suicide was not
one.
Ashcroft said the DEA would revoke the
license of any physician who prescribed a
lethal dose of drugs to a terminally ill
patient.
Myers, joined by patients, a physician and
a pharmacist, sued Ashcroft, and Jones
blocked the DEA from punishing doctors
while he considered the case.
In the suit, the plaintiffs argued that
Ashcroft violated administrative law by
adopting the new rule without notice;
exceeded his authority under the
Controlled Substances Act; and violated
the state's right to determine the
legitimacy of medical practices.
Jones took the opportunity to scold
Ashcroft for failing to notify Oregon of
his review of the law.
". . . The attorney general of the United
States completely ignored his earlier
promise to the Oregon Attorney General
to ascertain Oregon's views," he wrote.
Jones ultimately decided on narrow
statutory grounds. He largely skipped the
procedural and constitutional arguments,
ruling simply that the Controlled
Substances Act does not mention assisted
suicide and that Ashcroft failed to
demonstrate a good reason why he should
be able to interpret it to give him authority
over a subject that traditionally belongs to
state governments.
"I conclude that Congress did not intend
the (law) to override a state's decisions
concerning what constitutes legitimate
medical practice, at least in the absence of
an express federal law prohibiting the
practice. Similarly, I conclude that
Congress never intended . . . to grant
blanket authority to the attorney general
or the DEA to define ... what constitutes
the legitimate practice of medicine," Jones
wrote.
Indeed, he wrote, Congress twice has
attempted to pass legislation blocking
Oregon's law.
"Even though both acts failed in
Congress, certain congressional leaders
made a good faith effort to get through
the administrative door that which they
could not get through the congressional
door, seeking refuge with the newly-
appointed attorney general whose
ideology matched their views," he wrote.
Finally, Jones said he was not criticizing
assisted suicide opponents.
"But the fact that opposition to assisted
suicide may be fully justified morally,
ethically, religiously or otherwise, does not
permit a federal statute to be manipulated
from its true meaning to satisfy even a
worthy law," he wrote.
Eli Stutsman, a Portland attorney who
represented a physician and a pharmacist
in the case, said the plaintiffs were in a
strong position to defend the ruling on
appeal because Jones referred to the
important constitutional questions about
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the extent of federal power over the
states, but based his decision on a
straightforward reading of the law.
"He did a masterful job," Stutsrnan said.
"His opinion is bulletproof."
Kelly Clark, who wrote a friend of the
court brief for Right to Life, which
opposes assisted suicide, said the debate
was far from over.
"We will fight with any tool we have,
including an ambiguous statute because
we continue to be concerned that the right
to die, no matter how well-intentioned or
well-considered, will, over time, become
the obligation to die," Clark said.
James Romney, who
lateral sclerosis, or
degenerative nerve
Wednesday that Jones
relief.
has amyotrophic
ALS, a fatal
disease, said
decision was a
"Today I feel liberated again," Romney
said. "I feel like now I have a choice. I feel
I can decide how I can die and when I can
die."
Staff writer Don Colburn contributed to
this story.
Copyright © 2002 The Oregonian
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A Chronology
The Oirgonian
April 18, 2002
Nov. 8, 1994: Oregon voters approve the
first law in the nation allowing physicians
to prescribe lethal doses of medication to
terminally ill patients who request it.
Dec. 7, 1994: The day before the law can
take effect, U.S. District Judge Michael
Hogan issues a temporary restraining
order against it in response to a suit filed
earlier by National Right to Life. Aug. 3,
1995: Hogan rules that the law lacks
adequate safeguards to protect depressed
terminally ill patients who do not really
want to kill themselves.
Feb. 27, 1997: The 9th U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals overturns Hogan's ruling,
saying the plaintiffs could not sue because
they were not injured by the law. Assisted
suicide opponents appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court, which later declines to
hear the case.
Nov. 4, 1997: Oregon voters reject a
measure to repeal the law. The same day,
the assisted suicide law takes effect.
June 5, 1998: Then-U.S. Attorney General
Janet Reno determines that the Controlled
Substances Act does not prohibit Oregon
doctors from prescribing lethal doses of
medication to terminally ill patients.
Congressional action to block the law falls
short.
Nov. 6, 2001: U.S. Attorney General John
Ashcroft issues an order saying his
interpretation of the Controlled
Substances Act shows that it does block
doctors from using the Oregon law.
Nov. 8, 2001: U.S. District Judge Robert
E. Jones blocks Ashcroft's order from
going into effect.
Copyright @ 2002 The Oregonian
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Ashcroft Attacks Oregon's Suicide Law
Los Angeles Times
November 7, 2001
Josh Meyer and Kim Murphy
Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft on Tuesday
directed U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration agents to go after Oregon
doctors in assisted-suicide cases, saying it
is against federal law to dispense or use
controlled medications to help a
terminally ill patient die.
The move by Ashcroft, a strident critic of
assisted suicide, was aimed at overruling
an Oregon law that allows doctors to help
patients who want to hasten their deaths.
Ashcroft's memo specifically allows for
the revocation of drug prescription
licenses of doctors who participate in an
assisted suicide using federally controlled
substances. His directive did not authorize
criminal prosecution of those doctors. In
a memo to DEA Administrator Asa
Hutchinson, Ashcroft said that assisted
suicide is not a "legitimate medical
purpose" for prescribing, dispensing or
administering federally controlled
substances. He said that the use of such
drugs by physicians to manage patients'
pain is medically valid.
The action reignited the national debate
over assisted suicide. It drew praise from
anti-abortion groups and criticism from
those who support doctors' efforts to help
patients who want to take a cocktail of
barbiturates to end their pain and
suffering.
Ashcroft's directive reverses a June 1998
declaration by his predecessor, Janet
Reno. She barred federal agents from
moving against doctors who, in keeping
with the requirements of Oregon's
assisted-suicide law, help terminally ill
patients end their lives. That law was
passed by voters in 1994, but because of
court battles did not take effect until
October 1997.
Within hours of Ashcroft's
announcement, Oregon officials vowed to
go to court to obtain an injunction
blocking the directive. Supporters and
opponents alike predicted that the
Supreme Court would ultimately decide
the matter.
"It's beyond my comprehension why, in
the face of what's happening in the world
today, that this would be a priority of any
type for our attorney general," said
George Eighmey, executive director of the
Compassion in Dying Federation in
Oregon.
The Oregon group was one of many that
said Ashcroft's directive would have a
chilling effect on doctors nationwide over
fears that their prescription decisions will
be second-guessed by drug agents with no
medical expertise.
Critics of assisted suicide, including anti-
abortion organizations and some religious
groups, hailed Ashcroft's action. Some
said it would protect the elderly and
infirm in Oregon from pressure to take
their own lives.
"This is a carefully crafted ruling that
reassures doctors about their ability to
prescribe federally controlled drugs to
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relieve pain while ensuring that the federal
government does not facilitate assisted
suicide," said Burke Balch, director of
medical ethics at the National Right to
Life Committee.
Balch said the only doctors who will face
increased scrutiny are those who fill out
state paperwork admitting that they have
participated in an assisted suicide.
"It's not like the DEA is going in
anywhere, trying to second-guess
doctors," Balch said.
Neither the attorney general nor his aides
commented publicly on the directive,
which resembled a legal brief and
contained little in the way of explanation
or Ashcroft's reasons for issuing it.
"We're letting the memo speak for itself,"
said one Justice Department official.
Ashcroft's memo cited the Supreme
Court's ruling in a medical marijuana case
earlier this year that federal law regulating
controlled substances is uniform
throughout the United States, and cannot
be superseded by state law.
Therefore, Ashcroft concluded, Oregon's
law permitting doctor-assisted suicide is
now legally out of step with the law of the
land.
Ashcroft told Hutchinson that drug
agents around the nation, particularly in
Oregon, should resume enforcement of a
DEA policy prohibiting the dispensing of
controlled substances to assist suicides.
Hutchinson said in a statement that he
will instruct agents to do so immediately.
"I am pleased that this issue has been
clarified for the American public," said
Hutchinson, until recently a GOP
congressman from Arkansas. "DEA will
continue to maintain consistency in
striking the balance between relieving pain
and preventing the abuse of pain
medication."
Under Oregon's Death With Dignity Act,
doctors may provide--but not administer--
a lethal prescription to terminally ill adult
state residents. The law requires the
assessment of two physicians that the
patient has less than six months to live,
has chosen to die voluntarily and is able to
make health care decisions.
Seventy Oregon residents have used the
law to end their lives. Another half dozen
or so patients have completed the
application process and have their
prescriptions in hand; a few dozen more
are in the middle of the application
process and could be affected by
Ashcroft's directive.
Barbara Coombs Lee of Compassion in
Dying Federation said the relatively small
number of suicides has disproved
opponents' predictions that the law would
cause a dramatic increase in suicides. "We
now have four years of very careful
implementation during which we have
only seen a few people use the law under
extraordinary and compelling
circumstances," she said.
She rejected Ashcroft's linking of the
assisted-suicide issue with the medical
marijuana case, in which the Supreme
Court essentially put an Oakland "buyers'
club" out of business.
In its ruling in May, the court said there is
no exception in federal drug laws for the
medical use of marijuana to ease pain
from cancer, AIDS and other illnesses.
"It's easy to distinguish the federal
government's ability to put these buyer
clubs out of business from what the
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federal government is trying to do in this
case, which is override state determination
of what is [a] legitimate medical purpose
for medication already in common use
and under regulation by the state," Lee
said. "Marijuana is not a medication in
common use."
Oregon officials plan to argue that
Ashcroft's directive would have "dramatic
and irreversible repercussions on the
state," said Kevin Neely, spokesman for
the Oregon attorney general's office. He
said state lawyers would go to U.S.
District Court in Portland today to seek a
temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction to bar enforcement
of Ashcroft's directive.
"Today's Department of Justice decision
was inevitable, as it simply restated federal
law," said Republican Sen. Gordon Smith,
an opponent of the state law.
Democratic Sen. Ron Wyden, who
blocked legislation in Congress that would
have outlawed assisted suicide, accused
Ashcroft of ignoring the will of the state's
voters and of compromising medical care
throughout the country.
Copyright © 2001 Los Angeles Times
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Move by U.S. on Suicide Law Draws Suit in Oregon
The New York Times
November 8, 2001
Sam Howe Verhovek
Richard L. Holmes does not want to die.
"Hey, I'm into Medicare a third of a
million dollars trying to stay alive," said
Mr. Holmes, a 72-year-old retired
salesman of burglar alarms who, despite a
colon operation and a liver transplant in
recent years, finds himself facing what his
doctors say is terminal cancer. "I've
enjoyed life. I'd love to stay alive." But
that is not going to happen. So, knowing
that his days are numbered, Mr. Holmes
decided last month to apply for state
permission to obtain lethal medication
under the law that makes Oregon the only
state in the nation to allow physician-
assisted suicide.
Today, just three days before he would
have been entitled to obtain the
barbiturates that could enable him to
choose the hour of his death, Mr. Holmes
found himself at the center of an
extraordinary legal battle unfolding
between his home state and the United
States Justice Department, which on
Tuesday moved to strike down the
Oregon law by authorizing federal drug
agents to take action against any doctor in
the state who prescribed such drugs.
Mr. Holmes and three other patients
joined in a legal motion brought today in
Federal District Court here by Attorney
General Hardy Myers of Oregon to
impose a stay on the federal directive. A
ruling on the state's request is not
expected until Thursday at the earliest.
Five years after voting in favor of assisted
suicide, by 60 percent to 40 percent,
Oregon residents have at last come face to
face with a federal challenge to the
practice, under which at least 70 people
have taken their own lives. All of them,
under terms of the law, had received a
diagnosis from two doctors that they had
less than six months to live.
Most of the state's leading officials have
been blisteringly critical of the decision by
Attorney General John Ashcroft to move
against the law.
"This attorney general is supposed to be
figuring out who's responsible for the
anthrax," said Gov. John Kitzhaber, a
Democrat and a physician. "To introduce
this divisive issue at this point in time is
just, to me, unthinkable."
In Oregon, Mr. Ashcroft's most
prominent supporter is Senator Gordon
H. Smith, a Republican who faces re-
election next year. "For me," said Mr.
Smith, "it's an issue of principle upon
which I'm prepared to stake my political
career."
But for terminally ill people like Mr.
Holmes and the doctors involved, the
battle over the law has abruptly put them
into an ethical limbo.
A few doctors here said today that they
were exploring other legal avenues for
continuing to prescribe lethal drugs even
if the state's motion for a stay was
unsuccessful, or significantly delayed. But
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many doctors said that unless the stay was
approved, they would be unwilling to
prescribe the drugs now, because they
could lose their license to write
prescriptions.
"If I lost that license, I'd in effect be
unable to practice medicine at all," said
Dr. Peter Rasmussen, an oncologist in
Salem who is joining the state's lawsuit.
He has at least four patients now seeking
the drugs, and he has treated several
others -- he declines to give a number --
who have ended their lives under the law.
At the same time the state asked the court
for a stay, the state filed a broader lawsuit
arguing that Mr. Ashcroft exceeded his
authority under federal drug laws and was
illegally seeking to interfere with Oregon's
authority to regulate medicine.
There are at least two dozen terminally ill
people in the state who are awaiting final
approval from the state to receive
prescriptions for lethal medication, said
Barbara Coombs Lee, chief sponsor of the
assisted-suicide ballot measure, known as
the Death With Dignity Act, and
president of Compassion in Dying, an
organization based in Portland.
Many other Oregonians were
contemplating applying for approval,
James Romney, 56, is one. Mr. Romney
was a high school principal in Clackamas,
Ore., until last June, when his
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or Lou
Gehrig's disease, was diagnosed.
Doctors have told Mr. Romney he had
from eight months to two and a half years
to live, so he has not yet applied for any
lethal drugs but he had planned to at some
point.
"I was devastated, totally shocked," by Mr.
Ashcroft's announcement, Mr. Romney
said today at the office of Compassion in
Dying, where he went to sign a legal
motion in support of the state's lawsuit.
"It set me back, it took away all my sense
of liberty," he said. "Believe me, just
knowing that this is an available option is
very liberating for a person with my
condition, and they're trying to take it
away from me."
Mr. Holmes, who lives in suburban
Portland, said he still was not sure that he
would in the end take lethal medication.
Many Oregonians have obtained such
drugs under the law but then died of
natural causes without ingesting them.
Still, he said he had taken comfort in
knowing that assisted suicide was an
option.
"I've lived life pretty much as I've wanted
to, and I feel I should be able to end it
that way if I need to," said Mr. Holmes,
who said he had discussed physician-
assisted suicide with his son, who is a
physician's assistant, and his brother, who
is a doctor. Both support the concept.
"I could do myself in in a lot of other
ways," said Mr. Holmes, who is beginning
to feel some pain from the cancer that has
spread to his liver from his colon, and he
receives hospice care at his home. "I've
got three guns in the house. But that's too
violent. It's too scary."
Opponents of the law argue that taking
one's own life is an extreme and
unjustified act.
"We can take care of pain and depression
and anxiety in Oregon like they can in the
other 49 states without giving assisted
suicide to our patients," said Dr. Greg
Hamilton, a spokesman for a group here
called Physicians for Compassionate Care.
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But Mr. Holmes, not expecting any
miracles, wants the security he says the
law provides.
"I certainly believe there are miracles," he
said today, tugging at his gray beard.
"A liver transplant is a miracle," he said.
"When you wake up feeling so good after
you've felt so badly for so long. So I've
had a miracle. But I've also had enough
medical diagnoses to know this, that my
days are numbered."
Copyright @ 2001 The New York Times
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United States v. Haney
Ruling Below: (United States v. Haney, 10' Cr., 264 F.3d 1161, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis
19324, 2001 Colo. J. C.A.R 4447)
On appeal, defendant asserted that 18 U.S.C.S. 5 922(o), a statute regulating to possession of
automatic weapons, violated both U.S. Const. amend. II and the Commerce Clause, U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8. The court noted that U.S. Const. amend. II guarantees no right to keep and
bear a firearm that does not have some reasonable relationship to the preservation of a well
regulated militia and that a federal criminal gun-control law does not violate U.S. Const.
amend. II unless it impairs the state's ability to maintain a well-regulated militia. Accordingly,
because defendant did not argue that the viability of the state militias would be undermined,
the court concluded that 922(o) was facially constitutional. Second, the court found that 5
922(o) was a valid enactment under the Commerce Cause holding, inter alia, that banning
possession of post-1986 machineguns was an essential part of the federal scheme to regulate
interstate commerce in dangerous weapons and that even purely intrastate possession and
transfers of machineguns have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
John Lee HANEY, Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Tenth Circuit
Writ of Certiorari Denied: Haney v. United States
2002 U.S. Lexis 4266 (U.S. June 10, 2002)
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
John Lee Haney was convicted of
possessing two machineguns in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). On appeal, he
asserts that § 922(o) violates the Second
Amendment and the Commerce Cause.
Both arguments are foreclosed by
controlling Tenth Circuit precedent. See
United States v. Baer, 235 F.3d 561, 564
(10th Cir. 2000) (Second Amendment);
United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1521
(10th Cir. 1995) (Commerce Cause).
BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are essentially
undisputed. John Lee Haney walked into a
police station, engaged an officer in
conversation, and told him that he owned
semiautomatic and fully automatic guns.
He stated that they were not licensed and
that the federal government lacks
authority to require him to get a license.
Through a combination of Haney's
consent and a warrant, the authorities
found two fully automatic guns in Haney's
car and house. Haney also had literature
on how to convert a semiautomatic gun to
a fully automatic gun. Haney had
converted one of the guns himself and
had constructed the other out of parts. He
admitted possessing them.
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Haney was indicted for possessing two
machineguns in violation of § 922(o). He
proceeded to a jury trial, was found guilty,
and was sentenced to thirty-three months'
impnsonment.
DISCUSSION
The district court had jurisdiction under
18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. 5 1291. We review
constitutional challenges to statutes de
novo. United States v. Hampshire, 95
F.3d 999, 1001 (10th Cir. 1996).
I. Second Amendment
The Second Amendment reads, "A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed." Haney argues that by
banning possession of machineguns, 5
922(o) infringes his right to keep and bear
arms and hence violates the Second
Amendment. We reject this contention as
inconsistent with governing case law.
There are two twentieth-century Supreme
Court cases discussing the Second
Amendment
holdings. In
U.S. 174, 83
(1939), the
Amendment
prosecution
unregistered
the absence
in what appear to be
United States v. Miller, 307
L. Ed. 1206, 59 S. Ct. 816
Court rejected a Second
challenge to a criminal
for transporting an
firearm. The Court held, In
of any evidence tending to
show that possession or use of a 'shotgun
having a barrel of less than eighteen
inches in length' at this time has some
reasonable relationship to the preservation
or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we
cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such
an instrument...
In Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63
L. Ed. 2d 198, 100 S. Ct. 915 (1980), the
Court held that the laws prohibiting a
felon from possessing a firearm do not
violate the Due Process Clause. The Court
applied rational-basis scrutiny, noting that
the laws "are neither based upon
constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do
they trench upon any constitutionally
protected liberties." Id. at 65 n.8...
* * *
The purpose of the second amendment as
stated by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Miller was to preserve the
effectiveness and assure the continuation
of the state militia...
* * *
Consistent with these cases, we hold that a
federal criminal gun-control law does not
violate the Second Amendment unless it
impairs the state's ability to maintain a
well-regulated militia. This is simply a
straightforward reading of the text of the
Second Amendment. This reading is also
consistent with the overwhelming weight
of authority from the other circuits.
[Citations omitted.]
Applying this standard, it is clear that 5
922(o) is facially constitutional. Section
922(o)(2)(A) sets forth a specific
exemption for possession of a
machinegun "under the authority of" a
state; therefore, that section cannot impair
the state's ability to maintain a well-
regulated militia. Accord Wright, 117 F.3d
at 1274 n.19. Haney does not contend that
his possession of the machineguns at issue
in this case was under the authority of
Oklahoma.
Nor has Haney proven several facts
logically necessary to establish a Second
Amendment violation. As a threshold
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matter, he must show that (1) he is part of
a state militia; (2) the militia, and his
participation therein, is "well regulated" by
the state; (3) machineguns are used by that
militia; and (4) his possession of the
machinegun was reasonably connected to
his militia service. None of these are
established.
The militia of the Second Amendment is a
governmental organization: The
Constitution elsewhere refers to "the
Militia of the several States," Art. II, § 2,
and divides regulatory authority over the
militia between the federal and state
governments, Art. I, 5 8. See also Perpich
v. Dep't of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 345-46,
110 L. Ed. 2d 312, 110 S. Ct. 2418 (1990)
(describing the "dual enlistment"
provisions of the militia statutes). Thus,
the militia does not include the private
anti-government groups that sometimes
refer to themselves as "militias." Haney is
not part of the "well regulated" militia,
that is, a "militia actively maintained and
trained by the states," Wright, 117 F.3d at
1272. At best, Haney claims to be a
member of the "unorganized" (and
therefore not a "well regulated" state)
militia...
In sum, 992(o) does not impair the
state's ability to maintain a well-regulated
militia and therefore does not violate the
Second Amendment.
II. Commerce Clause
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution
grants Congress the power "to regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States."
Under this Commerce Cause, Congress
may regulate three broad categories of
activities:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the
channels of interstate commerce. Second,
Congress is empowered to regulate and
protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the
threat may come only from intrastate
activities. Finally, Congress' commerce
authority includes the power to regulate
those activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those
activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-
59, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995) (citations omitted).
Haney argues that 5 922(o) exceeds
Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause by regulating purely intrastate
activity. We note at the outset that all of
the courts of appeals that have addressed
this issue have upheld § 922(o) as a valid
enactment under the Commerce Clause.
[The court cites cases from the 2 nd, 5t, 6t,
7th 8 t, 1 0  1 1th and D.C. Circuit courts.]
Unlike 5 922(q), S 922(o) embodies a
proper exercise of Congress' power to
regulate "things in interstate commerce"
i.e., machineguns. Whereas § 922(q)
sought to regulate an activity which by its
nature was purely intrastate and could not
substantially affect commerce even when
incidents of those activities were
aggregated together, § 922(o) regulates
machineguns, which by their nature are a
commodity transferred across state lines
for profit by business entities. The
interstate flow of machineguns not only
has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, it is interstate commerce.
Section 922(o) regulates this extensive,
intricate, and definitively national market
for machineguns by prohibiting the
transfer and possession of machineguns
manufactured after May 19, 1986. As
such, 922(o) represents Congressional
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regulation of an item bound up with
interstate attributes and thus differs in
substantial respect from legislation
concerning possession of a firearm within
a purely local school zone. Wilks, 58 F.3d
at 1521 (citations, quotation marks, and
alterations omitted).
A. Things in Interstate Commerce
Wilks holds that machineguns are
inherently "things in interstate commerce
and therefore may be regulated under the
second Lopez category. We reject Haney's
argument that Willis has been undermined
by recent Supreme Court cases. United
States v. Morrison discussed only the third
Lopez category, not the second category
relied upon in Wilks...
B. Activities That Substantially Affect
Interstate Commerce
Moreover, we believe § 922(o) can also
properly be sustained under the third
Lopez category as regulating activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.
Indeed, Wilks suggested this basis too in
relying on the "extensive, intricate, and
definitively national market for
machineguns" and noting that
machineguns "by their nature are a
commodity transferred across state lines
for profit by business entities." 58 F.3d at
1521. We are guided in this approach by
the Supreme Court's recent decisions in
Lopez and Morrison.
Lopez invalidated 18 U.S.C. 5 922(q),
which criminalized possession of a firearm
in a school zone, finding that such
possession is in no sense an econonic
activity that might, through repetition
elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of
interstate commerce." 514 U.S. at 567.
Morrison similarly struck down 42 U.S.C.
13981, a provision of the Violence
Against Women Act that created a federal
civil remedy for gender- motivated
violence. The Supreme Court refused to
allow Congress to regulate "noneconomic,
violent criminal conduct based solely on
that conduct's aggregate effect on
interstate commerce." 529 U.S. at 617.
Both Lopez and Morrison reaffirmed,
however, that "where economic activity
substantially affects interstate commerce,
legislation regulating that activity will be
sustained." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560; see
also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610. The Lopez
Court also suggested that a statute would
be sustained if it was "an essential part of
a larger regulation of economic activity, in
which the regulatory scheme could be
undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated. " 514 U.S. at 561...
1. Essential Part of a Regulatory Scheme
We hold that banning possession of post-
1986 machineguns is an essential part of
the federal scheme to regulate interstate
commerce in dangerous weapons.
Congress has found that "firearms and
ammunition move easily in interstate
commerce," § 922(q)(1)(C), and has
therefore taken numerous steps to
regulate these transactions...
But focusing on weapons only as they
move in interstate commerce has not been
effective to curb the interstate flow of
these weapons. Rather, Congress has
found it necessary also to regulate
intrastate activities as a way of addressing
the interstate market in machineguns.
Similar statutes regulate intrastate
possession of other extremely dangerous
devices such as biological weapons, 18
U.S.C. 5 175(a), nuclear material, 18
U.S.C. 5 831(a), and semiautomatic assault
weapons, 18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(1)...
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Because of the ease of moving weapons
across state and national lines, Congress
has rationally concluded that it cannot rely
on the states to control the market in
these devices by themselves [... ]
2. Economic Activity Substantially
Affecting Interstate Commerce
The third Lopez category allowing
regulation of intrastate economic activity
requires that such activity have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.
We agree with the majority of circuits that,
after Morrison, have concluded
"economic activity" should be read
broadly to include activities that are
closely linked to commercial transactions.
Cf. Groome Res., 234 F.3d 192, 208;
United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 262
(3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 149 L. Ed. 2d
467, 121 S. Ct. 1600 (2001); Gibbs v.
Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 491 (4th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1081 (2001).
Possession of an illegal machinegun is
closely linked to the commercial
transaction of transferring an illegal
machinegun. It is unlike possession of a
gun in a school zone, which restricts only
the location in which a transfer could take
place by restricting gun possession at that
location, and therefore it has a more
attenuated connection to commercial
transactions. Cf. Navegar, 192 F.3d at
1059 ("Manufacture, transfer and
possession are activities that not only
substantially affect interstate commerce . .
. but are also the necessary predicates to
such commerce."). We conclude that 5
922(o) is "economic activity" for purposes
of the third Lopez category.
Even purely intrastate possession and
transfers of machineguns have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.
As noted above, Congress has concluded
that regulating intrastate possession and
transfers is necessary to control the
interstate market in these weapons.
Moreover, Congress has found that the
interstate market itself is significant. It
follows that intrastate possession and
transfers have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.
Although there is virtually no legislative
history explaining 5 922(o) itself, see
Wilks, 58 F.3d at 1519, we find support
for the rationality of these conclusions in
the legislative history of § 922(v), which
bans manufacturing, transferring, or
possessing certain semiautomatic assault
weapons. To restrict interstate commerce
in semiautomatic assault weapons,
particularly into states that prohibit them,
Congress "imposed criminal liability for
those activities which fuel the supply and
demand for such weapons. The ban on
possession is a measure intended to
reduce the demand for semiautomatic
assault weapons." Navegar, 192 F.3d at
1058 (quotation marks omitted). After
surveying the extensive congressional
testimony on how common it was for
individuals to purchase semiautomatic
assault weapons in one state and bring
them to another, the Navegar court
concluded that "Congress was well aware
that there was significant interstate traffic
in semiautomatic assault weapons and that
state laws and existing federal firearms
regulation were inadequate to control the
flow of these weapons across state lines."
Id. at 1060. It likewise is rational for
Congress to conclude that intrastate
machinegun possession substantially
affects interstate commerce in those
weapons.
CONCLUSION
We hold that 18 U.S.C. 5 922(o) is
constitutional and does not violate either
the Second Amendment or the Commerce
Cause, and therefore we AFFIRM
Haney's conviction.
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United States v. Emerson
Ruling Below: (United States v. Emerson, 5"' Cir., 270 F.3d 203, 2001 US. App. Lexis 22386)
In divorce proceedings, a Texas judge issued a temporary order which enjoined the husband
from, among other things, threatening his wife or causing bodily injury to her or their child. It
did not include an express finding that the husband posed a future danger to anyone. Later the
husband was indicted for unlawfully possessing a firearm while subject to the order, in violation
of 18 U.S.C.S. § 9 2 2(g)(8). The court held that under Texas law, such an order could not have
been properly issued unless the issuing court concluded, based on adequate evidence at a
hearing, that the party restrained would have otherwise posed a realistic threat of imminent
physical injury to the protected party. In such a case, the court concluded that the nexus between
firearm possession by the husband and the threat of lawless violence, was sufficient, though
likely barely so, to support the deprivation, while the order remained in effect, of the husband's
Second Amendment rights.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
Timothy Joe EMERSON, Defendant-Appellee
United States Court of Appeals
For the Fifth Circuit
Decided October 16, 2001
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
The United States appeals the district
court's dismissal of the indictment of
Defendant- Appellee Dr. Timothy Joe
Emerson (Emerson) for violating 18
U.S.C. 5 922(g)(8)(C)(ii). The district court
held that section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) was
unconstitutional on its face under the
Second Amendment and as applied to
Emerson under the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. We reverse and
remand.
Facts and Proceedings Below
[On August 28, 1998, Sacha Emerson,
Emerson's wife, filed a petition for
divorce.]
On September 14, 1998, Judge Sutton
issued a temporary order that included a
"Temporary Injunction" which stated that
Emerson "is enjoined from" engaging in
any of twenty-two enumerated acts,
including [threatening the petitioner.]
On December 8, 1998, the grand jury for
the Northern District of Texas, San
Angelo division, returned a five-count
indictment against Emerson [including an
allegation] that Emerson on November
16, 1998, unlawfully possessed "in and
affecting interstate commerce" a firearm, a
Beretta pistol, while subject to the above
mentioned September 14, 1998 order, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 5 922(g)(8)...
Emerson moved pretrial to dismiss the
indictment, asserting that section
9 2 2(g)(8), facially and as applied to him,
violates the Second Amendment and the
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Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. He also moved to dismiss
on the basis that section 9 22(g)(8) was an
improper exertion of federal power under
the Commerce Clause and that, in any
case, the law unconstitutionally usurps
powers reserved to the states by the Tenth
Amendment. An evidentiary hearing was
held on Emerson's motion to dismiss.
The district court granted Emerson's
motions to dismiss... The government
appealed, [challenging] the district court's
dismissal on Second and Fifth
Amendment grounds. Emerson defends
the district court's dismissal on those
grounds and also urges that dismissal was
in any event proper under the Commerce
Clause and on statutory grounds.
II. Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment
The district court held that prosecution
for violating section 922(g)(8) would
deprive Emerson of his Fifth Amendment
right to Due Process because: 1) Dr.
Emerson did not know that possession of
a firearm while being subject to the
September 14, 1998 order was a crime; 2)
section 9 22(g)( 8) is an "obscure criminal
provision" that would be difficult for
Emerson to discover; 3) there is nothing
inherently evil about possessing a firearm;
and 4) Emerson had no reason to suspect
that being subject to the September 14,
1998 order would criminalize otherwise
lawful behavior. Unitai Stat u Ermson; 46
F. Supp. 2d 598, 611-13. [We disagree.]
[T]here is no question that Emerson was
aware that on November 16, 1998, he
actively possessed a firearm of the kind
covered by the statute while subject to the
September 14, 1998 order or that he
misapprehended the actual contents of
that order.
The court noted that Emerson filled out
and signed BATF Form 4473 when, on
October 10, 1997, he purchased the
Beretta semi-automatic pistol referred to
in Count 1. [This form made clear that] so
long as he was under a court order such as
that of September 14, 1998, federal law
prohibited his continued possession of
that weapon.
III. Commerce Clause
The district court rejected Emerson's
contention that, in enacting section
922(g)(8), Congress exceeded its power
under the Commerce Clause. As the
district court noted, this Court has held
that, because section 922(g)(8) only
criminalizes the possession of firearms or
ammunition "in or affecting commerce
and the reception of firearms that have
been "shipped or transported in interstate
or foreign commerce", Congress did not
exceed its Article I, Section 8 powers in
enacting it. Unted Stata u Pieson, 139 F.3d
501, 503 (5th Cir.), cert. denial 525 U.S.
896, 119 S. Ct. 220, 142 L. Ed. 2d 181
(1998). Accordingly, the district court, as
bound by this precedent as we are, did not
err in denying Emerson's motion to
dismiss the indictment on Commerce
Clause grounds.
IV. Tenth Amendment
The district court held that congressional
enactment of section 9 22(g)(8) did not
violate the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution. Finding no reference to this
issue in Emerson's brief to this Court, we
must consider his Tenth Amendment
claim abandoned.
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V. Second Amendment
The Second Amendment provides:
"A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear arms, shall
not be infringed."
* * *
B. StamDecisis and Unitl States u Miller
The government steadfastly maintains that
the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S. Ct. 816,
83 L. Ed. 1206 (1939), mandated
acceptance of the collective rights or
sophisticated collective rights model, and
rejection of the individual rights or
standard model, as a basis for
construction of the Second Amendment.
We disagree.
* * *
We believe it is entirely clear that the
Supreme Court decided Miller on the basis
of the government's secoWnd argument-that a
"shotgun having a barrel of less than
eighteen inches in length" as stated in the
National Firearms Act is not (or cannot
merely be assumed to be) one of the
"Arms" which the Second Amendment
prohibits infringement of the right of the
people to keep and bear-and not on the
basis of the government's first argument
[that the Second Amendment rights are
limited to "militias or some other military
organization."]
** *
Nowhere in the Court's Miller opinion is
there any reference to the fact that the
indictment does not remotely suggest that
either of the two defendants was ever a
member of any organized, active militia,
such as the National Guard, much less
that either was engaged (or about to be
engaged) in any actual military service or
training of such a militia unit when
transporting the sawed-off shotgun from
Oklahoma into Arkansas. Had the lack of
such membership or engagement been a
ground of the decision in Miller, the
Court's opinion would obviously have
made mention of it. But it did not...
Nor do we believe that any other portion
of the Miller opinion supports the
sophisticated collective rights model.
We conclude that Miller does not support
the government's collective rights or
sophisticated collective rights approach to
the Second Amendment... We turn,
therefore, to an analysis of history and
wording of the Second Amendment for
guidance...
C. Text
We begin construing the Second
Amendment by examining its text: "[a]
well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
1. Substantive Guarantee
a. "People"
The states rights model requires the word
"people" to be read as though it were
"States" or "States respectively." This
would also require a corresponding
change in the balance of the text to
something like "to provide for the militia
to keep and bear arms." That is not only
far removed from the actual wording of
the Second Amendment, but also would
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be in substantial tension with Art. 1, § 8,
Cl. 16 (Congress has the power "To
provide for ... arming . . . the militia. .
For the sophisticated collective rights
model to be viable, the word "people"
must be read as the words "members of a
select militia". The individual rights
model, of course, does not require that
any special or unique meaning be
attributed to the word "people." It gives
the same meaning to the words "the
people" as used in the Second
Amendment phrase "the right of the
people" as when used in the exact same
phrase in the contemporaneously
submitted and ratified First and Fourth
Amendments.
There is no evidence in the text of the
Second Amendment, or any other part of
the Constitution, that the words "the
people" have a different connotation
within the Second Amendment than when
employed elsewhere in the Constitution.
In fact, the text of the Constitution, as a
whole, strongly suggests that the words
"the people" have precisely the same
meaning within the Second Amendment
as without. And, as used throughout the
Constitution, "the people" have "rights"
and "powers," but federal and state
governments only have "powers" or
"authority", never "rights." Moreover, the
Constitution's text likewise recognizes not
only the difference between the "militia"
and "the people" but also between the
"militia" which has not been "called forth"
and "the militia, when in actual service."
It appears clear that "the people," as used
in the Constitution, including the Second
Amendment, refers to individual
Americans.
b. "Bear Arms"-
Proponents of the states' rights and
sophisticated collective rights models
argue that the phrase "bear arms" only
applies to a member of the militia carrying
weapons during actual militia service.
Champions of the individual rights model
opine that "bear arms" refers to any
carrying of weapons, whether by a soldier
or a civilian. There is no question that the
phrase "bear arms" may be used to refer
to the carrying of arms by a soldier or
militiaman. The issue is whether "bear
arms" was also commonly used to refer to
the carrying of arms by a civilian.
The best evidence that "bear arms" was
primarily used to refer to military
situations comes from Ayntte v State, 2
Humph., Tenn. 154 (1840), a prosecution
for carrying a concealed bowie knife. The
Supreme Court of Tennessee, in
construing section 26 of its declaration of
rights, providing that "the free white men
of this State have a right to keep and bear
arms for their common defence," stated...
Here we know that the phrase has a
military sense, and no other, and we must
infer that it is used in the same way in the
26th section, which secures to the citizen
the right to bear arms...
Unlike the Tennessee constitution at issue
in Ayrte, the Second Amendment has no
"for their common defence" language...
Amici supporting the government also
cite other examples of state constitutional
provisions allowing a conscientious
objector to be excused from the duty of
bearing arms if he pays an equivalent so
that another can serve in his place.
However, there are numerous instances of
the phrase "bear arms" being used to
describe a civilian's carrying of arms. Early
constitutional provisions or declarations
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of rights in at least some ten different
states speak of the right of the "people"
[or "citizen" or "citizens"] "to bear arms in
defense of themselves [or "himself"] and
the state," or equivalent words, thus
indisputably reflecting that under
common usage "bear arms" was in no
sense restricted to bearing arms in military
service. And such provisions were
enforced on the basis that the right to
bear arms was nct restricted to bearing
arms during actual military service. See
Bliss u Carmuealth, 13 Am. Dec. 251, 12
Ky. 90 (Ky. 1822).
We conclude that the phrase "bear arms"
refers generally to the carrying or wearing
of arms. It is certainly proper to use the
phrase in reference to the carrying or
wearing of arms by a soldier or
militiaman; thus, the context in which
"bear arms" appears may indicate that it
refers to a military situation, e.g. the
conscientious objector clauses cited by
amici supporting the government.
However, amici's argument that "bear
arms" was exclusively, or even usually,
used to only refer to the carrying or
wearing of arms by a soldier or militiaman
must be rejected. The appearance of "bear
Arms" in the Second Amendment accords
fully with the plain meaning of the subject
of the substantive guarantee, "the people,"
and offers no support for the proposition
that the Second Amendment applies only
during periods of actual military service or
only to those who are members of a select
militia...
c. "Keep ... Arms"
Neither the government nor amici argue
that "keep ... Arms" commands a military
connotation. The plain meaning of the
right of the people to keep arms is that it
is an individual, rather than a collective,
right and is not limited to keeping arms
while engaged in active military service or
as a member of a select militia such as the
National Guard.
d. Substantive Guarantee as a Whole
Taken as a whole, the text of the Second
Amendment's substantive guarantee is not
suggestive of a collective rights or
sophisticated collective rights
interpretation, and the implausibility of
either such interpretation is enhanced by
consideration of the guarantee's
placement within the Bill of Rights and
the wording of the other articles thereof
and of the original Constitution as a
whole.
2. Effect of Preamble
We turn now to the Second Amendment's
preamble: "A well-regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State."
And, we ask ourselves whether this
preamble suffices to mandate what would
be an otherwise implausible collective
rights or sophisticated collective rights
interpretation of the amendment. We
conclude that it does not.
Certainly, the preamble implies that the
substantive guarantee is one which tends
to enable, promote or further the
existence, continuation or effectiveness of
that "well-regulated Militia" which is
"necessary to the security of a free State."
As the Court said in Miller, immediately
after quoting the militia clauses of Article
I, 5 8 (cl. 15 and 16), "with obvious
purpose to assure the continuation and
render possible the effectiveness of such
forces the declaration and guarantee of
the Second Amendment were made."
Id.,59 S. Ct. at 818. We conclude that the
Second Amendment's substantive
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guarantee, read as guaranteeing individual
rights, may as so read reasonably be
understood as being a guarantee which
tends to enable, promote or further the
existence, continuation or effectiveness of
that "well-regulated Militia" which is
"necessary to the security of a free
State...
In sum, to give the Second Amendment's
preamble its full and proper due there is
no need to torture the meaning of its
substantive guarantee into the collective
rights or sophisticated collective rights
model which is so plainly inconsistent
with the substantive guarantee's text, its
placement within the bill of rights and the
wording of the other articles thereof and
of the original Constitution as a whole.
D. History
1. Introduction
Turning to the history of the Second
Amendment's adoption, we find nothing
inconsistent with the conclusion that as
ultimately proposed by Congress and
ratified by the states it was understood
and intended in accordance with the
individual rights model as set out above.
E. Second Amendment protects individual
rights
We reject the collective rights and
sophisticated collective rights models for
interpreting the Second Amendment. We
hold, consistent with Miller, that it
protects the right of individuals, including
those not then actually a member of any
militia or engaged in active military service
or training, to privately possess and bear
their own firearms, such as the pistol
involved here, that are suitable as
personal, individual weapons and are not
of the general kind or type excluded by
Miler. However, because of our holding
that section 922(g)(8), as applied to
Emerson, does not infringe his individual
rights under the Second Amendment we
will not now further elaborate as to the
exact scope of all Second Amendment
rights.
VI. Application to Emerson
The district court held that section
922(g)(8) was unconstitutionally
overbroad because it allows second
amendment rights to be infringed absent
any express judicial finding that the
person subject to the order posed a future
danger. In other words, the section
922(g)(8) threshold for deprivation of the
fundamental right to keep and bear arms
is too low.
Although, as we have held, the Second
Amendment does protect individual rights,
that does not mean that those rights may
never be made subject to any limited,
narrowly tailored specific exceptions or
restrictions for particular cases that are
reasonable and not inconsistent with the
right of Americans generally to
individually keep and bear their private
arms as historically understood in this
country. Indeed, Emerson does not
contend, and the district court did not
hold, otherwise. As we have previously
noted, it is clear that felons, infants and
those of unsound mind may be prohibited
from possessing firearms. See note 21,
supra. n62 Emerson's argument that his
Second Amendment rights have been
violated is grounded on the propositions
that the September 14, 1998 order
contains no express finding that he
represents a credible threat to the physical
safety of his wife (or child), that the
evidence before the court issuing the
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order would not sustain such a finding
and that the provisions of the order
bringing it within clause (Q(ii) of section
922(g)(8) were no more than uncontested
boiler-plate. In essence, Emerson, and the
district court, concede that had the order
contained an express finding, on the basis
of adequate evidence, that Emerson
actually posed a credible threat to the
physical safety of his wife, and had that
been a genuinely contested matter at the
hearing, with the parties and the court
aware of section 922(g)(8), then Emerson
could, consistent with the Second
Amendment, be precluded from
possessing a firearm while he remained
subject to the order.
Though we are concerned with the lack of
express findings in the order, and with the
absence of any requirement for same in
clause (q(ii) of section 922(g)(8), we are
ultimately unpersuaded by Emerson's
argument. Section 922(g)(8)(A) requires an
actual hearing with prior notice and an
opportunity to participate, and section
922(g)(8)(C)(ii) requires that the order
"explicitly" prohibit the use (actual,
threatened or attempted) of physical force
that would reasonably be expected to
cause bodily injury. Congress legislated
against the background of the almost
universal rule of American law that for a
temporary injunction to issue:
"There must be a likelihood that irreparable
harm will occur. Speculative injury is not
sufficient; there must be more than an
unfounded fear on the part of the
applicant. Thus, a preliminary injunction
will not be issued simply to prevent the
possibility of some remote future injury.
A pnsendy existing actual threat nmt be
shoun... [Citations omitted.]
We conclude that essentially the same
standards are applicable to orders, such as
the September 14, 1998 order here, issued
under Texas Family Code 5 6.502, which
provides that in a pending divorce
proceeding "after notice and hearing, the
court may render an appropriate order,
including the granting of a temporary
injunction for ... protection of the parties
as deemed necessary . . . including an
order directed to one or both parties ...
prohibiting an act described by Section
6.501(a)." Section 6.501(a), dealing with
temporary restraining orders in divorce
proceedings, authorizes orders
"prohibiting one or both parties from: ...
(2) threatening the other, by telephone or
in writing, to take unlawful action against
any person, intending by this action to
annoy or alarm the other; . . . (4)
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
causing bodily injury to the other or to a
child of either party, (5) threatening the
other or a child of either party with
imminent bodily injury, . . ." The
predecessor statute to section 6.502 has
been construed as requiring a showing of
"reasonable necessity" for the temporary
injunction, including a showing of "a
probable injury." See Flone u Floene, 388
S.W.2d 220, 223-24 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1965).
We are also somewhat troubled by the
unavailability of review by direct appeal of
interlocutory orders under section 6.502.
See Texas Family Code 5 6.507. However,
appellate court review is available by
mandamus under an "abuse of discretion"
standard. Wdlacw v Bngg, 162 Tex. 485,
348 S.W.2d 523, 527 (Tex. 1961)...
In light of the foregoing, we cannot say
that section 922(g)(8)(q(ii)'s lack of a
requirement for an explicit, express
credible threat finding by the court issuing
the order-of itself or together with
appellate court review being available
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(prior to final judgment) only by
mandamus-renders that section infirm
under the Second Amendment. The
presence of such an explicit finding would
likely furnish sonw additional indication
that the issuing court properly considered
the matter, but such findings can be as
much "boilerplate" or in error as any
other part of such an order.
As to Emerson's contention that the
evidence before the court issuing the
September 14, 1998 order was insufficient
to show that he posed a credible threat to
the physical safety of his wife or child, we
conclude that under these circumstances
Lews v Unit State, 445 U.S. 55, 100 S.
Ct. 915, 63 L. Ed. 2d 198 (1980) and our
decision in United State Chanivs, 922
F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1991), each discussed
in part I hereof above, necessarily
preclude the court in the section 922(g)(8)
prosecution from that sort of collateral
review of the validity of the particular
section 922(g)(8) predicate order, at least
where, as we hold to be the case here, the
order is not so "transparently invalid" as
to have "only a frivolous pretense to
validity." See Chanien at 239.
of the general kind or type excluded by
MdIer, regardless of whether the particular
individual is then actually a member of a
militia. However, for the reasons stated,
we also conclude that the predicate order
in question here is sufficient, albeit likely
minimally so, to support the deprivation,
while it remains in effect, of the
defendant's Second Amendment rights.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's
dismissal of the indictment on Second
Amendment grounds.
Appendix omitted.
Concurring opinion omitted.
VII. Conclusion
Error has not been demonstrated in the
district court's refusal to dismiss the
indictment on commerce clause grounds.
For the reasons stated, we reverse the
district court's order granting the motion
to dismiss the indictment under the Fifth
Amendment.
We agree with the district court that the
Second Amendment protects the right of
individuals to privately keep and bear their
own firearms that are suitable as
individual, personal weapons and are not
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Supreme Court Sidesteps Gun-control Cases,
Lower Courts to Weigh Personal Right to Bear Arms
The Boston Globe
June 11, 2002
Lyle Denniston
The Supreme Court voted yesterday to
remain on the sidelines of constitutional
dueling over the Second Amendment,
leaving it to lower courts to be the first to
react to the Bush administration's new
argument in favor of a limited personal
right to have guns.
Without commenting on the issue, the
justices refused to review two recent
appellate court rulings: one asserting that
"the right to keep and bear arms"
specified in the Second Amendment is
sometimes an individual right; the other
upholding the traditional view of federal
courts that there is no personal right to
have guns.
The court, at least temporarily, left the
constitutional debate unresolved, as it has
stood for the past several years. Although
one member of the Supreme Court,
Justice Clarence Thomas, suggested five
years ago that the court might want to
reopen the question of the amendment's
scope, there was no indication that he or
any other justice had voted to hear either
of the new cases. The last time the
Supreme Court spoke on the question was
1939. It said then that the Second
Amendment only assures the government
the authority to provide arms for a state
militia, such as the National Guard of
modem times.
But that 63-year-old opinion was opaque
enough that the National Rifle
Association, a number of legal scholars,
and, most recently, the Bush
administration have found what they see
as an opening to argue that history
supports an individual's right to possess a
gun.
For decades, the Justice Department
rejected that position. Then, in May,
Attorney General John D. Ashcroft wrote
the NRA and announced that the Bush
administration was shifting to a personal-
rights interpretation of the amendment.
Ashcroft notified federal prosecutors of
that switch last November.
Ashcroft's legal team began pressing the
new position in court for the first time a
month ago, notifying the justices in the
two new cases, one from Texas, the other
from Oklahoma. Department lawyers said
the administration now believes that the
amendment "protects the rights of
individuals, including persons who are not
members of any military . . . to possess
and bear their own firearms, subject to
reasonable restnictions."
That phrasing is close to the key language
used in an opinion last October by the
Fifth US Circuit Court of Appeals based
in New Orleans, when it became the first
federal appeals court to declare that the
right to have guns is not confined to the
militia, but is a "right of individuals to
possess and bear their own arms . . .
suitable as personal, individual weapons,"
subject to reasonable restnctions.
That ruling cleared the way for trial of a
San Angelo, Texas, doctor on charges that
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he had a pistol when he was under a court
order barring him from threatening his
estranged wife and their daughter. Federal
law makes individuals under such
restraining orders ineligible to have guns.
The doctor, Timothy Joe Emerson, a gun
collector who had more than 30 weapons,
argued that the Second Amendment
shielded him from prosecution. The
appeals court, while recognizing a
personal right, said that the amendment
was not violated in Emerson's case,
because there was a clear need to keep
guns away from those who pose "a
credible threat" to others.
That decision's recognition of an
individual right in some circumstances
contrasts with rulings that have come
from every other federal appeals court
over the past several decades, including
the 10th US Circuit Court of Appeals
based in Denver, which decided the
Oklahoma case last August.
The Denver-based court said that a gun-
control law does not violate the Second
Amendment "unless it impairs the state's
ability to maintain a well-regulated
militia." The militia, it added, is "a
governmental organization," not
individuals possessing their own guns.
That decision upheld the conviction and
33-month prison term of a Duncan, Okla.,
man, John Lee Haney, for illegal
possession of machine guns. Federal law
bans individuals from possessing machine
guns. Haney sought to test his claim of a
Second Amendment right by walking into
a police station and announcing that he
had machine guns, contending that the
government could not prosecute him for
doing so. A jury convicted him.
Both Emerson in the Texas case and
Haney in the Oklahoma case took appeals
to the Supreme Court, arguing that their
prosecutions violated the Second
Amendment. Although the Justice
Department used their cases to advance
its new view of that amendment, it did
urge the justices to bypass both appeals,
saying the Texas case was premature
because it had not gone to trial and that
the Oklahoma case involved machine
guns, a kind of weapon that it argued no
individual has a right to possess.
Gun rights have become an active issue in
federal and state courts in recent years,
and appear likely to continue in dispute.
Alan Gottlieb, founder of the Second
Amendment Foundation, a gun-rights
group based in Bellevue, Wash., said:
"This issue is never going to go away.
People who want to eradicate the right to
have guns will never let go." But, he
added, "our position is stronger than it
has been in decades."
On the other side of the debate, Mathew
Nosunchuk, litigation director of the
Washington-based gun-control group, the
Violence Policy Center, praised the court.
He added: "This is a victory for public
safety and security, and a defeat for the
National Rifle Association and gun
criminals."
Copyright 0 2002 Globe Newspaper
Company
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Court Says That Individuals Have a Right to Own Guns;
Law: The Appellate Ruling Holds That the 2nd Amendment Goes Beyond the Issue
of State Militias.
Los Angeles Times
October 17, 2001
David G. Savage
A federal court of appeals, in a victory for
gun owners, ruled for the first time
Tuesday that the 2nd Amendment gives
individuals a constitutional right to
"privately possess and bear their own
firearms."
The decision, in a closely watched Texas
case, contradicts a long line of rulings that
had dismissed the 2nd Amendment as
archaic and insignificant. These earlier
decisions said the 18th-century
amendment merely protected the state's
right to maintain a "well-regulated militia."
But the National Rifle Assn. and its
lawyers have continued to insist that the
"right of the people to keep and bear
arms" protects gun owners today. They
say that the authors of the Constitution
intended the 2nd Amendment's right to
bear arms to stand on the same basis as
the 1st Amendment's rights to freedom of
speech and religion.
Over the last decade, many legal scholars
have taken a fresh look at the history of
the 2nd Amendment and come away
agreeing with the NRA's basic view.
Tuesday, these gun advocates and
historians finally won the endorsement of
legal opinion by a U.S. appellate court.
"We find that the history of the 2nd
Amendment reinforces the plain meaning
of its text, namely that it protects
individual Americans in their right to keep
and bear arms whether or not they are a
member of a select militia," wrote Judge
William Garwood for the U.S. 5th Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The ruling is sure to bolster the claims of
the NRA and others who say the
government cannot bar law-abiding
citizens from having firearms. In the
District of Columbia, for example, it is
generally illegal to own a handgun.
However, even gun-rights advocates
concede that the right to bear arms, just
like the right to free speech, has its limits.
In the Texas case decided Tuesday, the
judges who endorsed gun rights
nonetheless upheld a 1994 law that was
used to take away a pistol from a divorced
Texas physician who was said to pose a
"credible threat" to his ex-wife.
In 1998, Dr. Timothy Joe Emerson was
indicted for possessing a Beretta pistol in
violation of a judge's order. During
divorce proceedings, his ex-wife reported
that when she went to his office, the
doctor had pulled the gun from his desk
drawer.
Under a provision of the federal Violence
Against Women Act, the judge was
authorized to issue an order requiring that
the husband give up his personal weapons
until the divorce was final.
Emerson challenged the indictment and
the judge's order as unconstitutional
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because he had not committed a crime or
engaged in violence. A federal judge
agreed with him, citing the 2nd
Amendment.
That judge's decision sent the matter
before the U.S. Court of Appeals, which is
based in New Orleans. Arguments on the
question were heard more than a year ago,
and activists on both sides of the issue
had been anxiously awaiting the court's
decision.
Garwood, an appointee of former
President Ronald Reagan, was joined by
Judge Harold R. DeMoss Jr., an appointee
of former President George Bush.
The third judge in the appeals case,
Robert M. Parker, said his colleagues had
no need to opine on the meaning of the
2nd Amendment. They should have
upheld the indictment against Emerson
and stopped there, he said in a partial
dissent. Parker was appointed by former
President Bill Clinton.
Because of the mixed outcome, it is not
certain the U.S. Supreme Court will take
up an appeal in the case.
The practical effect of Tuesdays ruling is
also unclear. Gun-rights advocates
applauded the part of the opinion that
breathed life into the 2nd Amendment,
while gun-control advocates took heart
from the ruling that upheld a key part of
the Violence Against Women Act.
"This is ultimately a victory for us,
because it says domestic abusers don't
have a right to have guns," said Mathew
Nosanchuk, an attorney for the Violence
Policy Center, a gun-control group. "We
think the final score is, public safety one;
gun lobby and domestic abusers zero."
UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh,
who teaches the 2nd Amendment,
applauded the court's analysis of the right
to bear arms. "This is the first time a U.S.
Court of Appeals has recognized that the
2nd Amendment secures an individual
right. This also makes it more likely the
Supreme Court will have to confront this
issue soon," Volokh said.
In its history, the Supreme Court has said
surprisingly little about the 2nd
Amendment. It states: "A well regulated
militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear arms, shall not be infringed."
In 1939, the justices upheld a federal
indictment that charged two men with
carrying a sawed-off shotgun across state
lines. In a brief opinion in the case of U.S.
vs. Miller, the high court rejected their
claim based on the 2nd Amendment and
said this provision involved "well-
regulated militias," not gangsters and gun
runners.
Since then, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly turned away 2nd Amendment
claims. For that reason, most lawyers have
come to view the amendment as
essentially meaningless.
Only Justice Clarence Thomas has called
for taking a new look at the 2nd
Amendment, and Tuesdays ruling is likely
to spur more appeals on the issue.
George Mason University law professor
Daniel D. Polsby said the 5th Circuit's
ruling will probably be used to attack laws
in several communities that forbid
residents from legally owning handguns. It
may even spur new challenges to the
Brady Act, which sets a waiting period for
new buyers of handguns.
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U.S., in a Shift, Tells Justices Citizens Have a Right to Guns
The New York Times
May 8, 2002
Linda Greenhouse
Reversing decades of official government
policy on the meaning of the Second
Amendment, the Justice Department told
the Supreme Court for the first time late
Monday that the Constitution "broadly
protects the rights of individuals" to own
firearms.
The position, expressed in a footnote in
each of two briefs filed by Solicitor
General Theodore B. Olson, incorporated
the view that Attorney General John
Ashcroft expressed a year ago in a letter to
the National Rifle Association. Mr.
Ashcroft said that in contrast to the view
that the amendment protected only a
collective right of the states to organize
and maintain militias, he "unequivocally'
believed that "the text and the original
intent of the Second Amendment clearly
protect the right of individuals to keep
and bear firearms." It was not clear at the
time whether the letter to the rifle
association's chief lobbyist simply
expressed Mr. Ashcroft's long-held
personal opinion, or whether it marked a
departure in government policy and
possible challenge to Supreme Court
precedent. The court's view has been that
the the Second Amendment protects only
those rights that have "some reasonable
relationship to the preservation of
efficiency of a well regulated militia," as
the court put it in its last word on the
subject, a 1939 decision called United
States v. Miller.
But it became evident last fall that
Ashcroft did intend to set
government policy. In October,
federal appeals court in New Orleans,
saying it did not find the Miller decision
persuasive, declared that "the Second
Amendment does protect individual
rights," rights that nonetheless could be
subject to "limited, narrowly tailored
specific exceptions.
Mr. Ashcroft wrote all federal
prosecutors, calling their attention to the
decision in United States v. Emerson and
informing them that "in my view, the
Emerson opinion, and the balance it
strikes, generally reflect the correct
understanding of the Second
Amendment."
He told the prosecutors to inform the
department's criminal division of any case
that raised a Second Amendment question
so that the department could "coordinate
all briefing in those cases" and enforce
federal law "in a manner that heeds the
commands of the Constitution."
In the briefs it filed at the Supreme Court
after the close of business on Monday, the
solicitor general's office attached the
Ashcroft letter to the United States
attorneys and included the following
footnote to explain the new government
position:
"In its brief to the court of appeals, the
government argued that the Second
Amendment protects only such acts of
firearm possession as are reasonably
related to the preservation or efficiency of
the militia. The current position of the
United States, however, is that the Second
Mr.
new
the
583
Amendment more broadly protects the
rights of individuals, including persons
who are not members of any militia or
engaged in active military service or
training, to possess and bear their own
firearms, subject to reasonable restrictions
designed to prevent possession by unfit
persons or to restrict the possession of
types of firearms that are particularly
suited to criminal misuse."
While announcing the government's new
position, the briefs do not ask the court to
respond by taking any action itself. In
both cases, defendants charged with gun
offenses raised Second Amendment
defenses and appealed to the Supreme
Court. One is the Emerson case, now
called Emerson v. United States, No. 01-
8780, an appeal by a doctor who was
charged with violating a federal law that
makes it a crime for someone to own a
gun while under a domestic violence
restraining order. The other is Haney v.
United States, No. 01-8272, an appeal by a
man convicted of owning two machine
guns in violation of the federalprohibition
against owning those weapons.
Solicitor General Olson urged the court to
reject both appeals. He said that even
accepting an individual right to bear arms,
the application of the laws at issue in both
cases reflected the kind of narrowly
tailored restrictions by which that right
could reasonably be limited.
Consequently, there was no warrant for
the court to take either case, the briefs
said.
Mr. Olson declined today to discuss the
cases further. "The briefs speak for
themselves," he said.
The justices will consider the cases this
month. Ordinarily, the court would be
unlikely to accept a case over the
government's opposition. The Emerson
case is a particularly poor candidate for
review under the court's ordinary
standards because the decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit was not a final judgment.
Rather, it reinstated an indictment that a
federal district court had dismissed,
meaning that the defendant, Timothy J.
Emerson, now faces a trial at which he
may be acquitted, making any appeal
moot.
Still, the court may well consider these to
be something other than ordinary cases.
One justice, Clarence Thomas, invited a
Second Amendment case five years ago in
a separate concurring opinion to the
court's decision that invalidated part of
the Brady gun-control law. In that case,
Printz v. United States, the court found
that the law violated principles of state
sovereignty and did not address the
Second Amendment.
In his separate opinion, Justice Thomas
noted that the parties had not raised a
Second Amendment question but that
"perhaps, at some future date, this court
will have the opportunity" to consider the
meaning of the amendment.
Mathew S. Nosanchuk, litigation director
of the Violence Policy Center, a gun-
control group here, said today that even if
the briefs had no immediate impact at the
court, they would prove highly useful to
those opposed to gun control.
The briefs would be cited as "the
authoritative statement on the
government's position," he said, adding
that the Justice Department "has shown
its willingness to throw red meat to the
gun lobby and put its political agenda over
its institutional interests and obligations."
The National Rifle Association, which last
summer featured a picture of Mr.
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Ashcroft on the cover of its magazine and
called him "a breath of fresh air to
freedom-loving gun owners," lauded the
Justice Department's position today. "This
view is shared by courts and by notable
legal scholars alike," said Chris Cox, chief
N.RA. lobbyist. "The N.R.A. has always
felt that the Second Amendment is
unequivocal in its intent that the right to
bear arms is an individual night."
Andrew L. Frey, a former deputy solicitor
general who handled the government's
criminal cases in the Supreme Court from
1973 until 1986, was sharply critical of the
briefs.
"This has been the government's position
for more than 60 years," Mr. Frey said in
an interview. "People who happen to be
in office temporarily shouldn't use the
office to promote their personal views."
Mr. Frey, now a partner at the law firm
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, sent a 15-
page letter on behalf of the Violence
Policy Center to Mr. Olson, urging him to
adhere to the government's original
position in the cases.
Copyright D 2002 The New York Times
Company
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Revised View of 2nd Amendment Is Cited as Defense in Gun Cases
The New York Times
July 23, 2002
Adam Liptak
Scores of criminal defendants around the
nation have asked federal courts to
dismiss gun charges against them based
on the Justice Department's recently
revised position on the scope of the
Second Amendment.
The new position, that the Constitution
broadly protects the rights of individuals
to own guns, replaced the view, endorsed
by the great majority of courts, that the
amendment protects a collective right of
the states to maintain militias. While the
challenges have been rejected by trial
court judges, based largely on appeals
court precedent, supporters and
opponents of broad antigun laws say the
arguments have forced the Justice
Department to take contradictory stances.
Andrew L. Frey, a deputy solicitor general
in the Justice Department from 1973 to
1986, said the department's new position
would make life difficult for prosecutors
and might give criminal defendants
unforeseen opportunities.
"Is this a Pandora's box, which, when
once opened, cannot be controlled?"
asked Mr. Frey, who opposed the new
position in a letter to Justice Department
officials on behalf of a gun-control group.
A spokeswoman for the Justice
Department, Monica Goodling, said the
department was committed to prosecuting
gun crimes.
"The department believes it can defend
the constitutionality of all existing federal
firearns laws while working to take guns
out of the hands of those who abuse
them," Ms. Goodling said.
In briefs filed with the Supreme Court in
May, department lawyers said laws that
restrict gun ownership by unfit people or
restrict ownership of guns "particularly
suited for criminal misuse" are
appropriate.
The department faces the clearest
contradictions of its stance in
Washington, which has an essentially
complete ban on handguns. The city's
government is supervised by Congress,
and its local crimes are. prosecuted by the
Justice Department.
Ms. Goodling was more guarded in
discussing the District of Columbia's gun
law.
"The department can defend its criminal
prosecutions of the firearms laws in D.C.,
and is doing so," she said. The difference
in wording suggests that the department is
unwilling to endorse the constitutionality
of Washington's gun law in all
circumstances.
People on both sides of the gun control
debate find fault with the department.
"The Justice Department has created a
very dangerous situation that is
endangering public safety and forcing
Justice Department prosecutors to litigate
with one hand tied behind their backs,"
said Mathew S. Nosanchuk, litigation
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director of the Violence Policy Center, a
gun control group in Washington.
"Criminals are using the department's own
Second Amendment language to challenge
the gun laws."
On the other hand, Robert A. Levy of the
Cato Institute, a libertarian research group
in Washington, was critical of Attorney
General John Ashcroft for announcing
the new position in briefs to the Supreme
Court in May but not applying it in trial
courts.
"It's bizarre for Ashcroft to go out of his
way to assert that the Second Amendment
is about an individual right when he didn't
have to say anything," Mr. Levy said.
"When he has the chance to make the
assertion in a case where it really matters,
he doesn't. It's puzzling."
Prosecutors opposing the new Second
Amendment challenges have filed narrow
and cryptic responses. In a brief filed in
the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, for instance, the Justice
Department noted that its position on the
Second Amendment was inconsistent with
that of the court, which has held that the
amendment protects a collective right.
Still, it continued, "although the question
of the proper interpretation of the Second
Amendment is significant, this case simply
does not present that question in a
manner suitable for resolution."
In other briefs, the government has
argued that a particular defendant or
weapon fits within its own announced
exceptions. According to a brief filed in
San Francisco, "The government does not
concede that the Second Amendment
creates a fundamental individual right for
felons to bear arms, or for anyone to bear
arms" like the machine guns at issue in
that case.
The Supreme Court last addressed the
meaning of the Second Amendment in
1939, in a decision that lawyers on both
sides of the issue say supports their views.
That disagreement about Supreme Court
precedent, along with a federal appeals
court decision last year adopting the
individual-rights view, means it is an open
question how other appeals courts will
view the new challenges.
In footnotes in two filings with the
Supreme Court in May, the government
said the Second Amendment protected
the rights of individuals "to possess and
bear their own firearms, subject to
reasonable restrictions designed to
prevent possession by unfit persons or to
restrict the possessions of types of
firearms that are particularly suited to
criminal misuse."
Defendants have said this position
amounts to a recognition that the right to
bear arms is as fundamental as the right to
free speech and so requires courts to be
extremely skeptical of government efforts
to regulate guns. That is a position that
has long been held by groups opposing
gun control.
Public defenders say they are engaged in a
cat-and-mouse game with the
government, with the goal of forcing it to
articulate its true position.
The government's court filings, said John
Paul Reichmuth, a federal public defender
in Oakland, Calif., are "evasive and
anemic to the point of unconsciousness."
But, Mr. Reichmuth said, "at some point
in some argument where a real case is
going on, they won't be able to fall back
on their procedural arguments and they'll
have to state what the content of the right
is.
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An appeal in the most challenging case,
that of the District of Columbia's gun law,
has already reached the local appellate
court, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals. It was filed by Bashuan Pearson,
who was charged with felony weapons
possession. In court papers, Mr. Pearson
said that he had a license to carry the
pistol in question in Maryland and that he
had a clean criminal record.
Mr. Pearson complained to the appeals
court that in its own court papers the
Justice Department "refuses to reveal
whether, under the current view of the
attorney general concerning the meaning
of the Second Amendment, the District's
gun laws are facially unconstitutional."
Mr. Pearson asked for a full-court hearing.
Only the full court can overrule an earlier
precedent of the court, which held that
the Second Amendment protects a
collective right.
Apparently not satisfied that the justice
Department will adequately defend the
local law, the District of Columbia's
lawyers have asked to intervene in the
case.
James C. McKay Jr., a lawyer for
Washington, said Justice Department
prosecutors must reconcile their day-to-
day prosecutorial practices with the
department's new policy. "There is a
conflict between their very hard approach
to gun possession and their position that
there is a Second Amendment right to
carry a gun," Mr. McKay said.
The government is allowed to take
contrary legal positions in different
settings, legal experts said. "The argument
that you're being hypocritical is not a
legally sufficient argument," said Akhil
Reed Arnar, a law professor at Yale.
But there are practical difficulties in
reconciling warring positions in related
litigations, said Michael Dorf, a law
professor at Columbia.
"Ashcroft is trying to please two different
constituencies," Mr. Dorf said. "On the
one hand, there is the gun lobby, which is
very pleased with his decision. On the
other hand, he has to consider federal
prosecutors and probably the general
public as well."
Mr. Frey, the former deputy solicitor
general, said he hoped the question would
remain academic.
"I hope the upshot will be that the
attorney general's new position will be
rejected and recede into the mists of
history," he said, "or that it will turn out
to be contentless in that there will be no
cases to which it will apply."
Copyright @ 2002 The New York Times
Company
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Ashcroft's Assault on Gun Laws
The Boston Globe
July 21, 2001
Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Charles E. Schumer
A SERIES of stealth measures and after
private communication with the gun
lobby, Attorney General John Ashcroft is
quietly taking steps to erode the very gun
laws he has sworn under oath to defend.
All law-abiding Americans should be
deeply concerned about Ashcroft's efforts
to undermine the existing Brady Law's
criminal background check system and
dramatically reverse longstanding Justice
Department measures to keep guns out of
the hands of those who pose the greatest
risk to safety and security. We urge the
attorney general to reverse the course he
is taking and to live up to the
commitments he made during his Senate
Judiciary Committee confirmation
hearings. Last January, during those
confirmation hearings, Ashcroft conceded
that he personally disagrees with some of
the nation's gun laws. This disclosure was
no surprise to most of us who had served
with him while he was a senator.
However, in response to direct questions
about whether he would attempt to
reverse or urge a new interpretation of
existing gun laws, he said his personal
disagreements with those laws would in
no way affect his commitment to
upholding them. "As attorney general, it's
not my judgment to make that kind of call
about the relative merit of gun laws," he
testified. "My responsibility is to uphold
the acts of the legislative branch of this
government in that arena." A majority of
the Senate accepted his commitment, and
he was confirmed by a vote of 58 to 42.
Only six months after those confirmation
hearings, it appears that Ashcroft is
backing off his commitment. On May 17,
he sent a letter to the National Rifle
Association contending that the Second
Amendment confers an individual right to
own guns, not just a collective right to a
well-regulated militia.
As support for this contention, he cited
four Supreme Court decisions from the
1890s but failed to mention the court's
leading decision in 1939 that is clearly
contrary to his position.
Moreover, Ashcroft's interpretation of the
Second Amendment is diametrically
opposed to that currently being advanced
by the Justice Department in the pending
case of United States v. Emerson, where
the department has advanced the position
that gun ownership is a collective, not
individual, right.
In his letter to the NRA, Ashcroft also
articulated a new standard for evaluating
gun laws, proposing to require that any
restriction on gun ownership be
supported by a compelling state interest
a test that very few laws can survive. Even
law professors who otherwise agree with
the individual-rights theory acknowledge
that the Constitution permits the
reasonable regulation of guns. Ashcroft's
new Second Amendment theory,
however, will strengthen the hand of the
NRA and other foes of gun control.
Immediately after we became aware of
Ashcroft's letter to the NRA, we wrote to
him, asking him to reconsider the changes
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in gun control policy he was advocating.
He has not responded.
Shortly afterwards, two public policy
groups, the Brady Campaign and
Common Cause, filed an ethics complaint
against the attorney general, charging that
his letter to the NRA constitutes an
ethical breach because it conflicts with the
official position of the United States in the
Emerson case. According to Samuel
Dash, an expert in legal ethics, the
attorney general's letter to the NRA
constitutes an act of disloyalty to his
client, the United States, and an
impermissible conflict of interest.
We have also learned that the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel is
drafting an opinion to make the attorney
general's views on the Second
Amendment official policy of the
government. This would be a radical
departure from its longstanding position.
Ashcroft's antipathy to sensible gun
control is also demonstrated by his recent
decision to require the immediate
destruction of records gathered under the
National Instant Background Check
System. This is the system used to
conduct background checks of gun
purchasers under the Brady Law. Current
regulations require the FBI to retain these
records for 90 days. Eliminating this
needed would eviscerate the ability of law
enforcement officials to prevent fraud and
illegal gun sales by unscrupulous dealers
to straw purchasers, convicted felons, and
persons guilty of domestic violence.
Immediate destruction of these records
can only serve the interests of criminals.
In response to Ashcroft's decision, we are
sponsoring a bill to keep the 90-day
retention period intact. The Judiciary
Committee must also heighten its
oversight of the Justice Department to
make sure that the attorney general's
special-interest agenda on gun issues does
not prevail. As the nation's chief law
enforcement officer, Ashcroft has a
responsibility to vigorously uphold the
laws, including laws with which he
disagrees. He has no authority to
unilaterally repeal America's gun-control
laws.
Copyright @ 2001 Globe Newspaper
Company
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Word for Word: The Second Amendment Debate;
To Bear or Not to Bear. It Depends on How You Read History
The New York Times
September 24, 2000
William Glaberson
A FEDERAL judge in Texas gave gun
groups a startling victory last year and set
off an appeals battle that legal experts say
could be the most important dispute over
the Constitutional right to firearms in
recent memory.
The judge, Sam R. Cummings, held that
history proves that the right "to keep and
bear arms" in the Second Amendment
gave individual citizens a right to
weapons. His decision, with its emotional
resonance for gun supporters, was in
conflict with the vast weight of modem
rulings, which have held that the
amendment merely gave the states a right
to keep armed militia units. The judge
dismissed gun possession charges that had
been filed against Timothy Joe Emerson, a
doctor in San Angelo, Tex. Prosecutors
appealed and the case is awaiting a
decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in New
Orleans, which heard arguments in June.
Friend-of-the-court briefs were filed by
more than 50 groups on every side of the
issue, presenting the judges with a fierce
historical debate about what the nation's
founders meant when they wrote, "A well-
regulated militia, being necessary to the
security of a free state, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed." The following excerpts reveal
sharply different readings of the Founding
Fathers' comments.
The Second Amendment can be
understood, lawyers on all sides argue, by
examining the intentions of James
Madison, the primary drafter of the Bill of
Rights. But the lawyers -- and historians --
don't agree on what Madison meant.
Madison drafted the Bill of Rights with
the aid of innumerable suggestions from
his countrymen, most commonly in the
form of the state bills of rights and the
hundreds of amendments suggested by
the state conventions that ratified the
Constitution....
The Bill of Rights was thus infused from
the bottom up with the dominant
ideology of the day. The common theme
running through these state conventions
which took place in the spring and
summer of 1788 was the clear and
unequivocal understanding that the right
to keep and bear arms belonged to "the
people" independent of "the state."
For example, in the New Hampshire
convention held on June 21, 1788, the
delegates adopted the following language:
Congress shall never disarm any citizen,
unless such as are or have been in actual
rebellion.
These provisions recollect the spirit at the
time when the Constitution was adopted
which was the simple recognition that
"the people" have liberty to keep and bear
arms to fulfill various individual needs,
including self-defense.
-- The Second Amendment Foundation, a
group that promotes the right to firearms
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Following common usage, the framers of
the Second Amendment used the phrase
"bear arms" to refer to possession of
weapons for military use. . . . The best
evidence for the Second Amendment
meaning of "bear arms" is in the original
draft of the Amendment proposed in the
First Congress by James Madison: "The
right of the people to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed; a well-armed, and
well-regulated militia being the best
security of a free country. but no person
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms
shall be compelled to render military
service in person.
In ... the conscientious objector provision,
Madison clearly used the phrase "bearing
arms" to refer solely to the possession of
weapons for military use....
Madison's use of the phrase "bear arms"
to refer to military activities is echoed in
other contemporary usages. . . . Records
of debates in the Continental and U.S.
Congresses between 1774 and 1821
include 30 uses of the phrase "bear arms"
or "bearing arms" (other than in
discussing the proposed Second
Amendment); in every single one of these
uses, the phrase has an unambiguously
military meaning....
If the Second Amendment had been
adopted as originally drafted by Madison,
its scope would unmistakably be limited to
the possession of weapons for use in the
militia.
As it happened, Congress removed the
conscientious objector clause, but this
deletion should not change our
understanding of the remaining language.
-- Ad Hoc Group of Law Professors and
Historians, 52 scholars urging the reversal
of Judge Cummings's ruling
Patrick Henry, the Virginia orator who
opposed the Constitution because he
feared a strong central government, said
access to arms was a key to liberty. But
the meaning of his words may depend
upon which of his words are quoted.
The right of the individual to keep and
bear arms was closely associated by the
framers with the militia tradition that the
American colonists brought with them
from England. Many Americans of the
late eighteenth century were mistrustful of
standing armies, and the Federalists and
Anti-Federalists were agreed on at least
one fundamental point: liberty was more
secure on these shores than in England
because the American people were
armed...
Patrick Henry . .. proclaimed: "The great
object is that every man be armed ...
Everyone who is able may have a gun."
-- National Rifle Association
Henry . .. did state that " the great object
is, that every man be armed." But Henry
went on to note, as Judge Cummings
neglects to mention: "But we have
learned, by experience, that, necessary as it
is to have arms, and though our Assembly
has, by a succession of laws for many
years, endeavored to have the militia
completely armed, it is still far from being
the case. When this power is given up to
Congress without limitation or bounds,
how will your militia be armed?"
When Henry's statement is read in
context, it is clear that his goal that "every
man be armed" was directed toward a
successful state militia (in which each
militia member had the use of a gun) --
not toward arming members of the public
for their individual needs.
-- Center to Prevent Handgun Violence
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George Mason, a Virginia delegate to the
Constitutional Convention who pushed
for a Bill of Rights, is another figure
quoted by both sides.
Congress . . . upheld the beliefs of the
Framers of our Constitution, who were
avid supporters of individual gun
ownership and its protection under the
Second Amendment. Many of them also
detailed the value of individual firearm
ownership toward the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia....
These same Framers feared the
destruction of the general militia. . . .
Some of the Framers' statements include:
.I ask, Who are the militia? They
consist now of the whole people, except a
few public officers." George Mason, June
16, 1788. ...
The Framers' intent was to have an armed
populace capable of defending themselves
from all forms of tyranny.
-- The Citizens Committee for the Right
to Keep and Bear Arms
The district court misinterprets the
historical record by basing its holding
almost entirely on an equation of the
"militia" with the public . . . and
concluding from that equation that the
Framers must have intended that the right
to bear arms belong to individual
members of the citizenry.
But the fact that the militia was drawn
from the general population -- in other
words, that many citizens were eligible for
membership -- is entirely different from
saying that the militia should simply be
indiscriminately equated with the
population at large. The district court's
failure to understand this distinction is
well illustrated by its reliance on a
statement by George Mason: "Who are
the militia? They consist now of the whole
people."
What the district court overlooks,
however, is that Mason's discussion
continues: ". . . the militia of the future
day may not consist of all classes, high
and low, and rich and poor, but they may
be confined to the lower and middle
classes of the people, granting exclusion
to the higher classes of the people. . . .
Under the present government, all ranks
of people are subject to militia duty."
Mason's concern, quite clearly, was that if
Congress were permitted full control over
the militia, it might grant exemption from
military service to federal elites, rather
than distributing militia "duty" among the
people generally. No such concern would
be implicated if the Second Amendment
conferred a right to bear arms wholly
unrelated to militia service.
-- Center to Prevent Handgun Violence
Copyright D 2000 The New York Times
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Dueling Scholars Join Fray Over a Constitutional Challenge to Gun Control Laws
The New York Times
September 21, 2000
William Glaberson
A federal appeals court case that offers
the strongest constitutional challenge to
gun control laws in decades has provoked
a bitter academic dispute that could help
shape rulings on whether Americans have
an unfettered right "to keep and bear
arms.
The case involves a federal district judge's
decision last year to dismiss gun
possession charges against a Texas doctor
because, he ruled, individual citizens have
a constitutional right to gun possession.
The judge relied largely on scholarship in
the 1990's holding that the drafters of the
Second Amendment meant to give
individuals the unfettered right to arms,
even though the Supreme Court suggested
in 1939 that the amendment guarantees
only a collective right for states to arm
their militias. Now other scholars,
including some leading experts on
constitutional history, have seized on the
Texas case as a cause and are challenging
the 1990's scholarship as a distortion of
history. Saying the Supreme Court seems
likely at some point soon to consider the
right to arms for the first time since 1939,
these experts are touching off an
extraordinary battle that has scholars
flinging insults at one another over such
arcana as the meaning of stray comments
during English parliamentary debates in
the 1600's.
"The intellectual equivalent of a check-
kiting scheme," is how Saul Cornell, an
Ohio State University historian who has
written about the issue, described the
arguments of those who say the founders
meant to provide an individual right to
own guns.
Don B. Kates, a California lawyer who has
been a prolific proponent of an individual
right, said it was the other side that had
stooped to invented history. "Some of the
stuff is so bad, it's difficult to believe
anybody would publish it," Mr. Kates said.
A new book by an Emory University
historian, Michael A. Bellesiles, that is
receiving wide attention is part of the
debate. In "Arming America: The Origins
of a National Gun Culture," Professor
Bellesiles says that contrary to myth,
records show few people in early America
owned guns. His assertion supports the
argument that the drafters of the Second
Amendment were not thinking about
guaranteeing an individual right to guns.
Professor Bellesiles' book and other new
research are infuriating some individual-
right scholars who were so confident a
few years ago that they labeled theirs the
"standard" interpretation of the Second
Amendment and said any serious dispute
about the amendment's history was over.
Even some liberal experts on
constitutional law said they had been
persuaded.
But much of the newest scholarship,
including some being published this
month, is an argumentative re-
examination of the writing during the
19 9 0's that influenced, among others, the
federal judge in the Texas case, Sam R.
Cummings, in his Second Amendment
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ruling in favor of Dr. Timothy Joe
Emerson of San Angelo, Tex.
Judge Cummings wrote, "A historical
examination of the right to bear arms,
from English antecedents to the drafting
of the Second Amendment, bears proof
that the right to bear arms has consistently
been, and should still be, construed as an
individual right."
The Justice Department appealed, and
more than 50 groups on all sides of the
issue filed friend-of-the-court briefs. A
three-judge panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
New Orleans heard arguments in the case
in June.
Meanwhile, the academics have been busy
parsing old letters by the drafters of the
Bill of Rights and deconstructing
proposals for the wording of the Second
Amendment. The version that became
part of the Constitution reads, "A well
regulated militia, being necessary to the
security of a free state, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed."
This month, Lois G. Schwoerer, a
professor emeritus of history at George
Washington University in Washington, is
publishing an academic article that attacks
the work of another history professor,
Joyce Lee Malcolm of Bentley College in
Waltham, Mass. Professor Malcolm is one
of the most influential scholars to argue
that history proves the Second
Amendment was intended to guarantee an
individual right to arms. Professor
Malcolm's work was one of Judge
Cummings' sources for his conclusions in
the Second Amendment ruling.
Professor Malcolm's 1994 book, "To
Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an
Anglo-American Right" (Harvard
University Press), argues that an individual
right to weapons goes as far back as the
English Declaration of Rights of 1689.
That guarantee, she said, was imported to
America and adopted in the Second
Amendment.
Not so, says Professor Schwoerer, an
expert on the English Declaration of
Rights. Her new article says the right to
bear arms in England was limited by class
and religion and was always subject to
regulation. Professor Malcolm's
conclusions, Professor Schwoerer said in
an interview, were "unthinkable" and
"very bad history" that involved "errors in
interpretation and handling of evidence."
Professor Malcolm was incensed but not
surprised by Professor Schwoerer's
remarks, she said. Gun-control advocates
have been looking for scholars to criticize
her work, she said. "She's been courted as
a historian of English history they could
use to discredit my work," Professor
Malcolm said of Professor Schwoerer.
Professor Schwoerer's article says her
sleuthing in 17th-century records raised
questions about Professor Malcolm's
evidence and conclusions. Professor
Malcolm's book says, for example, that
one Heneage Finch, a Tory, "pressed" in a
1689 parliamentary debate for a right to
"private possession of weapons to restrain
the crown."
Finch's remarks, Professor Schwoerer
said, "really didn't have anything to do
with whether you could have arms or
not." In response, Professor Malcolm
said, "It is possible to usinterpret one
speech." But that hardly threw into
question her conclusion that the English
wanted and won an individual right to
arms, she said.
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The American debate over the Second
Amendment in 1789 is also getting a
rigorous new examination. This month's
Chicago-Kent Law Review, which
includes Professor Schwoerer's article,
carries a broadside by a Stanford
University historian, Jack N. Rakove, a
Pulitzer Prize winner. Professors Rakove
and Schwoerer and seven other scholars
first presented their findings at a
conference in April organized by Carl T.
Bogus, a gun-control proponent and a law
professor at Roger Williams Law School
in Bristol, R.I.
Professor Rakove said scholars who
advocate an individual right to arms have
"abused and misused" historical sources.
When the Second Amendment was
proposed, he said, the debate centered on
the powers of the states as opposed to
those of the federal government and
"never reached the question of individual
ownership" of weapons.
That has not stopped some scholars from
implying that it did, Professor Rakove
said. His article cites as an example a law
professor at the University of Tennessee,
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, a leading
proponent of the individual-right
interpretation.
Professor Rakove and Professor Reynolds
are facing off over exactly what James
Madison intended the Second
Amendment to mean, a difficult topic
because Madison's pronouncements on
the subject are sparse and subject to
interpretation.
Professor Reynolds has written, for
example, that Madison approved the
individual-right interpretation of the
Second Amendment. Madison did so,
Professor Reynolds argued, by responding
warmly to a 1789 letter from an essayist
named Tench Coxe.
"Preposterous," Professor Rakove's article
says. Coxe did say the Second
Amendment confirmed a right to keep
"private arms." But Madison's answer
merely thanked a supporter for backing
the Bill of Rights and made no comment
on the meaning of the Second
Amendment, Professor Rakove writes.
Professor Reynolds said he disagreed
about the meaning of Madison's letter but
added that "it's all a side issue" because
Madison publicly stated his support for an
individual right elsewhere.
Professor Rakove disagreed with that,
saying misstatements about Madison's
letter to Coxe showed how proponents of
an individual right to arms distorted
history. "I'm just looking at how these
guys use evidence," Professor Rakove
said.
Scholars on both sides of the debate said
their own recent evidence should finally
end the discussion about the meaning of
the Second Amendment. But others
conceded that was unlikely. "So long as
scholars walk the earth," Professor Bogus
said, "the debate will continue."
Copyright a 2000 The New York Times
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Liberals Have Second Thoughts on the Second Amendment
The Wal StretJournal
November 22, 1999
Coin Levey
It's the year of Littleton, "smart guns" and
city lawsuits against gun makers. So where
are the law professors speaking up for gun
control? In the past few years, many of
the premier constitutional experts of the
left have come to a shocking conclusion:
The Second Amendment must be taken
seriously.
Back in 1989, the University of Texas's
Sanford Levinson became something of a
maverick by writing an article in the Yale
Law Journal called "The Embarrassing
Second Amendment," in which he
maintained that the amendment
guaranteed an individual right to own
guns. Mr. Levinson's argument flew. in the
face of the interpretation that had
prevailed since a 1939 Supreme Court
ruling, which held that the amendment's
reference to a "well-regulated militia"
meant it only guaranteed a "collective"
right to bear arms.
Until recently, few legal scholars had done
much research on the Second
Amendment. "One came up knowing it
was a collective right -- not because we
learned about it in law school, but because
we read the occasional op-ed," says Dan
Polsby of Virginia's George Mason Law
School. "Sandy Levinson made it
respectable to think that heterodoxy might
be possible."
The most prominent of the converts is
Harvard's Laurence Tribe, once touted as
a potential Supreme Court appointee in a
Democratic administration. Mr. Tribe
surprised many of his fellow liberals when
the latest edition of his widely used
textbook, "American Constitutional Law,"
appeared this year. Previous versions had
virtually ignored the Second Amendment.
The new one gives it a full work-up -- and
comes down on the side of Mr. Levinson.
Mr. Tribe believes the right to bear arms
is limited, subject to "reasonable
regulation in the interest of public safety,"
as he and Yale Law Professor Akhil Reed
Amar wrote in the New York Times last
month. But Mr. Tribe has written that
people on both sides of the policy divide
face an "inescapable tension. . . between
the reading of the Second Amendment
that would advance the policies they favor
and the reading of the Second
Amendment to which intellectual honesty,
and their own theories of Constitutional
interpretation, would drive them."
Journalist Daniel Lazare, a liberal gun-
control advocate, acknowledges the
tension, writing in Harper's: "The truth
about the Second Amendment is
something that liberals cannot bear to
admit: The right wing is right." Mr. Lazare
argues for amending the Constitution to
repeal the Second Amendment.
What accounts for the change in Second
Amendment interpretation? One of the
catalysts has been a recently unearthed
series of clues to the Framers' intentions.
These include early drafts of the
amendment penned by James Madison in
1789. In his original version he made
"The right of the people" the first clause,
indicating his belief that it is the right of
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the people to keep and bear arms that
makes a well-regulated militia possible.
State constitutions of the era confirm this
interpretation: Pennsylvania accorded its
citizens the "right to bear arms for the
defense of themselves and the state."
In a letter to English Whig John
Cartwright, Thomas Jefferson wrote that
"the constitutions of most of our states
assert, that all power is inherent in the
people; . . . that it is their right and duty to
be at all times armed." These cross-
Atlantic discussions are important, since
the Framers were distinguishing the right
of Americans to bear arms from English
law's treatment of the question. Joyce Lee
Malcolm, a professor at Bentley College,
has examined the Second Amendment in
light of English law. She concludes that
the Colonists had intended to adopt basic
ideas of English governance but to
strengthen the people's rights. A right to
"keep and bear" was seen as a bulwark
against oppressive government.
Other scholars have found supporting
evidence in the 14th Amendment, which
bars states, in addition to the federal
government, from restricting certain rights
of citizens. According to Robert Cottrell
of George Washington University, in the
aftermath of slavery, with no real police
presence, this protection was critical to
preventing the monopoly of guns from
resting in the hands of white officials,
many of whom moonlighted in white
hoods. The 14th Amendment has been a
powerful force in constitutional law,
playing a key role in the development of
free-speech jurisprudence.
"The emaciated condition of the Second
Amendment now is very similar to the
condition of the First Amendment in
1908," says Duke University Law
professor William Van Alstyne. In the
aftermath of World War I, Supreme Court
Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis
Brandeis began writing dissents in favor
of a broader reading of the First
Amendment. But not until the 1930s did
courts begin adopting their arguments.
The new reading of the Second
Amendment may get a hearing if a gun
control case, Emerson v. Texas, makes it
to the Supreme Court. In a divorce
proceeding, Timothy Joe Emerson was
issued what's been called a "y'all be civil"
restraining order -- routine in Texas
divorce cases. Unknown to him, one
provision barred him from possessing a
gun. When he took his 9mm Beretta out
of a desk drawer during an argument with
his wife, he was charged with violation of
a federal gun control law.
U.S. District Judge Sam Cummings ruled
that the order violated Mr. Emerson's
Second Amendment rights. As Mr. Polsby
puts it, "If you're simply attaching a
firearms forfeiture to a person who has no
such designation as a dangerous person,
that's not acceptable if the Second
Amendment means anything."
The state of Texas has appealed to the
Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. If
that court's ruling makes it to the Supreme
Court, it would be the first gun-control
case heard by the justices since 1939's U.S.
v. Miller, which set the precedent for the
collective-right interpretation. In that case,
the Supreme Court held that a bootlegger
was rightly convicted of transporting a
sawed-off shotgun across state lines, on
the grounds that the weapon had no
legitimate use in a militia.
Today, two Supreme Court justices have
suggested interest in a reading of the
Second Amendment as guaranteeing an
individual right. Clarence Thomas has
noted the law-review articles piling up on
the side of an expanded interpretation,
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suggesting it may be time to reconsider
Miller. And Antonin Scalia, in a decision
on an unrelated matter, referred to " 'the
people' protected by the Fourth
Amendment, and by the First and Second
Amendments."
"As a liberal and a humanist," Prof. Tribe
says today, "people thought I was
betraying them by saying that the Second
Amendment is part of the Constitution."
But, he adds, "what is being knocked away
now is a phony pillar and a mirage."
Copyright © 1999 Dow Jones &
Company, Inc.
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Davey v. Locke
Ruling Below: (Daveyv. Locke, 9th Cir., 2002 U.S. App. Lexis 14461)
The student was selected to receive a scholarship but was disqualified because he chose to
pursue a degree in theology. The HECB claimed that Wash. Rev. Code § 28B.10.814 and
Wash. Const. art. I, § 11, barred it from providing funding to students who majored in
theology, which the HECB interpreted as theology taught from a religious perspective. The
court found that § 28B.10.814 and the HECB's implementing policy, Wash. Admin. Code 5
250-80-020(12), lacked neutrality because the student's eligibility for the scholarship was
conditioned on giving up his religious pursuit. Although the state was not required to
subsidize the exercise of constitutional rights, it could not deny a benefit based on the
exercise of rights. Applying strict scrutiny, the court found that the federal Constitution's
Free Exercise Clause limited the state's prohibition on establishment of religion. The state's
interest was therefore not sufficiently compelling, and application of § 250-80-020(12)(f) and
Wash. Rev. Code 5 28B.10.814 to deny the student his scholarship was unconstitutional.
Question Presented: Whether Washington Const. art. I, §11, to the extent that it prohibits
awarding finanacial aid to a student who wishes to pursue a degree in theology, a violation of
the United States Consititution?
Joshua DAVEY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Gary LOCKE, Gov., individually and in his official capacity; et al., Defendants-
Appellees.
United States Court Of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
Decided July 18, 2002
RYMIvER, Circuit Judge:
This appeal challenges Washington law
that denies a state-funded "Promise
Scholarship" to students who are qualified
for it by virtue of high school grades,
family income, and attendance at an
accredited college in the state, solely
because the student decides to pursue a
degree in theology.
Joshua Davey was awarded the
Scholarship but lost it when he declared a
major in Pastoral Ministries at Northwest
College. He claims that this was
discriminatory and denied him access to
funds that were otherwise available to all
eligible students in violation of the
religion clauses of the First Amendment
and his federal and state constitutional
rights to freedom of speech and equal
protection. Washington's Higher
Education Coordinating Board (HECB),
which administers the Promise
Scholarship, defends its action on the
ground that the state did not prohibit
Davey from pursuing religious studies but
simply declined to fund them; that state
funding for Davey's religious instruction is
barred by state law, Wash. Rev. Code §
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28B.10.814,' and the state constitution's
provision regarding the separation of
church and state;2 and that refusing to
award aid to students pursuing a degree in
theology is reasonably related to the bar in
the Washington Constitution.
We conclude that HECB's policy lacks
neutrality on its face. It makes the
Promise Scholarship (which is neutral
toward religion) available to all students
who meet generally applicable criteria,
except for those who choose a religious
major. As this classification facially
discriminates on the basis of religion, it
must survive stnct scrutiny. We are not
persuaded that it does; Washington's
interest in avoiding conflict with its own
constitutional constraint against applying
money to religious instruction is not a
compelling reason to withhold scholarship
funds for a college education from an
eligible student just because he personally
decides to pursue a degree in theology.
Accordingly, we hold that HECB
impermissibly deprived Davey of his
scholarship.
HECB submits that the state
obligation to underwrite Davey's
has no
pursuit
Wash. Rev. Code S 28B.10.814 provides that "no
aid shall be awarded to any student who is
ursuing a degree in theology.
Article I, § 11 of the Washington Constitution
provides:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of
religious sentiment, belief and worship, shall be
guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be
molested or disturbed in person or property on
account of religion; but the liberty of conscience
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to
excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices
inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state.
No public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious
worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of
any religious establishment. ...
of a religious degree, or to make it less
costly, relying primarily on [the Supreme
Court decisions in] Regan [u Taxation Wth
Repasentation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 76 L.
Ed. 2d 129, 103 S. Ct 1997 (1983)] and
Rust [v Sulliuan, 500 U.S. 173, 114 L. Ed.
2d 233, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991)]. This is
undoubtedly true in the abstract. Regan
and Rust stand for the proposition that the
government, as speaker or policymaker,
may selectively sponsor or pay for
programs that it believes to be in the
public interest, without being obliged to
fund or encourage an alternative activity.
In Regan, the Court upheld denial of a tax
exemption (the equivalent of a subsidy)
for lobbying activities of non-profit
welfare organizations because it reflected
a policy decision to subsidize such
organizations generally and to give an
extra subsidy to those that did not engage
in lobbying. In Rust, the Court upheld
regulations that limited the ability of
recipients of federal grants for family-
planning services to engage in abortion-
related advice and activities. [citations
omitted] Even so, as the Court states in
Regan, the government may not deny a
benefit to a person because he exercises a
constitutional right [citations omitted] [...]
In Rcsen1h r [v Rector and Visiton of Univ
jf Va., 515 U.S. 819, 132 L. Ed. 2d 700,
115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995)], the University
authorized payment of outside contractors
for the printing costs of student
publications through a Student Activities
Fund, except that costs of religious
activity (in connection with publications
otherwise eligible for funding) would not
be reimbursed. The [Supreme] Court
distinguished this practice from the
principle recognized in Rust and Regan-
Although acknowledging that the
Government is not required to subsidize
the exercise of fundamental rights, we
reaffirmed the requirement of viewpoint
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neutrality in the Government's provision
of financial benefits [... ]
REVERSED.
* )" )
We have concluded that in this case there
is a free exercise problem. This leaves us
with Washington's indisputably strong
interest in not appropriating or applying
money to religious instruction as
mandated by its constitution, and Davey's
interest in a Scholarship to which he was
entitled based on the objective criteria the
state set for qualification but from which
he was disabled based on his being a
theology major. We believe that
Washington's interest in this case is less
than compelling. The Promise Scholarship
is a secular program that rewards superior
achievement by high school students who
meet objective criteria. It is awarded to
students; no state money goes directly to
any sectarian school. Scholarship funds
would not even go indirectly to sectarian
schools or for non-secular study unless an
individual recipient were to make the
personal choice to major in a subject
taught from a religious perspective, and
then only to the extent that the proceeds
are used for tuition and are somehow
allocable to the religious major. See Zelan
U Sirrros-Hans, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4885,
122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002) (emphasizing
importance of neutrality and individual
choice in upholding voucher program).
The proceeds (approximately $ 1,500 in
Davey's year) may be used for any
education-related expense, including food
and housing; application to religious
instruction is remote at best. HECB does
not argue otherwise. In these
circumstances it is difficult to see how any
reasonably objective observer could
believe that the state was applying state
funds to religious instruction or to
support any religious establishment by
allowing an otherwise qualified recipient
to keep his Scholarship.
McKEOWN, Circuit judge, dissenting:
The majority suggests that we begin with
first principles, and I do as well. The
genesis of this controversy is not the
Washington statute or its implementing
regulations. Instead, we must start where
the State of Washington began over a
hundred years ago long before it created
the Promise Scholarship when it defined
its vision of religious freedom as one
completely free of governmental
interference, a vision the State explicitly
refused to taint by the influx of public
monies into religious instruction.
Specifically, I refer to that original
provision of the state's 1889 constitution
which provides that "No money or
property shall be appropriated for or
applied to any religious worship, exercise
or instruction, or the support of any
religious establishment." Wash. Const. art.
I, S 11.
Nonetheless, the majority concludes that
Washington has prohibited Davey's free
exercise of religion, or more accurately
that the State has attempted to suppress
"dangerous ideas," maj. op. supra at 10151,
despite the clear and consistent message in
its constitution that the citizens of
Washington are more concerned about
the potentially dangerous distortion that
the state funding of religious activities
might create, not the suppression of ideas,
dangerous or otherwise. Nothing in this
statutory scheme implicates Davey's ability
to express his beliefs. If such is the result
of a decision to fund certain activities to
the exclusion of others (that is, if funding
decisions somehow coerce an individual's
free exercise of religion), then I cannot see
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how the rationale of the abortion funding
cases can survive. As expressed by the
Supreme Court, the freedom to exercise
the choice of religion cannot be
distinguished from the freedom to
exercise the choice between childbirth and
abortion. Therefore, if the "bottom line,"
as the majority suggests is that the
funding/forum distinction does not end at
the frontier of free speech and concerns
about viewpoint discrimination, ma). op.
supra at 10152, then it must at least reach
to the abortion context where that right
has been characterized in exactly the same
fashion as that concerning the free
exercise of religion.
IV
In the Court's most recent
pronouncement in the religion arena,
ZdmInv Sirnrs-Harns, 2002 U.S. LEXIS
4885 (U.S. June 27, 2002), Justice Thomas
specially concurred to express his opinion
that "state action should be evaluated on
different terms [in the context of the
Establishment Clause] than similar action
by the Federal Government," concluding
that federal courts should "strike a proper
balance between the demands of the
Fourteenth Amendment on the one hand
and the federalism prerogatives of States
on the other." Id, slip op. at 4 (Thomas,
J., concurring). Concededly, Justice
Thomas was suggesting that states should
be allowed more constitutional freedom
to experiment with involvement in
religion, id, but I cannot conclude that
such federalism concerns should represent
a one-way street when it comes time for a
state to decide whether to enter into the
ill-defined terrain of the Establishment
Clause's jurisprudence.
No less than the State of Ohio's decision
to fund students' sectanian education,
which the Court endorsed in Zelmn, the
State of Washington's decision not to
"experiment" in the funding of religious
indoctrination should represent an equally
valid concern both as a matter of
federalism and with respect to the more
explicit limitations of the Religion Clauses.
Thus, in the absence of a more substantial
burden than this decision has placed on
Davey's choice of study, I conclude that
Washington has successfully navigated the
tensions between the free exercise of
religion and the prohibition of its
endorsement when, at the time of
statehood, it decided to refrain from
funding religious instruction. I therefore
respectfully dissent.
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Another Surprise Church-State Ruling from the 9th Circuit;
Court Strives for Neutrality In Washington State Case
The News Tribune
July 21, 2002
The First Amendment, which forbids any
law "respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof," requires judges and lawmakers to
perform an essential but exquisitely
difficult - balancing act.
Americans who are wary of organized
religion often emphasize the
Establishment Clause at the expense of
the Free Exercise Clause; Americans who
aren't big on in the separation of church
and state tend to do just the opposite. But
both provisions must be honored to
achieve the First Amendment's real
purpose: official neutrality - not hostility
or favoritism toward religious worship
and institutions.
The inherent tension between the
Establishment and Free Exercise clauses
is what makes Davey v. Locke such a
difficult case. Joshua Davey is a 22-year-
old Washingtonian who had a state
scholarship revoked when he attempted to
use it to pursue a pastoral degree at
Northwest College, a Christian school in
Kirkland.
The Promise Scholarship in question is
awarded across the board to high school
students who graduate in the top 10
percent of their class and whose family
income doesn't exceed 135 percent of the
state's median income.
As a National Merit Scholar of modest
means, Davey qualified without problem.
But when he declared his major, he ran
afoul of a state law that forbids the use of
state assistance for religious studies a law
rooted in the Washington Constitution's
sweeping language on church-state
separation. When the state moved to take
the scholarship away, Davey sued on the
grounds of religious discrimination.
On Thursday, he won an important
victory in the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, where a three-judge panel ruled
2-1 in his favor.
The 9th Circuit decision resembles the
U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision on
tuition vouchers in one respect: It turns
on the fact that the state assistance is
given to individuals, not directly to
religious schools.
In the voucher case, the court ruled that
the state wasn't subsidizing parochial
schools in Cleveland because the decision
was made by families and the state was
neutral about whether the family chose a
secular or religious school. In the
Washington case, the 9th Circuit panel
decided that once Washington had
established the Promise Scholarship for a
broad class of students, it could not then
single out and deny aid to individuals who
chose to use the money to pursue a
religious course of studies.
Copyright @ 2002 The News Tribune,
Tacoma, Washington
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In States, Hurdles Loom
The New York Times
June 30, 2002
Laurie Goodstein
IN 1986, Larry Witters was a 28-year-old
from Spokane who washed dishes in a
medical lab and was going blind from a
degenerative eye disease. His ambition
was to become a pastor or a missionary,
and he applied to Washington State for
vocational aid to study at a Christian
college.
When the state refused him the aid
because he had chosen a religious school,
Mr. Witters took the case all the way to
the Supreme Court. He won, but he never
got a penny from the State of
Washington. The reason is that
Washington's Constitution has an
amendment that forbids using tax dollars
for religious schools. The amendment is a
holdover from the 1800's, an era of anti-
immigrant, anti-Catholic sentiment, and as
many as 37 states still have similar
amendments in their constitutions.
Last week, in a monumental moment in
church-state law, the Supreme Court ruled
for a Cleveland program that permits
government vouchers to be used in
religious schools. But in all the hoopla
over the decision, it went largely
unnoticed that these 19th-century
amendments could prove to be a major
obstacle to the growth of the voucher
movement in many states, according to
both voucher supporters and opponents.
"There are going to be many stops before
some voucher train just runs coast to
coast," said Barry Lynn, executive director
of Americans United for the Separation of
Church and State, who opposes vouchers.
The state amendments barring aid to
religious schools are often called "Blamie
amendments." The first state to pass one
was Massachusetts, where in 1854, the
Know-Nothing party swept to power
pledging to "Americanize America." It
proposed legislation that would have
prevented Roman Catholics from holding
public office, dismissed Irish workers
from state jobs and added an amendment
to the state Constitution that tax money
"shall never be appropriated to any
religious sect for the maintenance
exclusively of its own schools."
Other states took up similar amendments,
and about 20 years later, a House speaker,
James G. Blaine, tried to bolster his
presidential candidacy by urging Congress
to pass a copycat amendment to the
United States Constitution. It failed, but
within 15 years, Blaine amendments had
been adopted in more states. Many
Western states adopted them as a
condition of their admission to the Union,
and in the Pacific Northwest, the laws
were pushed by the Ku Klux Klan,
according to Kevin J. Hasson, president
of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty,
a legal advocacy group that often
represents religious groups.
"Blaine amendments are a dirty little
secret from the anti-immigrant past," Mr.
Hasson said. "They not only get in the
way of vouchers and prohibit other sorts
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of useful aid, but they enshrine bigotry in
many state constitutions.
The Blame amendments are a serious
threat to voucher supporters, because the
Supreme Court does not have the final
word. When the court rules that
something is permissible, like vouchers, it
does not necessarily mean that it is
required, constitutional scholars say.
Blaine amendments have been invoked by
state courts to invalidate Supreme Court
rulings that permitted public money to be
used to finance buses to transport
students to religious schools, and that
allowed taxpayers to deduct tuition and
expenses at parochial schools.
Pro-voucher groups like the Becket Fund
plan to challenge the Blamie amendments
on the grounds that most were born of
bigotry. They are already challenging the
Massachusetts law and are preparing cases
in two Western states, Mr. Hasson said.
They liken their cause to the fight for
African-American and homosexual rights.
But those who support strict separation of
church and state will resist framing the
issue as a referendum on prejudice. They
will support the Blaine laws -- which they
call "no-aid amendments" -- by arguing
that while vouchers may be an appealing
attempt to give educational choices to
poor students, the scheme is a dangerous
breach of the First Amendment.
Those opposed to vouchers will argue that
despite their ugly origins, the amendments
have protected taxpayers from spending
money on religious programs they find
distasteful. Mr. Lynn pointed out that in
Massachusetts, a state with a large
Catholic population, voters have twice
voted down challenges to their Blaine
amendment, which has forced the Becket
Fund to take its fight to the courts.
"There are people who support these
amendments," he said, "not because they
don't like Catholic schools and not
because they don't like Catholics, but
because they want to prevent their money
from supporting a religion -- any religion -
- that they don't believe in."
Now that the Supreme Court has spoken,
the battle will now begin over whether
19th-century law should dictate 21st-
century policy, said Mr. Hasson. "It's the
next big fight," he said, "and I don't think
anybody is yet focusing on it."
Copyright 2002 The New York Times
Company
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School Choice, Not an Echo:
After the Supreme Court's Decision, the Future of the Movement
National Review
July 29, 2002
John J. Miller
FOR more than a dozen years, Clint
Bolick of the Institute for justice had
dreamed of the day the Supreme Court
would hand down a blockbuster verdict
on school choice. He'd been litigating the
issue for that long, and on the morning of
June 27, when the Court was scheduled to
rule in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, Bolick
found himself in the shower trying to
memorize a short speech- acknowledging
defeat.
"I just wanted to be prepared," he says. As
it turned out, Bolick didn't need the
concession speech: In a 5-4 decision, the
Court delivered a broad ruling, written by
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, saying
that school choice is constitutional.
Within a few days, President Bush was
pronouncing Zelman "a great victory" and
calling it "just as historic" as the Brown v.
Board of Education ruling, which ordered
an end to school segregation in 1954.
"The Court," remarked Bush, "declared
that our nation will not accept one
education system for those who can
afford to send their children to a school of
their choice and [another] for those who
can't."
Actually, the Supreme Court said no such
thing. Zelman does not present a
mandate; it merely permits school choice
to exist as an option. In another sense, it's
a stay of execution. It was the opponents
of school choice who brought the case-
against a program that gives vouchers to
about 4,500 poor kids in Cleveland-but
the stakes weren't as high for them as they
were for schoolchoice supporters. Zelman
surely invigorates the movement, but at
bottom it simply lets the debate go on.
Contrary to the president's claim, the
nation will, in fact, accept two systems of
education. We've been doing it for a long
time. There are about 54 million school--
age children in the U.S., and only about
20,000 of them participate in a genuine
school-choice program-roughly one out of
every 2,700 kids. There would have been
more, but for school choice's miserable
political performance. Ballot initiatives
were crushed in California and Michigan
in 2000. The National School Boards
Association reports that 28 state
legislatures have considered school choice
over the last two years; nowhere did it
become law. If the future has never
looked brighter for school choice, it may
be because its prospects recently have
been so dim
Zelman creates the conditions for positive
change. The decision removes an
important obstacle that has bedeviled
school choice for years-the claim that
education vouchers used at parochial
schools violate the First Amendment. The
Court now says they don't. Yet plenty of
legal hurdles remain, as well as even
tougher political ones.
One of the most important remaining
opponents of school choice is a former
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Republican presidential nominee: James
G. Blaine, who was the GOP nominee in
1884. (Grover Cleveland beat him.)
Blaine's campaign is best remembered for
a supporter's colorful putdown of the
Democratic party-"whose antecedents
have been rum, Romanism, and
rebellion."
Back in those days, there was a big
constituency for anti-Catholic politics, and
Blaine tried hard to exploit it. Catholics
were beginning to seek state aid for their
schools, and Blaine wanted to make sure
they didn't get it. He introduced a
constitutional amendment prohibiting aid
to explicitly religious schools. It won the
necessary supermajority in the House
before falling just short in the Senate.
Because it commanded a majority in
Congress, however, lawmakers were able
to impose their will on states seeking
admission to the Union, including
southern states seeking re-admission:
Their constitutions were made to include
"Blaie amendments," and today about
three dozen states have them.
"They're the next big legal problem for
school choice," says Bolick. Zelman may
allow school choice, but these relics of
anti- Catholicism-whose prohibitions also
apply to non-Catholic religious schools-
will continue to muck things up until they,
too, are defeated in court. This probably
will happen in many of the places where
challenges are brought-the Arizona
supreme court recently defanged the
state's Blaine amendment, calling it "a
clear manifestation of ... bigotry." But
total victory, or anything approaching it,
will take a long time and cost a lot of
money.
A top political priority for school-- choice
supporters must be to protect the gains
they've already made. In Ohio, there's
hope that the Cleveland program will
expand in size and perhaps spread to
other cities. But in Milwaukee, whose
program is the oldest and largest, school
choice is under constant pressure. The
Wisconsin government currently faces a
$1.1 billion budget deficit, and Democrats
proposed to make ends meet, in part, by
hacking $24 million from school choice.
They abandoned this position late in June,
but may pursue it more aggressively next
year if a member of their party wins the
governorship in November-a very real
possibility.
Protecting gains, of course, won't be
enough. "The ZeLman decision lets us
move from defense to offense," says
Robert Enlow of the Friedman
Foundation. That will require more
cooperation within school choice's
uncertain constituency of conservatives
and the urban poor. The suburban voters
who elect conservatives aren't keen on
school choice-they've already exercised a
form of it in picking where to live, see
their property values tied to school-district
boundaries, and remain basically satisfied
with their public schools. The urban poor
are stuck in a limbo where they tend to
support school choice, but their political
leaders don't.
For many on the right, school choice is
less about self-interest than compassion.
The subtext of the entire movement is the
underachievement of black students. The
average black 17-year-old reads about as
well as the average white 13-year-old.
These are just the averages, of course;
thousands of black kids don't even meet
this low standard.
The most important argument made for
school choice is that it will improve
academic performance. It is now possible
to test this claim, because, in addition to
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the country's three major publicly funded
school-choice programs in Cleveland,
Milwaukee, and Florida, thousands of
children also participate in large-scale
scholarship programs that function as
privately financed school-- choice
programs. There's one thing everybody
agrees on, even researchers who are
hostile to school choice: Parents of
school-choice children are much more
satisfied with their kids' schools than
other parents. This is no small thing,
because parents are likely to see the
intangible benefits of private schooling--
advantages that test scores don't
necessarily capture.
Which is not to say the test scores for
school-choice kids aren't good. In their
new book, The Education Gap, published
by the liberal-leaning Brookings
Institution, professors William G. Howell
of the University of Wisconsin and Paul
E. Peterson of Harvard report that black
students given scholarships for private
schools had much higher test scores than
comparable students who stayed in public
schools. In New York City, they were 9
percentage points higher after three years-
enough to cut the black-white education
gap in half. (The scores of non-black
students did not appear to be much
affected by school choice.)
School choice can't succeed without black
leadership. A few prominent black
politicians-though not nearly enough-have
embraced school choice. They include
former Atlanta mayor Andrew Young and
former New York congressman Floyd
Flake. Newark city councilman Cory
Booker made school choice a centerpiece
of his hotly contested mayoral race this
spring, he lost, but he's young and will be
back The Black Alliance for Educational
Options has run a series of slick
advertisements targeting the black middle
class, and it now claims 33 chapters
around the country. The Zelman decision
may change some minds, too. "Those of
us who have not supported the idea of
vouchers may take a second look. I think
constituents will ask me to take another
look," Georgia state representative Tyrone
Brooks told the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution shortly after the decision.
There also seems to be a generation gap in
opinion: Three years ago, the Joint Center
for Political and Economic Studies found
that 49 percent of black elected officials
under the age of 41 supported vouchers,
compared to just 23 percent who were 50
to 64 years old.
Conservatives will be smart to build
bridges with these open-minded pols.
Bush's 2003 budget proposes a $50
million pilot program for school choice,
but a better rallying point may be Dick
Armey's bill to provide vouchers for
about 8,300 poor kids in the District of
Columbia. Congress approved similar
legislation four years ago; President
Clinton vetoed it, but he did so quietly
and out of sight because he didn't want to
broadcast his opposition. A Democratic
Senate is unlikely to cooperate this time
around, but Republicans should at least
put their party on record as supporting an
innovative idea for poor children-and
make liberals cast votes against it.
Success will present its own challenges for
conservatives. The current accountability
movement, embodied by the recent
federal education bill, poses a special
threat. Private schools already have to
meet certain regulations set by states, but
these are mainly of the fire-- code variety.
Private schools are for the most part able
to create their own curricula and teach as
they please-- freedoms that help them
outperform public schools. It won't take
much, however, for liberals to push for
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rules that require private schools accepting
vouchers to meet the same standards as
the public schools. If that happens, school
choice might boomerang: Rather than
effectively privatizing a piece of the
public-education system, it would force
private schools to operate more like the
failing public ones.
That makes the Zelman decision a cause
not just for conservative celebration, but
for conservative vigilance as well.
[John J. Miller is the National Political
Reporter for National Review magazine.]
Copyright * 2002 National Review, Inc.
Newdow v. United States
Ruling Below: (Newdow v. United States, et al., 9 ,h Cir., 292 F.3d 597, 2002 U.S. App.
Lexis 12576)
The court then held that, in the context of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United
States of America, the statement that the United States is a nation "under God" was an
endorsement of religion, namely, a belief in monotheism. The court further held that the
school district's practice of teacher-led recitation of the Pledge aimed to inculcate in students
a respect for the ideals set forth in the Pledge, and, thus, amounted to state endorsement of
those ideals.
Michael A. NEWDOW, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
US Congress; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; William Jefferson Clinton,
President of the United States; State California; et al., Defendants-Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
Decided June 26, 2002
GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:
Michael Newdow appeals a judgment
dismissing his challenge to the
constitutionality of the words "under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance to the
Flag. Newdow argues that the addition of
these words by a 1954 federal statute to
the previous version of the Pledge of
Allegiance (which made no reference to
God) and the daily recitation in the
classroom of the Pledge of Allegiance,
with the added words included, by his
daughter's public school teacher are
violations of the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
Newdow is an atheist whose daughter
attends public elementary school in the
Elk Grove Unified School District
("EGUSD") in California. In accordance
with state law and a school district rule,
EGUSD teachers begin each school day
by leading their students in a recitation of
the Pledge of Allegiance ("the Pledge")...
The classmates of Newdow's daughter in
the EGUSD are led by their teacher in
reciting the Pledge codified in federal law.
On June 22, 1942, Congress first codified
the Pledge as "I pledge allegiance to the
flag of the United States of America and
to the Republic for which it stands, one
Nation indivisible, with liberty and justice
for all." Pub. L. No. 623, Ch. 435, 5 7, 56
Stat. 380 (1942) (codified at 36 U.S.C. 5
172). On June 14, 1954, Congress
amended Section 172 to add the words
"under God" after the word "Nation."
Pub. L. No. 396, Ch. 297, 68 Stat. 249
(1954) ("1954 Act"). The Pledge is
currently codified as "I pledge allegiance
to the Flag of the United States of
America, and to the Republic for which it
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stands, one nation under God, indivisible,
with liberty and justice for all." 4 U.S.C. §
4 (1998) (Title 36 was revised and
recodified by Pub. L. No. 105-225, § 2(a),
112 Stat. 1494 (1998). Section 172 was
abolished, and the Pledge is now found in
Title 4.)
Newdow does not allege that his
daughter's teacher or school district
requires his daughter to participate in
reciting the Pledge. Rather, he claims that
his daughter is injured when she is
compelled to "watch and listen as her
state-employed teacher in her state-run
school leads her classmates in a ritual
proclaiming that there is a God, and that
our's [sic] is 'one nation under God."'
DISCUSSION
[The court notes that it lacks jurisdiction
to compel the President or Congress to
act in their official capacities.]
C. Standing
Newdow has standing as a parent to
challenge a practice that interferes with his
right to direct the religious education of
his daughter. "Parents have a right to
direct the religious upbringing of their
children and, on that basis, have standing
to protect their right." Doe u Madison Sc.
DISL Na 321, 177 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir.
1999) (en banc)...
[The final question of standing relates to
the 1954 Act. Specifically, has Newdow
suffered an "injury in fact" that is "fairly
traceable" to the enactment of the Act?]
[TJhe legislative history of the 1954 Act
shows that the "under God" language was
not meant to sit passively in the federal
code unbeknownst to the public; rather,
the sponsors of the amendment knew
about and capitalized on the state laws
and school district rules that mandate
recitation of the Pledge. The legislation's
House sponsor, Representative Louis C.
Rabaut, testified at the Congressional
hearing that "the children of our land, in
the daily recitation of the pledge in school,
will be daily impressed with a true
understanding of our way of life and its
origins, and this statement was
incorporated into the report of the House
Judiciary Committee. H.R Rep. No. 83-
1693, at 3 (1954), Vpintl in 1954
U.S.C.C.AN. 2339, 2341. Taken within its
context, the 1954 addendum was designed
to result in the recitation of the words
"under God" in school classrooms
throughout the land on a daily basis, and
therefore constituted as much of an
injury-in-fact as the policies considered in
Wallaw and Santa Fe. As discussed earlier,
Newdow has standing as a parent to
challenge a practice that interferes with his
right to direct the religious education of
his daughter. The mere enactment of the
1954 Act in its particular context
constitutes a religious recitation policy
that interferes with Newdow's right to
direct the religious education of his
daughter. Accordingly, we hold that
Newdow has standing to challenge the
1954 Act.
D. Establishment Clause
The Establishment Cause of the First
Amendment states that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment
of religion," US. Const. amend. I, a
provision that "the Fourteenth
Amendment makes applicable with full
force to the States and their school
districts." Le v Weisnun, 505 U.S. 577,
612
580, 120 L. Ed. 2d 467, 112 S. Ct. 2649
(1992). Over the last three decades, the
Supreme Court has used three interrelated
tests to analyze alleged violations of the
Establishment Clause in the realm of
public education: the three-prong test set
forth in Lenvn v Kunzrun, 403 U.S. 602,
612-13, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745, 91 S. Ct. 2105
(1971); the "endorsement" test, first
articulated by Justice O'Connor in her
concurring opinion in Lych, and later
adopted by a majority of the Court in
Couty fAlge#eny v ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
106 L. Ed. 2d 472, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989);
and the "coercion" test first used by the
Court in Lee.
We are free to apply any or all of the three
tests, and to invalidate any measure that
fails any one of them. The Supreme Court
has not repudiated Lenm; in Santa Fe, it
found that the application of each of the
three tests provided an independent
ground for invalidating the statute at issue
in that case; and in Lee, the Court
invalidated the policy solely on the basis
of the coercion test. Although this court
has typically applied the Lerrn test to
alleged Establishment Clause violations,
see, eg, Arn Farrly Ass'n, In v City and
County of San Franvsco, 277 F.3d 1114,
1120-21 (9th Cir. 2002), we are not
required to apply it if a practice fails one
of the other tests. Nevertheless, for
purposes of completeness, we will analyze
the school district policy and the 1954 Act
under all three tests.
We first consider whether the 1954 Act
and the EGUSD's policy of teacher-led
Pledge recitation survive the endorsement
test...
In the context of the Pledge, the
statement that the United States is a
nation "under God" is an endorsement of
religion. It is a profession of a religious
belief, namely, a belief in monotheism.
The recitation that ours is a nation "under
God" is not a mere acknowledgment that
many Americans believe in a deity. Nor is
it merely descriptive of the undeniable
historical significance of religion in the
founding of the Republic. Rather, the
phrase "one nation under God" in the
context of the Pledge is normative. To
recite the Pledge is not to describe the
United States; instead, it is to swear
allegiance to the values for which the flag
stands: unity, indivisibility, liberty, justice,
and since 1954 monotheism. The text
of the official Pledge, codified in federal
law, impermissibly takes a position with
respect to the purely religious question of
the existence and identity of God. A
profession that we are a nation "under
God" is identical, for Establishment
Clause purposes, to a profession that we
are a nation "under Jesus," a nation
"under Vishnu," a nation "under Zeus," or
a nation "under no god," because none of
these professions can be neutral with
respect to religion. "The government must
pursue a course of complete neutrality
toward religion." Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60.
Furthermore, the school district's practice
of teacher-led recitation of the Pledge
aims to inculcate in students a respect for
the ideals set forth in the Pledge, and thus
amounts to state endorsement of these
ideals. Although students cannot be
forced to participate in recitation of the
Pledge, the school district is nonetheless
conveying a message of state endorsement
of a religious belief when it requires public
school teachers to recite, and lead the
recitation of, the current form of the
Pledge.
The Pledge, as currently codified, is an
impermissible government endorsement
of religion because it sends a message to
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unbelievers "that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community."
Lynh, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)...
Similarly, the policy and the Act fail the
coercion test. Just as in Lw, the policy and
the Act place students in the untenable
position of choosing between
participating in an exercise with religious
content or protesting... Although the
defendants argue that the religious content
of "one nation under God" is minimal, to
an atheist or a believer in certain non-
Judeo-Christian religions or philosophies,
it may reasonably appear to be an attempt
to enforce a "religious orthodoxy" of
monotheism, and is therefore
impermissible. The coercive effect of this
policy is particularly pronounced in the
school setting given the age and
impressionability of schoolchildren, and
their understanding that they are required
to adhere to the norms set by their school,
their teacher and their fellow students.
Furthermore, under Le, the fact that
students are not required to participate is
no basis for distinguishing Barntte from
the case at bar because, even without a
recitation requirement for each child, the
mere fact that a pupil is required to listen
every day to the statement "one nation
under God" has a coercive effect. The
coercive effect of the Act is apparent from
its context and legislative history, which
indicate that the Act was designed to
result in the daily recitation of the words
"under God" in school classrooms.
President Eisenhower, during the Act's
signing ceremony, stated: "From this day
forward, the millions of our school
children will daily proclaim in every city
and town, every village and rural
schoolhouse, the dedication of our Nation
and our people to the Almighty." 100
Cong. Rec. 8618 (1954) (statement of Sen.
Ferguson incorporating signing statement
of President Eisenhower). Therefore, the
policy and the Act fail the coercion test.'
Finally we turn to the Lenm test, the first
prong of which asks if the challenged
policy has a secular purpose. Historically,
the primary purpose of the 1954 Act was
to advance religion, in conflict with the
first prong of the Lern test. The federal
defendants "do not dispute that the words
'under God' were intended" "to recognize
a Supreme Being," at a time when the
government was publicly inveighing
against atheistic communism.
Nonetheless, the federal defendants argue
that the Pledge must be considered as a
whole when assessing whether it has a
secular purpose. They claim that the
Pledge has the secular purpose of
"solemnizing public occasions, expressing
confidence in the future, and encouraging
the recognition of what is worthy of
appreciation in society." Lynh, 465 U.S. at
693.
The flaw in defendants' argument is that it
looks at the text of the Pledge "as a
whole," and glosses over the 1954 Act...
[As was the case with the Alabama statute
in Wallaw,] the legislative history of the
1954 Act reveals that the Act's sde
purpose was to advance religion, in order
to differentiate the United States from
I In A anow v Unita Stat-, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir.
1970), this court, without reaching the question of
standing, upheld the inscription of the phrase "In
God We Trust" on our coins and currency. [...
But] A mrow is distinguishable in many ways from
the present case. The most important distinction is
that school children are not coerced into reciting
or otherwise actively led to participating in an
endorsement of the markings on the money in
circulation.
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nations under communist rule. "The First
Amendment requires that a statute must
be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by
a purpose to advance religion." 472 U.S. at
56 (citations omitted) (applying the Lenvn
test). As the legislative history of the 1954
Act sets forth:
[T]he human person is important because
he was created by God and endowed by
Him with certain inalienable rights which
no civil authority may usurp. The
inclusion of God in our pledge therefore
would further acknowledge the
dependence of our people and our
Government upon the moral directions of
the Creator. At the same time it would
serve to deny the atheistic and
materialistic concepts of communism with
its attendant subservience of the
individual.
HR. Rep. No. 83-1693, at 1-2 (1954),
pintAd in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2340.
In language that attempts to prevent
future constitutional challenges, the
sponsors of the 1954 Act expressly
disclaimed a religious purpose. "This is
not an act establishing a religion .... A
distinction must be made between the
existence of a religion as an institution and
a belief in the sovereignty of God. The
phrase 'under God' recognizes only the
guidance of God in our national affairs."
FIR Rep. No. 83-1693, at 3 (1954),
nninted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2341-
42. This alleged distinction is irrelevant for
constitutional purposes. The Act's
affirmation of "a belief in the sovereignty
of God" and its recognition of "the
guidance of God" are endorsements by
the government of religious beliefs. The
Establishment Cause is not limited to
"religion as an institution"; this is clear
from cases such as Santa Fe, where the
Court struck down student-initiated and
student-led prayer at high school football
games. 530 U.S. 310-16. The
Establishment Clause guards not only
against the establishment of "religion as
an institution," but also against the
endorsement of religious ideology by the
government. Because the Act fails the
purpose prong of Lenvn, we need not
examine the other prongs. Lenvn, 403 U.S.
at 612-14.
Similarly, the school district policy also
fails the Lenvn test. Although it survives
the first prong of Lenvn because, as even
Newdow concedes, the school district had
the secular purpose of fostering patriotism
in enacting the policy, the policy fails the
second prong... Given the age and
impressionability of schoolchildren, as
discussed above, particularly within the
confined environment of the classroom,
the policy is highly likely to convey an
impermissible message of endorsement to
some and disapproval to others of their
beliefs regarding the existence of a
monotheistic God. Therefore the policy
fails the effects prong of Levn, and fails
the Lenn test. In sum, both the policy
and the Act fail the Lenvn test as well as
the endorsement and coercion tests.2
2 We recognize that the Supreme Court has
occasionally commented in dicta that the presence
of "one nation under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance is constitutional. See A Iegheny, 492 U.S.
at 602-03; Lyrxb, 465 U.S. at 676; 465 U.S. at 693
(O'Connor, J., concurring); A bington S&h. Dist U
SAMenp, 374 U.S. 203, 303-04, 10 L. Ed. 2d 844,
83 S. Ct. 1560 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring);
374 U.S. at 306-08 (Goldberg, J., joined by Harlan,
J., concurring); Engd, 370 U.S. at 435 n. 21.
However, the Court has never been presented with
the question directly, and has always clearly
refrained from deciding it. Accordingly, it has
never applied any of the three tests to the Act or
to any school policy regarding the recitation of the
Pledge. That task falls to us, although the final
word, as always, remains with the Supreme
Court...
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In conclusion, we hold that (1) the 1954
Act adding the words "under God" to the
Pledge, and (2) EGUSD's policy and
practice of teacher-led recitation of the
Pledge, with the added words included,
violate the Establishment Clause. The
judgment of dismissal is vacated with
respect to these two claims, and the cause
is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with our holding. Plaintiff is to
recover costs on this appeal.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge, concurring
and dissenting:
I concur in parts A, B and C of the
majority opinion, but dissent as to part D.
We are asked to hold that inclusion of the
phrase "under God" in this nation's
Pledge of Allegiance violates the religion
clauses of the Constitution of the United
States. We should do no such thing. We
should, instead, recognize that those
clauses were not designed to drive
religious expression out of public thought;
they were written to avoid discrinmination.
We can run through the litany of tests and
concepts which have floated to the
surface from time to time. Were we to do
so, the one that appeals most to me, the
one I think to be correct, is the concept
that what the religion clauses of the First
Amendment require is neutrality, that
those clauses are, in effect, an early kind
of equal protection provision and assure
that government will neither discriminate
for nor discriminate against a religion or
I I admit, however, to serious misgivings about
standing to attack 4 U.S.C. § 4 itself. Congress has
not compelled anyone to do anything. It surely has
not directed that the Pledge be recited in class;
only the California authorities have done that...
religions. See Gentala v City of Tucson, 244
F.3d 1065, 1083-86 (9th Cr.) (en banc)
(Fernandez, J., dissenting), wt granted and
fagrnt caztal by _ U.S. _, 122 S. Ct.
340, 151 L. Ed. 2d 256 (2001); Gaining v
Baphy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1306-07 (9th Cir.
1996) (Fernandez, J., concurring). But,
legal world abstractions and ruminations
aside, when all is said and done, the
danger that "under God" in our Pledge of
Allegiance will tend to bring about a
theocracy or suppress somebody's beliefs
is so minuscule as to be de minimis. The
danger that phrase presents to our First
Amendment freedoms is picayune at
most.
Judges, including Supreme Court Justices,
have recognized the lack of danger in that
and similar expressions for decades, if not
for centuries, as have presidents and
members of our Congress. [Gtations
omitted] I think it is worth stating a little
more about two of the cases which I have
just cited. In County ofA Ieey, 492 U.S.
at 602-03, 109 S. Ct. at 3106, the Supreme
Court had this to say "Our previous
opinions have considered in dicta the
motto and the pledge, characterizing them
as consistent with the proposition that
government may not communicate an
endorsement of religious belief." The
Seventh Circuit, reacting in part to that
statement, has wisely expressed the
following thought:
Plaintiffs observe that the Court
sometimes changes its tune when it
confronts a subject directly. True enough,
but an inferior court had best respect
what the majority says rather than read
between the lines. If the Court proclaims
that a practice is consistent with the
establishment clause, we take its
assurances seriously. If the Justices are just
pulling our leg, let them say so.
Shernun, 980 F.2d at 448.
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Some, who rather choke on the notion of
de minimis, have resorted to the
euphemism "ceremonial deism." Se, eg,
Lyrch, 465 U.S. at 716, 104 S. Ct. at
1382 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But
whatever it is called (I care not), it comes
to this: such phrases as "In God We
Trust," or "under God" have no tendency
to establish a religion in this country or to
suppress anyone s exercise, or non-
exercise, of religion, except in the fevered
eye of persons who most fervently would
like to drive all tincture of religion out of
the public life of our polity. Those
expressions have not caused any real harm
of that sort over the years since 1791, and
are not likely to do so in the future. As I
see it, that is not because they are drained
of meaning. Rather, as I have already
indicated, it is because their tendency to
establish religion (or affect its exercise) is
exiguous. I recognize that some people
may not feel good about hearing the
phrases recited in their presence, but,
then, others might not feel good if they
are omitted. At any rate, the Constitution
is a practical and balanced charter for the
just governance of a free people in a vast
territory. Thus, although we do feel good
when we contemplate the effects of its
inspiring phrasing and majestic promises,
it is not primarily a feel-good prescription.
In West Virgina Bani of Education v
Barrette, 319 U.S. 624, 630, 642, 63 S. Ct.
1178, 1181, 1187, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943),
for example, the Supreme Court did not
say that the Pledge could not be recited in
the presence of Jehovah's Witness
children; it merely said that they did not
have to recite it. That fully protected their
constitutional rights by precluding the
government from trenching upon "the
sphere of intellect and spirit." 319 U.S. at
642, 63 S. Ct. at 1187. As the Court
pointed out, their religiously based refusal
"to participate in the ceremony [would]
not interfere with or deny rights of others
to do so." 319 U.S. at 630, 63 S. Ct at
1181. We should no t perrt Neudow's fwl-goal
wrnept to abarg that hilane
My reading of the stelliscript suggests that
upon Newdow's theory of our
Constitution, accepted by my colleagues
today, we will soon find ourselves
prohibited from using our album of
patriotic songs in many public settings.
"God Bless America" and "America The
Beautiful" will be gone for sure, and while
use of the first and second stanzas of the
Star Spangled Banner will still be
permissible, we will be precluded from
straying into the third. And currency
beware! Judges can accept those results if
they limit themselves to elements and
tests, while failing to look at the good
sense and principles that animated those
tests in the first place. But they do so at
the price of removing a vestige of the awe
we all must feel at the immenseness of the
universe and our own small place within
it, as well as the wonder we must feel at
the good fortune of our country. That will
cool the febrile nerves of a few at the cost
of removing the healthy glow conferred
upon many citizens when the forbidden
verses, or phrases, are uttered, read, or
seen.
In short, I cannot accept the eliding of the
simple phrase "under God" from our
Pledge of Allegiance, when it is obvious
that its tendency to establish religion in
this country or to interfere with the free
exercise (or non-exercise) of religion is de
minmis.
Thus, I respectfully concur in part and
dissent in part.
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U.S. Court Votes to Bar Pledge of Allegiance; Use of 'God' Called Unconstitutional
The Washington Post
June 27, 2002
Chades Lane
The Pledge of Allegiance, recited by
millions of American children at the start
of each school day, is unconstitutional
because it describes the United States as
one Nation, under God," a federal
appeals court ruled yesterday.
A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled 2 to 1
that the reference to God, which was
added to the pledge by Congress in 1954,
amounts to an official endorsement of
monotheism. Thus, the San Francisco-
based court said, both the 1954 law and a
California school district's policy requiring
teachers to lead children in the pledge
violate the First Amendment prohibition
against the establishment of a state
religion.
If the ruling is allowed to stand,
schoolchildren could no longer recite the
pledge, at least in the nine western states
covered by the court. "A profession that
we are a nation 'under God' is identical ...
to a profession that we are a nation 'under
Jesus,' a nation 'under Vishnu,' a nation
'under Zeus,' or a nation 'under no god,'
because none of these professions can be
neutral with respect to religion," Judge
Alfred T. Goodwin, an appointee of
President Richard M. Nixon currently
serving as a semi-retired senior judge,
wrote for the three-judge panel. Goodwin
was joined by Stephen Reinhardt, an
appointee of President Jimmy Carter.
The case was brought by Michael A.
Newdow, a Sacramento atheist, who did
not want his daughter to have to recite the
pledge in her second-grade class in the Elk
Grove school district. After a federal
district judge dismissed his lawsuit,
Newdow, arguing the case himself,
appealed to the 9th Circuit.
The ruling comes as patriotic and religious
feelings are running high because of the
war against terrorism -- and on the day
before the Supreme Court was set to
redefine the church-state boundary in a
major case regarding taxpayer-funded
vouchers for private and parochial
education.
It immediately rekindled an issue whose
incendiary potential was demonstrated
during the 1988 presidential election.
Republican candidate George 11W. Bush
blasted Democratic nominee Michael S.
Dukakis for his decision as Massachusetts
governor to veto mandatory recitation of
the pledge in the state's public schools.
Yesterday, President George W. Bush led
politicians of both parties in a chorus of
denunciation, saying through spokesman
Ari Fleischer that the court's decision was
"ridiculous."
House Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-
Tex.) called it "sad" and "absurd."
House Minority Leader Richard A.
Gephardt (D-Mo.), a possible presidential
candidate, said, "I see no reason to change
the time-tested, venerable pledge that is
such a central part of our country's life
and our nation's heritage."
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Another possible contender, Sen. John
Edwards (D-N.C.), called the ruling
"wrong."
House members gathered on the front
steps of the Capitol to recite the Pledge of
Allegiance en masse. The Senate
unanimously approved a resolution
sponsored by its Democratic and
Republican leaders that expressed support
for the reference to God in the pledge,
and instructed the Senate's legal counsel
to intervene in the case. The vote was 99
to 0, with Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)
absent.
Calling the decision "just nuts," Majority
Leader Thomas A. Daschle (S.D.), yet
another possible Democratic presidential
candidate, urged the entire body to be on
hand this morning when the Senate begins
its work by saying the pledge. Few
senators usually are on hand for the
pledge.
Fleischer said the Justice Department is
considering "how to seek redress." The
options include asking the full 9th Circuit
to reconsider the case or taking the matter
directly to the Supreme Court.
If the ruling stands in the 9th Circuit, it is
likely the high court would review it, since
it clashes with a decision by the Chicago-
based U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th
Circuit upholding the pledge.
School is out for the summer, but the 9th
Circuit's ruling would not take effect for
60 days, pending the government's appeal.
The states that would be directly affected
are Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon and
Washington.
Critics of the ruling echoed views
expressed by the lone dissenter on the
panel, Senior Judge Ferdinand F.
Fernandez, who was appointed by
President George H.W. Bush. Fernandez
contended that there is only a "minuscule"
risk that the use of the phrase "under
God" would "bring about a theocracy or
suppress someone's beliefs."
Under his two colleagues' view, he wrote,
" 'God Bless America' and 'America the
Beautiful' will be gone [from public
places] for sure, and . . . currency beware!"
Coins and bills carry the slogan "In God
We Trust."
Goodwin's opinion insisted that the 9th
Circuit's ruling was merely the logical
extension of Supreme Court cases that
have prohibited organized prayer in the
classroom and at high school graduations
and football games.
Under these precedents, Goodwin wrote,
the officially sponsored recitation of the
phrase "under God" -- added at the height
of the Cold War for the express purpose
of distinguishing American values from
the atheistic norms of the Soviet Union --
amounted to not only state endorsement
of religion, but also a subtle form of
coercion over elementary school students.
"Although [individual] students cannot be
forced to participate in recitation of the
pledge, the school district is nonetheless
conveying a message of state endorsement
of a religious belief when it requires public
school teachers to recite, and lead the
recitation of, the current form of the
pledge," Goodwin wrote.
Although the 9th Circuit is the most
liberal federal appeals court in the country
-- its rulings are frequently reversed by the
more conservative Supreme Court -- legal
analysts from across the ideological
spectrum said yesterday that it was not
stretching the high court's past cases.
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"I don't think this is necessarily a wacko
9th Circuit result," said Washington
lawyer Christopher Landau, a former law
clerk to Justice Antonin Scalia, who
dissented in the cases the 9th Circuit cited
to support its decision. "This is the
Supreme Court reaping what it sowed."
"It is eminently defensible," said Eugene
Volokh, a specialist in church-state law at
UCLA Law School. "I'm not sure it's
ultimately the right result. But the court is
applying principles the Supreme Court has
established."
Volokh suggested, however, that a
majority of the court may ultimately
decide that "under God" in the pledge,
like the cry of "God save the United
States and this honorable court," which
opens each Supreme Court oral argument,
qualifies as what the late justice William
Brennan once called "ceremonial deism"
traditional references to a higher power
so frequently invoked that they have lost
any specific religious meaning.
"There is still a very credible argument
that at some point you have to stop trying
to relentlessly extirpate religious
symbolism from the life of a country that
is after all very religious," said Volokh,
who served as a law clerk to Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor.
Copyright * 2002 The Washington Post
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'Under God' Iconoclast Looks to Next Targets
The New York Times
July 1, 2002
Evelyn Nieves
There is so much about society that Mike
Newdow would like to change.
He does not understand, for example,
why the English language allows itself
anything so cumbersome and awkward as
masculine and feminine pronouns. The
Mike Newdow dictionary would replace
"he" and "she" with "re," "his" and "hers"
with "rees" and "him" and "her" with
"erm." "Come on, try it out," he says.
'Re went to the store.' It's easy."
Of course, it was another one-syllable
word -- God -- that gave Mr. Newdow,
49, an emergency room doctor and a
lawyer, his moment in the national
spotlight. He argued that the phrase "one
nation, under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance violated the separation of
church and state -- and won, at least with
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in San
Francisco.
But he is not stopping there.
Despite the outpouring of outrage from
politicians and pundits over the pledge
ruling -- not to mention the death threats
on his answering machine -- Mr. Newdow
still plans to challenge the use of "In God
We Trust" on currency. He would like to
see an end to prayers at presidential
inaugurations. "At President Bush's it just
went on and on," he says, clearly annoyed.
"I said, 'Holy smokes, they can't do that!'"
As an atheist, he plans to ferret out all
insidious uses of religion in daily life.
"Why should I be made to feel like an
outsider?"
Yet the First Amendment is hardly Mr.
Newdow's only preoccupation, even if he
calls himself the founding minister of the
First Amendment Church of True Science
(FACTS). More than anything, Mr.
Newdow, a father in the throes of a
custody dispute, would like to change
family law.
Even more than the phrase "one nation,
under God," the term "in the best
interests of the child" infuriates Mr.
Newdow no end. It raises his blood
pressure, turns his words into an angry
jumble and makes him late for
appointments. Television reporters still
looking for sound bites on the pledge
from Mr. Newdow would be well advised
to steer clear of asking about his real
obsession. As he himself warns, "I could
go on about family law for days."
Partly because he was successful in
arguing the unconstitutionality of the
pledge -- a feat all the constitutional
lawyers he conferred with said was
impossible -- and partly because he is
quite the overachiever -- he is working on
a master's degree in public health and
recently passed the bar exam -- when he
says he is "planning on changing family
law" people might want to take him
seriously.
His 8-year-old daughter, whom he
followed when her mother moved to
Sacramento from Florida two years ago, is
the light of his life, he says, but the courts
will not let him prove it. The stay-at-home
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parent, he complains, gets the benefit of
the doubt in court.
He shares custody, but not his goal of half
the time. He is also miffed that because he
is the primary wage earner of the two
parents, the court keeps ordering him to
pay for his daughter's mother's legal fees
every time he and she land in court.
"It's the worst system in the entire
nation," he said of California Family
Court. "You want to do a real story? Do it
on the family courts. They steal people's
children based on absolutely nothing.
They take the most important people in a
child's life and make them go away. You
challenge them and it's impossible to win
because most family court judges were
family court lawyers for 20 years and they
don't want you challenging things they
spent their careers endorsing, and getting
rich from. Do I sound passionate?"
Mr. Newdow, who grew up in Teaneck,
N.J., graduated from Brown University,
the University of Michigan Law School
and the University of California at Los
Angeles medical school. Although he
began challenging the "under God" phrase
in the Pledge of Allegiance in 1997, he
never took a state bar exam until he
decided to take on family law. He took the
California test in February, 14 years after
he graduated from law school, and passed
without studying -- "by sheer luck," he
says.
His custody fights are the reason he cut
back on his work as an emergency room
doctor, he said. Now, he spends just two
days a month as an attending physician in
the emergency room at the U.C.L.A.
Medical Center. "Now family law takes up
all of my time," he said.
He recently filed a brief, he said,
challenging the court's demand that he
pay his daughter's mother's lawyer fees
based on a legal fight over whether he
could have custody of his daughter on a
certain day.
"Completely unproven assumptions are
accepted to achieve a goal -- 'the best
interests of the child' -- that itself is
arbitrary and indefinable, and for which
there are no valid measurements," he said.
Mr. Newdow, who is still fielding requests
for interviews on the pledge, says he never
tires of discussing issues important to him.
He is even willing to debate on tabloid
television shows. "When you have right
on your side, the argument is easy," he
said.
No one can doubt the courage of his
convictions. Just before the interview was
over, he reminded the reporter to
remember his ideas for changing the
English language. "Don't forget the re,
rees, erm thing," he said. "Just make it a
little aside. Our language would be so
much richer."
Copyright © 2002 The New York Times
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Court That Ruled on Pledge Often Runs Afoul of Justices
The New York Times
June 30, 2002
Adam Liptak
Over the last 20 years, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
developed a reputation for being wrong
more often than any other federal appeals
court.
In recent years, in cases involving medical
marijuana, assisted suicide, disabilities and
more mundane issues, dozens of the
court's decisions have been reversed
unanimously by the Supreme Court. "In
the 1996 term, for example, the Ninth
Circuit was reversed in at least 24 cases --
a staggering number -- and at least 16 of
them were 9-0 reversals," Akhil Amar, a
law professor at Yale, wrote in an online
commentary. "When you're not picking
up the votes of anyone on the court,
something is screwy."
The Ninth Circuit may be facing yet
another reversal. On Wednesday, it
touched off an avalanche of criticism by
pronouncing the Pledge of Allegiance
unconstitutional.
While the court is famously liberal, critics
attribute its record in the Supreme Court
more to its unwieldy size than to ideology.
It is by far the largest federal appeals
court. At full strength, it has 28 judges,
almost twice as many as the next biggest
circuit. Its decisions affect a fifth of the
nation's population and a third of its land,
in nine states and two territories.
Of the court's 23 active judges, 17 were
appointed by Democratic presidents. That
makes it "vastly more liberal than most
other courts of appeals, and certainly the
Supreme Court," said Eugene Volokh, a
law professor at the University of
California in Los Angeles.
But Mark A. Perry, an appellate lawyer in
Washington who was a clerk for a Ninth
Circuit judge, said ideology does not
account for the court's track record. "Size
gives rise to conflict and confusion," he
said. "There is no consistency."
Richard A. Posner, a federal appeals court
judge in Chicago, devoted a law review
article to proving statistically that the
Ninth Circuit's size predisposes it to
"judicial irresponsibility." When a former
chief judge of the court, joined by three of
his predecessors, including the author of
the Pledge of Allegiance decision, took
issue with a similar statistical analysis in
1998, Justice Antonin Scalia of the
Supreme Court was incredulous.
"There is," Justice Scalia wrote, "no doubt
that the Ninth Circuit has a singularly
(and, I had thought, notoriously) poor
record on appeal. That this is unknown to
its chief judges may be yet another sign of
an unmanageably oversized circuit."
The court's size has led to periodic calls
for dividing it. In 1997, Congress created a
com-nission to consider the issue. Its
chairman was Byron R- White, who had
retired from the Supreme Court a few
years before.
The records of the White Commission
include frank discussions by Supreme
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Court and Ninth Circuit judges of the
court's shortcomings.
For instance, judges on the court said they
did not have time to read all of the
decisions it issued.
According to the commission's 1998
report, 57 percent of judges in the Ninth
Circuit, compared with 86 percent of
federal appeals court judges elsewhere,
said they read most or all of their court's
decisions.
"The Ninth Circuit issues too many
decisions for anyone to read," wrote Judge
Andrew J. Kleinfeld, who was appointed
by the first President George Bush.
"Judges on the same court should read
each other's decisions. We are so big that
we cannot and do not."
"Put bluntly," wrote Judge Diarmuid F.
O'Scannlain, who was appointed by
President Ronald Reagan, "it becomes
difficult to know what our circuit's law is."
The court's chief judge, Mary M.
Schroeder, who was appointed by
President Jimmy Carter, defended it in an
interview. "We have evaluated and we
have studied," she said, "and we have not
been able to document issues that are
directly attributable to the size of the
court."
In his study, Judge Posner considered
how often the Supreme Court had
reversed the Ninth Circuit in a way that
suggested simple error by the lower court,
as opposed to a principled disagreement
on a knotty legal question.
Sometimes the Supreme Court reverses
lower courts summarily. This means,
Judge Posner wrote, that the lower court
"got the issue so clearly wrong that there
is no need for the illumination of the
issues that briefing and argument would
afford."
Other times, the Supreme Court reverses
unanimously. That means, Judge Posner
wrote, that the decision was "more likely
to be just plain incorrect, rather than
being merely the reflection of political
difference."
By both measures, the Ninth Circuit was
wrong more often than any other circuit
in the dozen years Judge Posner surveyed,
though 1997.
Judge Posner concluded that "problems
of quality control indeed increase with the
size of the circuit."
The White Commission recommended
that the Ninth Circuit be divided into
largely autonomous divisions. Legislation
along those lines was proposed but not
adopted.
The Ninth Circuit covers Alaska, Arizona,
California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, Oregon and Washington, along
with Guam and the Northern Mariana
Islands.
The judges have chambers throughout the
circuit and meet only rarely. Assuming 28
judges, there are more than 3,000 possible
combinations of three-judge panels. But
the active judges rely heavily on more than
20 senior judges, and panels often also
contain visiting judges.
The court's reversal rate has improved in
recent years, said Erwin Chemerinsky, a
law professor at the University of
Southern California. In the term that just
concluded, the Supreme Court affirmed 4
of 18 Ninth Circuit decisions, which is in
line with rates for other circuits. Six of the
reversals were unanimous, which is not.
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Two of the unanimously reversed
decisions were written by Judge Stephen
Reinhardt, a Carter appointee who was in
the majority in the Pledge of Allegiance
decision. A third opinion by Judge
Reinhardt was affirmed.
Professor Chemerinsky cautioned that it
was possible to read too much into
reversal rates. "The opinions written by
conservatives on the Ninth Circuit are just
as likely to be overturned as opinions by
liberals," he said. "When you're dealing
with hard questions, a reversal rate does
not mean the court of appeals was wrong
and the Supreme Court was right. It
means the Supreme Court got the last
word."
Critics say the Ninth Circuit's procedure
for full-court review accounts for much of
the reversal rate. All other circuits sit as
one to hear full-court, or en banc, cases.
The Ninth Circuit sits in panels of 11.
The procedure injects randomness into
decisions. If a case is decided 6 to 5, there
is no reason to think it represents the
views of the majority of the court's 23
active members.
"If you run a judicial process as a crap
shoot," Judge Kleinfeld wrote, "the crap
shooter's principles will affect the
outcomes."
In 1998, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
complained that the Ninth Circuit did not
use even this flawed procedure enough.
She wrote that the court had heard only 8
of 4,481 cases en banc in the previous
year. In that time, the Supreme Court
addressed 45 cases from the Ninth
Circuit.
That has since changed.
"The Ninth Circuit is now more likely to
grant en banc review than any other
circuit," said Tracey George, a law
professor at Northwestern University. She
said it now reviews just over one percent
of panel decisions; the average in other
circuits is about seven-tenths of one
percent.
Judge Reinhardt said this
improved its reversal record.
has not
"Justice O'Connor said we should go en
banc more," he said, "and then they give
us higher reversal rates on en banc
decisions."
Still, so few decisions are reviewed by the
Supreme Court or an en banc panel that
some judges may feel free to ignore
precedent without significant fear of
reversal.
In the Ninth Circuit, Judge Posner wrote,
"a three-judge panel that decides to defy
circuit precedent or otherwise go out on a
thin limb has a reasonable prospect of
getting away with it."
Professor Amar wrote that judges on the
Ninth Circuit rule "a little like how some
taxpayers play the audit lottery, taking
self-serving positions on their returns
while hoping not to get audited."
Copyright @ 2002 The New York Times
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Court Statistics
The New York Tines
July 6, 2002
John T. Noonan Jr
To the Editor:
Re "Court That Ruled on Pledge Often
Runs Afoul of Justices" (front page, June
30), about the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: If a fallible
human being has a 1 percent error rate
and does 100 problems, he will get 1
problem wrong. If he does 500 problems,
he will get 5 wrong. If a second person
does only 100 problems, he will make four
fewer mistakes than a person who does
500 problems. This does not make him
more accurate.
In the calendar year 2001, the Ninth
Circuit terminated 10,372 cases, and was
reversed in 14, with a correction rate of
1.35 per thousand. The Fourth Circuit,
reputedly the most conservative circuit
and the circuit with the second-largest
number of cases reviewed by the Supreme
Court, terminated 5,078 cases and was
reversed in 7, making a correction rate of
1.38 per thousand.
JOHN T. NOONAN JR.
U.S. Circuit Judge, 9th Circuit
San Francisco, July 1, 2002
Copyright @ 2002 The New York Times
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EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
GAO Goes to Court to Get Cheney Data;
Disclosure: It's the First Time the Watchdog Agency Has Sued the Executive
Branch. White House Vows a Legal Battle
Los Angeles Times
February 23, 2002
David G. Savage
The clash between a congressional
watchdog agency and the White House
escalat3eed Friday, as lawyers for the
General Accounting Office sought a court
order that would force Vice President
Dick Cheney to reveal with whom he met
as the administration formed its national
energy plan.
In its first lawsuit against the executive
branch, the GAO said it has a legal right
to know who attended meetings of
Cheney's National Energy Policy.
Development Group.
Congress created the GAO in 1921 as an
auditing unit, and its law "broadly
authorizes GAO to investigate all matters
relating to the use of public funds," David
M. Walker, the comptroller general, said in
his lawsuit.
That includes the authority to examine not
just how money was spent but also how
government officials made official policy,
the lawsuit argues. In May, Cheney balked
at the rather routine document request
from Walker's agency and said it
threatened "to intrude into the heart of
executive deliberations."
President Bush and his advisors were
determined to erect a legal barrier around
the White House, in contrast to the
Clinton era, when investigators succeeded
in prying secrets from the administration.
Bush and Cheney chose to draw a line
against the GAO probe, although they did
so when the now-failed Enron Corp. was
a high-flying energy trader based in
Houston.
This year, Enron's spectacular collapse has
raised the political stakes in the case of
Walker vs. Cheney. It puts an even
brighter spotlight on the administration's
close ties to Texas energy executives,
including top Enron officials.
"We take this step reluctantly," Walker
said in filing the lawsuit. "Nevertheless,
given GAO's responsibility to Congress
and the American people, we have no
other choice."
Rep. Henry A. Waxman, the Los Angeles
Democrat who first sought the
information along with Rep. John D.
Dingell (D-Mich.), called the legal action a
"remarkable and sad" development.
"The American people and Congress have
an obvious right to know which lobbyists
and special interests tried to influence the
vice president's energy policy," Waxman
said.
The White House, which has
acknowledged that Cheney or members of
the task force met six times last year with
representatives of Enron, said it will
vigorously fight the legal battle. If
627
necessary, administration officials said,
they will invoke "executive privilege," the
doctrine that was discredited by the Nixon
administration during the Watergate
scandal of the 1970s.
"We expected this [lawsuit], and we are
ready to defend our principles in court,"
White House spokeswoman Anne
Womack said. "This goes to the heart of
the presidency and to the ability of the
president and vice president to receive
candid, discreet advice."
White House lawyers contend that the
GAO is going beyond its legal authority.
While the accounting office can examine
how agencies spend their money, the
White House is not an "agency," they say,
and Cheney's task force was not spending
money.
Beyond that, the White House lawyers
argue, Waxman and Dingell do not
represent Congress or even a
congressional committee. As Democrats,
they are in the minority in the House of
Representatives and therefore do not
speak for the body as a whole, the
attorneys say.
They will urge a federal judge to reject the
GAO's claim on these narrow grounds. If
those arguments fail, the administration is
prepared to raise the stakes by claiming
that the Constitution shields the president
from congressional meddling.
U.S. Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson
has been tapped to head the White House
defense.
Because Olson argues regularly before the
Supreme Court, his appointment signals
that the administration is determined to
fight the battle all the way through the
legal system. He has a month to file a
response to the GAO's suit in a federal
district court in Washington.
"This is just one chapter in the larger
effort by the Bush administration to
reassert the prerogatives of the
presidency," said Duke University law
professor Christopher Schroeder, who
served as a Justice Department legal
advisor during the Clinton administration.
"Usually these disputes get hashed out at a
much lower level, but this administration
is saying, 'We're going to stand on
principle and not yield.'"
The administration took that stance last
summer. "But that was before Enron,"
Schroeder said, questioning whether the
make-up of the energy task force is the
best test case for a legal fight.
In a separate lawsuit, Larry Klayman, who
heads the private watchdog group Judicial
Watch, has asked U.S. District Judge
Emmet Sullivan to order Cheney to reveal
information about his task force on the
grounds that it is a federal advisory
committee. Congress has said these
official advisory panels must disclose who
participates.
"We support what they did, but our
lawsuit was brought under a law the
Supreme Court has already said is
constitutional," Klayman said.
And Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (D-Conn.),
who chairs the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee, is considering seeking
information on Cheney's task force
directly through his panel. His request
could sidestep the administration's claim
that Waxman does not speak for a
congressional committee and the GAO
does not speak for Congress.
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White House Told to Save Records
The New York Times
February 2, 2002
Stephen Labaton & Don Van Natta Jr.
The Justice Department directed the
White House staff tonight to preserve
records of contacts between government
officials and Enron executives over the
last three years, a sign that federal
prosecutors have significantly broadened
their criminal investigation to include the
company's political dealings in
Washington.
The request, made in a letter this evening
from the Justice Department to the White
House counsel, prompted the
administration to notify agencies
throughout the executive branch not to
destroy any Enron-related records. "We
believe that documents in the possession
of the White House, its staff and
employees may contain information
relevant to our investigation into the
financial condition of Enron and
statements made by Enron employees and
agents relating to its financial condition
and business interests," said the letter
from Christopher A. Wray, an aide to the
deputy attorney general.
It instructed the White House and other
agencies to safeguard all documents,
electronic records and computer files that
"relate in any way to Enron's financial
condition and/or business interests."
The destruction of documents at Enron,
which has filed for bankruptcy protection,
and its auditing firm, Arthur Andersen, is
at the center of the Justice Department's
criminal investigation into fraud
allegations.
Administration officials vowed to comply
with the request but played down its
political implications, pointedly noting
that it covered a period that started before
President Bush came to Washington.
White House officials said tonight that
they were uncertain about the extent of
Enron-related documents they had.
"The White House is one of a number of
agencies that has received this request,
going back to the Clinton administration,"
said Claire Buchan, a White House
spokeswoman. "We intend to fully comply
with the request as part of our ongoing
commitment to be cooperative with the
investigation."
Still, the request foreshadows the
likelihood that some of the documents
will be sought by criminal investigators,
and as such, could pose a political
problem for the administration, which has
refused to turn over government records
to Congress. The White House will now
have to justify denying records to
Congress while sending them to the
Justice Department and possibly a grand
jury.
For months, top administration officials
have spurned a demand by the General
Accounting Office, an investigative arm of
Congress, for records of meetings of Vice
President Dick Cheney and the
administration's energy task force with
executives from Enron and other energy
companies. Congressional investigators
are seeking to determine what role Enron
and the other companies played in
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formulating the administration's energy
policy last spring.
"This new development makes it all the
more important that the administration
release the information the General
Accounting Office is seeking," said Henry
A. Waxman, the California Democrat who
is the ranking minority member of the
House Government Reform Committee
and has been the among the most vocal in
Congress in demanding the records.
"There should be no appearance that the
White House is hiding information."
Just hours before the White House
disclosed the Justice Department request,
President Bush, meeting with Republican
lawmakers, vigorously defended his
refusal to turn over the records of the
energy task force to Congress, according
to several people who attended the
meeting.
Mr. Bush's impassioned statement to party
members holding a strategy session at the
Greenbrier resort in West Virginia echoed
his administration's public stand.
Congressional Republicans applauded Mr.
Bush's insistence that withholding the
records was a matter of constitutional
principle.
The president's ardent defense came a day
after a federal district judge in Washington
questioned in a related case the contention
by the White House that it has a
constitutional right to keep information
about the meetings secret.
Judge Emmet G. Sullivan ruled Thursday
that the energy task force must explain
why it should not be forced to turn over
records of the meetings. The ruling came
in a lawsuit filed by Judicial Watch, the
legal watchdog group in Washington, that
closely tracks the lawsuit the accounting
office is expected to file soon against the
White House.
The administration argued that turning
over information like the names of
attendees and the subjects discussed at
meetings of the energy task force would
interfere with the president's
constitutional power to obtain
confidential advice from his closest
advisers.
But Judge Sullivan said that was not
adequate. Citing what he called
"insufficient guidance to the court to
analyze the constitutional concerns" raised
in the case, the judge ordered the White
House to provide a brief defending its
position by Tuesday.
In another development, Democrats in
Congress investigating the company
attacked the credibility of a special
committee of Enron directors expected to
release a report this weekend on the
complex partnership deals central to the
company's demise.
Two senior Democrats on the House
Energy and Commerce Committee, John
D. Dingell of Michigan and Peter Deutsch
of Florida, suggested that the report could
lack credibility because one committee
member, Herbert S. Winokur Jr.,
authorized the creation of some of the
partnerships.
In a letter to William C. Powers Jr., the
chairman of the special committee, who is
expected to testify before Congress on
Monday, the two lawmakers complained
that "Mr. Winokur is essentially
investigating his own actions and
approving or disapproving the resulting
report."
"You can understand," their letter
continued, "why disinterested observers
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might conclude that the report's
independence, or at least the appearance
of independence, has been compromised."
Minutes of a June 28, 1999, Enron board
meeting show that Mr. Winokur was
present when the board heard a
presentation on the formation of
investment partnerships named LJM that
would be headed by the company's chief
financial officer, Andrew S. Fastow.
Mr. Winokur "played a direct role in
approving the LJM partnerships in 1999,
appearing to have had direct knowledge of
both their structure and the potential
conflicts Mr. Fastow's role presented to
Enron," the letter said.
A message left at Mr. Winokur's home in
Connecticut was not answered, and Mr.
Powers, through a spokeswoman, said
that he had seen the letter but declined to
comment on it.
Representative Waxman asked Thomas E.
White, the secretary of the Army, to meet
with him next week to discuss the Enron
affair. Mr. White left a senior executive
position at Enron last year to join the
administration. Mr. White did not
immediately respond to the congressman's
request.
Separately, Democratic leaders in
Congress criticized Mr. Bush's proposal to
bolster 401(k) plan safeguards so that
workers do not concentrate their
retirement savings in company stock as
employees at Enron did. Representative
Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri, the
House Democratic leader, called Mr.
Bush's proposal "half-measures." The
Senate majority leader, Tom Daschle of
South Dakota said the Bush plan "would
do little, if anything, to restore public
confidence in the private pension system."
But Representative Tom DeLay of Texas,
the House majority whip, said the
proposals "strike a sound and appropriate
balance between protecting individuals
and preserving their freedom to diversify"
investments in their retirement accounts.
Copyright 0 2002 The New York Times
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Cheney Should Stop Stalling
The New York Times
February 11, 2002
John W. Dean
Vice President Dick Cheney's posturing
about his energy task force has a familiar
ring to someone who served in the Nixon
White House. It is the sound of someone
who has something to hide.
It was during Watergate that I first came
to appreciate the power of the General
Accounting Office over the executive
branch. H. R. Haldeman, the White
House chief of staff, called me to say that
the accounting office wanted to examine
the White House's books and records.
The president didn't want them sniffing
around. How could we stop them The
short answer was we couldn't stop them --
we could only delay them. And that is
precisely what Mr. Cheney is attempting
to do with his misguided efforts to
prevent the accounting office from seeing
some records pertaining to the meetings
of his energy task force.
Mr. Cheney says he is refusing to provide
the requested information as a matter of
principle. But as a matter of law, it is clear
that the General Accounting Office has a
right to the information.
Some three decades ago, I convinced Mr.
Haldeman that the office's auditors were
not partisans looking for dirt. And the
president relented when I explained that
to litigate the G.A.O.'s authority would
bring only negative publicity and defeat.
The audit proceeded, and nothing
whatsoever came of it.
Mr. Cheney has spent enough years on
Capitol Hill and in the executive branch to
know that the G.A.O.'s auditors and
examiners play it straight, and that David
M. Walker, the comptroller general of the
United States, is no exception. And that's
why his snub of the accounting office's
request for limited information about the
work of his energy task force is surprising.
He has said he wants to "protect the
ability of the president and the vice
president to get unvarnished advice from
any source we want."
The accounting office, however, has not
asked that he disclose the "unvarnished
advice" -- only the names of those who
provided it. The vice president has already
revealed he, or members of his staff, met
on at least five occasions with Enron
officials.
Yet rather than give out any more names,
the vice president has challenged the
accounting office's authority to request
this information. Thus the G.A.O. must
sue to resolve the question.
If the vice president does not believe, as a
matter of principle, that the General
Accounting Office should have oversight
power, he should try to sell Congress on
changing the statute that empowers it.
That he has not done, perhaps because he
knows such an effort would be futile.
Richard Nixon was most vocal about
maintaining this or that principle of
executive authority when he had the most
to hide. I cannot but wonder what truly
motivates Mr. Cheney's newfound interest
in litigating principles of executive versus
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legislative authority. On the surface it
appears he has decided he is better off
taking the political fallout from resisting
the accounting office's request than he
would be if he disclosed the information.
I can only speculate as to why he is
stonewalling. But I don't need to speculate
about the effect of his stonewalling. It
places the vice president, knowingly or
not, in cover-up mode.
In fact, much of the Watergate cover-up
was simply stalling. The goal was to push
any potential problem beyond the 1972
election, and in that we succeeded. Later
Mr. Nixon would try to stall until he
completed his presidency, but he failed.
The Bush administration's stalling strategy
appears to be very simple: Delay
disclosing the requested information by
contesting the accounting office's
authority. It will take months, if not years,
for that lawsuit to work its way through
the lower federal courts before it can
ultimately be resolved by the Supreme
Court. Then, after losing in the Supreme
Court, the administration can still delay
release of the information by mounting
another fight over executive privilege --
which the president has not yet invoked.
All this litigation will certainly get the
administration safely past the 2004
election.
Of course, there is another possibility. Mr.
Cheney may believe that the five
conservative justices who put him in his
current job will again assist the
administration.
Such a remarkable political win in the
Supreme Court, effectively neutering the
oversight authority of the accounting
office -- and, by extension, that of
Congress -- would amount to a sesnic
realignment of power in Washington.
Before Bush v. Gore, I would have
considered such a ruling an impossibility.
Now I am not so sure.
John W. Dean served as White House
counsel from 1970 to 1973 and is author,
most recently, of "The Rehnquist Choice:
The Untold Story of the Nixon
Appointment That Redefined the
Supreme Court."
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Cheney Is Right to Fight the GAO
The Wall StwretJoumal
February 7, 2002
Douglas W. Kmiec
Will Enron drag Dick Cheney down with
it?
The General Accounting Office is
threatening to sue the vice president if he
doesn't spill the beans about the closed-
door sessions of his energy task force --
including, reportedly, meetings with top
Enron executives. Despite no evidence of
any wrongdoing, Democrats and the press
are striving hard to create the dreaded
"appearance of impropriety."
But think a moment about what the GAO
is demanding. If its demand are met, the
executive branch would have to report on
conversations held in private. It would
mean disclosing the names of everyone
Mr. Cheney or the task force talked with,
and what they talked about, including
market and proprietary information that
competitors don't share with one another.
How can anyone, whether in government
or out, work effectively without being able
to hold private meetings?
To those who have balked at the audacity
of its request, the GAO has retorted that
this is all "routine." Unfortunately, the
agency is telling the truth. The GAO has
been in the habit of interfering with the
constitutional functions of the presidency
for the last quarter-century.
By statute, as Congress's auditor, the
GAO has specific responsibilities: It is
empowered to conduct financial audits
that ensure federal dollars are not
misspent. And it is empowered to evaluate
the effectiveness of government programs
created by statute. Nowhere is it
authorized to play grand inquisitor, with
the right to tell the vice president and the
president who they can talk to, or how to
formulate policy.
The GAO's mission creep doesn't have to
be tolerated. Back in 1988, I had a face-off
with GAO over its desire to supervise the
National Security Council in its
formulation of policy toward Panamanian
dictator Manuel Noriega. The Department
of Justice's ruling at the time left little
wiggle room for GAO overreaching then
or now. "GAO's investigative authority.
. . is limited to auditing the finances of
government agencies and is thus
inadequate basis for the GAO Noriega
investigation, which clearly goes well
beyond a financial audit," Justice
concluded.
GAO's justification of its actions on the
basis of a catch-all authority to "evaluate
the results of a program or activity the
Government carries out under existing
law" was also rejected. The phrase
"program or activity under existing law,"
we noted at the time, only refers to
activities that are carried out pursuant to
statute -- not to any and every activity
carried out by the president in the course
of discharging his constitutional
responsibilities.
Vice President Cheney would be well
advised to make a similar argument.
Providing, that is, he doesn't ask the
president to summarily dismiss the lawsuit
altogether. That course of action, while
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perhaps politically dicey, would be
perfectly justified -- the president is
authorized by statute to terminate the
GAO's misdirected actions. Judicial
enforcement is denied the GAO
"whenever the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget or the President
certify that the information could be
withheld," and "disclosure reasonably
could be expected to impair substantially
the operations of the Government."
Note that in all of this, the president need
not even fall back on "executive privilege"
to prevent the disclosure of information
given to him in confidence.
Executive privilege has never fully
recovered from the black eye President
Nixon gave it when he misapplied it to
cover up executive wrongdoing. But like
other legal "privileges" (e.g., attorney-
client), it exists for a good reason. As
numerous judicial rulings make clear,
executive privilege protects information
about state secrets, pending law
enforcement matters, or the pre-
decisional conversations of those helping
the president.
To be sure, the privilege is not absolute.
Mr. Nixon had to give way to a Supreme
Court ruling which forced him to turn
over the White House tapes in order to
ensure a fair trial for Watergate
defendants. But often forgotten is the fact
that the federal courts did not require Mr.
Nixon's famous tapes be supplied to the
Senate Watergate Committee -- only to
the courts. That committee's work could
be completed with the partial transcripts,
the courts ruled, that the president had
already delivered.
In our present moment, similar
considerations should apply. Congress has
already been given a comprehensive task
force report by which to evaluate
President Bush's energy policy. Aside
from the Democrats' desire to cast
suspicion on the president by insinuation,
neither Congress nor its offshoot, the
GAO, needs to know the strategies that
were revealed to the vice president under
the promise of confidentiality.
Government is necessarily dependent
upon the informational expertise of
regulated industries in fashioning
economically efficient and effective
regulation. Those who say otherwise are
spinning an unhelpful yam.
What about Hillary Clinton's health-care
task force? scream the Democrats. Didn't
Republicans (and this editorial page)
castigate Mrs. Clinton for not disclosing
who her outside advisers were meeting
with as they formulated an overhaul of the
nation's health-care system? Yes, but
there's an important difference.
The energy task force, made up entirely of
executive officers, is outside the statutory
scope of the open meeting requirements
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
Those requirements only apply when
nongovernmental individuals are given
direct say over policy making -- a line that
Mrs. Clinton's task force (but not Mr.
Cheney's) crossed.
Likewise, Congress has long exempted
from the Freedom of Information Act the
very kind of pre-decisional, consultative
material that GAO now seeks. These
exemptions are critical to preserving the
constitutional balance secured by the
separation of powers.
This is what the vice president is fighting
for, as Congress, and the GAO, aim to tar
a highly popular president with the
misdeeds of a failed corporation. Mr.
Cheney is not fighting for political
advantage; he is fighting for high
principle.
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Judge Orders Cheney Panel's Files Released;
Courts: Ruling Opens a New Path to Details of Secret U.S. Energy Policy Meetings
That the Vice President Had Sought to Suppress.
Los Angeles Times
February 28, 2002
Edmund Sanders
A federal judge has ordered the U.S.
Department of Energy to release
documents that could shed light on secret
meetings between Vice President Dick
Cheney's energy task force and industry
officials, saying the records were in
"extraordinary public interest."
The ruling, issued Feb. 21 and made
public Wednesday, requires the
government to make available thousands
of pages related to meetings held last year
as President Bush was developing his
national energy plan.
Numerous lawmakers, including Rep.
Henry A. Waxman (D-Los Angeles),
suspect that the meetings may reveal that
industry leaders, including officials of the
now-bankrupt Enron Corp., had
significant input into shaping the policy.
Energy Department officials said
Wednesday that they would comply with
the judge's ruling. "We've always said we
would comply and have worked diligently
to do so," said Energy Department
spokeswoman Jill Schroeder.
A White House spokesman declined
comment, referring reporters to the
Energy Department statement.
The lawsuit was filed in December by the
Natural Resources Defense Council, an
environmental organization. It seeks much
of the same information as a landmark
suit filed last week against Cheney himself
by the General Accounting Office, the
investigative arm of Congress.
Despite pleas from some Republicans,
Cheney has steadfastly refused to release
the records, saying that the president has
the right to keep the information private
and warning that disclosure might hinder
the president's ability to gather
unvarnished opinions.
Administration officials said last week that
if necessary they would invoke "executive
privilege" to maintain the confidentiality
of Cheney's records.
Presidents dating back to George
Washington have employed this doctrine
to withhold information from Congress or
the judiciary. By targeting the Energy
Department rather than the vice
president, the council skirted this issue.
The council's Freedom of Information
Act request applies only to records
involving Energy Secretary Spencer
Abraham or other department staff
members. But since the department
played a large role in the task force, it is
expected that the documents will be
similar to those sought under the GAO
suit.
U.S. District Judge Gladys Kessler
ordered the department to release the
records in two batches, on March 25 and
April 10.
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Noting that the council first requested the
documents in April 2001, Kessler
chastised the department for its "woefully
tardy" response.
"In addition to having no legal or practical
justification for working at a glacial pace
on [the council's request] until the suit was
filed in December, the material which [the
council] seeks is of extraordinary public
interest," she wrote, noting that Congress
is expected to take up sweeping energy
legislation as early as this week.
"It's a devastating defeat for the
administration and another sign that their
position is weak and they're not going to
prevail," said Phil Schiliro, Waxman's
chief of staff.
The continuing White House refusal to
release details of its energy task force's
inner workings has caused deep
consternation among Republicans, who
fear the political fallout from the
perception that Cheney has something to
hide.
The lawsuits have also put a bright
spotlight on the administration's close ties
to Texas energy executives; both Bush
and Cheney have backgrounds in the
energy business. And the standoff over
the release of information has become
even more sensitive for the Bush
administration in recent months because
of the collapse of Houston-based Enron,
one of the nation's largest energy
companies and a major supporter of
Bush's presidential campaign.
The White House has acknowledged that
Cheney or members of the task force met
six times last year with representatives of
Enron, but it has refused to release other
details.
Previously, the Energy department had
informed the court that it would release
the records between March 15 and May
15. Schroeder, the department
spokeswoman, said the release was
delayed because the department had to
sort through more than 7,000 pages of
documents.
Attorneys for the council accused the
department of "stonewalling."
"We ran out of patience and the judge ran
out of patience," said Sharon Buccino,
senior attorney at the council. She said she
expects the records to include the names
of participants at task force meetings,
dates and topics discussed.
Buccino predicted that the records will
reveal heavy lobbying by energy industry
interests.
"It's a policy that benefits Enron and
other energy companies while doing
nothing to promote true energy
independence," Buccino said, referring to
Bush's May 2001 energy plan.
A spokesman for the GAO could not be
reached.
But Buccino said the GAO suit remains
important because it may uncover
additional meetings that did not include
Energy Department officials.
In Washington today, another federal
judge will hear arguments in a similar
lawsuit filed by Judicial Watch, a
watchdog legal group that is seeking the
same records from Cheney.
Times staff writer Edwin
contributed to this report.
Chen
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White House Subpoenaed Over Contacts with Enron;
Inquiry: The Bush Team Defends Its Staff Actions and Provides the Senate Panel
with Information about Letters, Phone Calls and Meetings
Los Angeles Times
May 23, 2002
Richard Simon
Escalating the confrontation between the
legislative and the executive branches over
the Enron bankruptcy, a Senate
committee Wednesday issued the first
congressional subpoenas directed at the
Bush White House, seeking information
about its contacts with officials of the
energy giant.
A few hours after the subpoenas were
issued, the White House provided the
committee with summaries of dozens of
contacts--including letters, telephone calls
and meetings--between Enron officials
and the administration. The summaies
were being prepared before the committee
action, the White House said.
The issuance of the subpoenas came after
the administration, in a separate fight,
filed court papers seeking dismissal of a
first-ever lawsuit by the General
Accounting Office against the executive
branch. The suit concerns private
meetings held by Vice President Dick
Cheney's energy task force with industry
groups. The White House contends that
turning over any executive branch
information to Congress would make it
more difficult for future presidents and
their staffs to seek candid advice. The
Democrats, for their part, are equally
intent on asserting their oversight powers.
The Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee, chaired by Sen. Joseph I.
Lieberman (D-Conn.), approved the
subpoenas on a party-line vote as part of
its investigation into
government could have
prevent Enron's collapse.
whether the
done more to
The subpoenas--issued to the executive
office of the president and to Cheney's
office--seek information on White House
contacts with Enron representatives about
appointments to regulatory agencies and
the administration's energy policy. They
also request Enron-related
communications between the White
House and federal agencies.
White House spokeswoman Anne
Womack said the administration was
perplexed that Lieberman had chosen
"this confrontational approach rather than
working cooperatively."
In a nine-page letter to Lieberman sent
late Wednesday, the administration said it
had found "no instance in which Enron
approached any person within the
executive office of the president or the
office of the vice president seeking help in
connection with its financial difficulties
prior to bankruptcy."
The White House-Enron contacts listed in
the letter were more extensive than had
previously been disclosed, though many
included large group meetings, telephone
calls, letters or ceremonial events, such as
the 2001 White House Easter egg roll.
The White House listed more than a
dozen meetings--most already publicized--
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between senior administration officials
and Enron representatives last year.
Enron Chairman Kenneth L. Lay called
and wrote White House personnel
director Clay Johnson recommending
appointing Patrick H. Wood III and Nora
Brownell, among five others, to the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
While those two were named, the White
House said Lay had recommended 21
people, of whom "only three ultimately
received appointments."
White House Counsel Alberto R.
Gonzales had asked Lieberman to delay
the subpoenas, noting that he was
searching White House visitor entry files
and e-mails in an effort to cooperate.
But Lieberman, a potential challenger to
President Bush in 2004, contended that
the White House was not providing
everything he needed for his probe. After
two months of unsuccessful negotiations
with the administration, he said, "this
back-and-forth has continued, which has
ultimately frustrated the committee's work
and frustrated my patience."
"This administration believes that the
involuntary release of any information will
ultimately unravel presidential
prerogatives," said Marshall Wittmann, a
scholar at the conservative Hudson
Institute. "The Bush White House views
congressional subpoenas like
Transylvanian vampires view garlic."
Larry Sabato, director of the University of
Virginia Center for Politics, added: "The
Bush-Cheney administration is unusually
interested in preserving its executive
privileges and maintaining secrecy about
its own decisions....
"They're violating the basic rules of
modem-day politics: get information out
quickly and completely, and support
government in the sunshine instead of the
shade," Sabato said. "All the Bush
administration accomplishes in doing that
is to convince people that it has
something to hide."
But he noted: "It's also true that the
Democrats want Enron to be a major
issue during the fall campaign."
The Justice Department filed court papers
on Tuesday, seeking to dismiss the GAO
lawsuit. In a statement issued Tuesday, a
department spokeswoman said, "The
GAO's assertion of virtually unlimited
authority to investigate the executive
branch would revolutionize and violate
the separation-of-powers doctrine that has
made our nation's government so strong."
The president also has fought with fellow
Republicans over access to information.
Last December, Bush invoked executive
privilege in rejecting a subpoena issued by
the GOP chairman of the House
Government Reform Committee for the
Justice Department to turn over records
related to Clinton administration fund-
raising and a decades-old Boston mob
case.
Lieberman said he was not accusing the
White House of wrongdoing in its
dealings with Enron. "The clear message
I've gotten from the White House is that
they're not going to give us what we
want," Lieberman said.
Sen. Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.) said that
he saw no justification for subpoenaing
the White House [because no one at the
White House was responsible for
monitoring Enron's public disclosures or
energy business.].
Copyright © 2002 Los Angeles Times
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U.S. Judge Slams Administration;
Says White House Defines too Broadly What Advice Can Be Kept Confidential
Newsday
July 13, 2002
The Associated Press
A federal judge says the Bush
administration has a disturbingly broad
legal view of confidential advice to the
president that would keep a huge amount
of government information secret.
U.S. District Judge Emmet Sullivan also
accused the Bush administration of
making purposefully misleading
arguments in defending Vice President
Dick Cheney's energy task force against
two lawsuits.
The Sierra Club environmental
organization and Judicial Watch, a
conservative watchdog group, are seeking
records about how the Cheney task force
was influenced by industry lobbyists in
formulating national energy policy.
Sullivan criticized the administration's
position that applying the Federal
Advisory Committee Act to the Cheney
task force encroaches on the president's
right to receive confidential advice. "The
implications of the bright-line rule
advocated by the government are
stunning," Sullivan said.
The judge said the government's position
signifies that "any action by Congress or
the judiciary that intrudes on the
president's ability to recommend
legislation to Congress or get advice from
Cabinet members in any way would
necessarily violate the Constitution."
"Such a ruling would
understanding of checks
between the three
eviscerate the
and balances
branches of
government on which our constitutional
order depends," said the judge, adding
that the proper approach is to examine
whether disclosure would prevent the
executive branch from carrying out any
constitutionally assigned function.
The judge's opinion details his reasoning
for his rejection in May of the
administration's motion to dismiss the
cases.
Sullivan said Justice Department lawyers
defending the Cheney task force had
mischaracterized a minority opinion in a
Supreme Court case as if it were
controlling legal authority. He said the
government misstated the law in other
instances, as well.
"One or two isolated mis-citations or
misleading interpretations of precedent
are forgivable mistakes of busy counsel,
but a consistent pattern of misconstruing
precedent presents a much more serious
concern," Sullivan wrote.
Larry Klayman, chairman and general
counsel of Judicial Watch, said the judge's
opinion shows the administration's
arguments were made only to delay the
case.
[... ] [T]he judge granted the
administration's motion to dismiss Judicial
Watch's claims based on the Freedom of
Information Act.
Copyright © 2002 Newsday, Inc.
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Planned Parenthood V. ACLA
Ruling Below: (Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American
Coalition of Life Activists, 9" Cir., 290 F.3d 1058; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9314; 2002 Daily
Journal DAR 5376)
Prior to this suit, three physicians had been murdered, each after publication of their name
and address on posters identifying them as abortion doctors. Similar posters were
subsequently published identifying a number of the plaintiff physicians. Physicians and
clinics performing abortions brought suit under the Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances
Act (FACE) claiming they were targeted with threats by defendants, various activists and
individuals.
Based on context such as prior incidents of violence following publication of names and
addresses of abortion doctors, the court affirmed the holding that posters identifying
abortion doctors constituted a true threat and, thus, were not protected speech under the
First Amendment.
PLANNED PARENTHOOD of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc., et al., Plaintiffs-
Appellees,
V.
AMERICAN COALITION OF LIFE ACTIVISTS, et al., Defendants-Appellants
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
Decoded May 16, 2002
RYMER, Circuit Judge:
For the first time we construe what the
Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances
Act (FACE), 18 U.S.C. § 248, means by
"threat of force." FACE gives aggrieved
persons a right of action against whoever by
"threat of force ... intentionally ...
intimidates ... any person because that
person is or has been ... providing
reproductive health services. " 18 U.S.C. 5
248(a)(1) and (c)(1)(A). This requires that
we define "threat of force" in a way that
comports with the First Amendment, and it
raises the question whether the conduct
that occurred here falls within the category
of unprotected speech.
Four physicians, Dr. Robert Crist, Dr.
Warren M. Hem, Dr. Elizabeth Newhall,
and Dr. James Newhall, and two health
clinics that provide medical services to
women including abortions, Planned
Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette,
Inc. (PPCW) and the Portland Feminist
Women's Health Center (PFWHQ,
brought suit under FACE claiming that
they were targeted with threats by the
American Coalition of Life Activists
(ACLA), Advocates for Life Ministries
(ALM), and numerous individuals. Three
threats remain at issue: the Deadly Dozen
"GUILTY" poster which identifies Hem
and the Newhalls among ten others; the
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Crist "GUILTY "poster with Crist's name,
addresses and photograph; and the"
Nuremberg Files," which is a compilation
about those whom the ACLA anticipated
one day might be put on trial for crimes
against humanity. The "GUILTY" posters
identifying specific physicians were
circulated in the wake of a series of
"WANTED" and "unWANTED" posters
that had identified other doctors who
performed abortions before they were
murdered.
Although the posters do not contain a
threat on their face, the district court held
that context could be considered. It defined
a threat under FACE in accordance with
our "true threat" jurisprudence, as a
statement made when "a reasonable person
would foresee that the statement would be
interpreted by those to whom the maker
communicates the statement as a serious
expression of intent to harm. "Applying this
definition, the court denied ACLA's motion
for summary judgment in a published
opinion. Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. ACLA
(PPCW II ), 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or.
1998). The jury returned a verdict in
physicians' favor, and the court enjoined
ACLA from publishing the posters [... I
A panel of this court reversed. In its view,
the standard adopted by the district court
allowed the jury to find ACLA liable for
putting the doctors in harm's way by
singling them out for the attention of
unrelated but violent third parties, conduct
which is protected by the First
Amendment, rather than for authorizing or
directly threatening harm itself, which is
not. [... ]
We reheard the case en banc because these
issues are obviously important. We now
conclude that it was proper for the district
court to adopt our long-standing law on"
true threats" to define a "threat" for
purposes of FACE. [...]
III
ACLA argues that the First Amendment
requires reversal because liability was based
on political speech that constituted neither
an incitement to imminent lawless action
nor a true threat. It suggests that the key
question for us to consider is whether these
posters can be considered "true threats"
when, in fact, the posters on their face
contain no explicitly threatening language.
Further, ACLA submits that classic political
speech cannot be converted into non-
protected speech by a context of violence
that includes the independent action of
others.
FACE does not define "threat," although it
does provide that "the term 'intimidate'
means to place a person in reasonable
apprehension of bodily harm to him-or
herself or to another." 18 U.S.C. §
248(e)(3). Thus, the first task is to define
"threat" for purposes of the Act. This
requires a definition that comports with the
First Amendment, that is, a "true threat."
The Supreme Court has provided
benchmarks, but no definition.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 23
L. Ed. 2d 430, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 48 Ohio Op.
2d 320 (1969), makes it clear that the First
Amendment protects speech that advocates
violence, so long as the speech is not
directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is not likely to incite or
produce such action. [... ]
However, while advocating violence is
protected, threatening a person with
violence is not. In Watts v. United States,
394 U.S. 705 (1969), the Court explicitly
distinguished between political hyperbole,
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which is protected, and true threats, which
are not. [... ]
ACLA's position is that the posters,
including the Nuremberg Files, are
protected political speech under Watts, and
cannot lose this character by context. But
this is not correct. The Court itself
considered context and determined that
Watts's statement was political hyperbole
instead of a true threat because of context.
Id. at 708. Beyond this, ACLA points out
that the posters contain no language that is
a threat. We agree that this is literally true.
Therefore, ACLA submits, this case is really
an incitement case in disguise. [...]
Under our cases, a threat is "an expression
of an intention to inflict evil, injury, or
damage on another." Gilbert II, 884 F.2d at
457; Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1265.
"Alleged threats should be considered in
light of their entire factual context,
including the surrounding events and
reaction of the listeners." Orozco-Santillan,
903 F.2d at 1265; see also Mitchell, 812
F.2d at 1255 (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708;
Merrill, 746 F.2d at 462; Roy, 416 F.2d at
876). [... ]
It is not necessary that the defendant intend
to, or be able to carry out his threat; the
only intent requirement for a true threat is
that the defendant intentionally or
knowingly communicate the threat.
Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1265 n.3;
Gilbert II, 884 F.2d at 456-57; Mitchell, 812
F.2d at 1256 (upholding 5 871 conviction
of defendant with no capacity to carry out
threat); Roy, 416 F.2d at 877. Other circuits
are in accord. [...]
Threats are outside the First Amendment to
''protect individuals from the fear of
violence, from the disruption that fear
engenders, and from the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur. " R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 388,
120 L. Ed. 2d 305, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
This purpose is not served by hinging
constitutionality on the speaker's subjective
intent or capacity to do (or not to do) harm.
[ ... I
Neither do we agree that threatening speech
made in public is entitled to heightened
constitutional protection just because it is
communicated publically rather than
privately. As Madsen indicates, threats are
unprotected by the Fist Amendment
"however communicated." Madsen, 512
U.S. at 753.
Therefore, we hold that "threat of force" in
FACE means what our settled threats law
says a true threat is: a statement which, in
the entire context and under all the
circumstances, a reasonable person would
foresee would be interpreted by those to
whom the statement is communicated as a
serious expression of intent to inflict bodily
harm upon that person. So defined, a
threatening statement that violates FACE is
unprotected under the First Amendment.
Although ACLA does not believe we
should reach this point, if we do it submits
that no claim was made out even under
"true threats" cases. First, it argues that
other threats cases were criminal actions
against someone who made a real threat
directly to others, not political speech as is
the case here. It contrasts what it calls "a
threat plus context" present in United
States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir.
1996), and in other out-of-circuit cases,
with the absence of a direct threat in this
case. However, our cases do not require
that the maker of the threat personally
cause physical harm to the listener. [... ] It
is the making of the threat with intent to
intimidate -- not the implementation of it --
that violates FACE.
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ACLA also maintains that "context" means
the direct circumstances surrounding
delivery of the threat, or evidence sufficient
to resolve ambiguity in the words of the
statement -- not two weeks of testimony as
occurred here in the district court.
Otherwise, ACLA submits, FACE is facially
invalid. However, none of our cases has
limited "context "to explaining ambiguous
words, or to delivery. We, and so far as we
can tell, other circuits as well, consider the
whole factual context and "all of the
circumstances," Merrill, 746 F.2d at 462, in
order to determine whether a statement is a
true threat. [... ]
Indeed, context is critical in a true threats
case and history can give meaning to the
medium. Use of Ryder trucks -- which the
Eighth Circuit found to be a true threat in
United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067 (8th
Cir. 2000) -- is an example that is strikingly
similar to the use of "wanted"-type posters
in this case. Hart, who was a known anti-
abortion activist, parked two Ryder trucks
in the driveways of an abortion clinic, He
was prosecuted and convicted of violating
FACE. The court held that Hart had
threatened the clinic to intimidate it by
using Ryder trucks, because a Ryder truck
had been used in the Oklahoma City
bombing of the Murrah Federal Building.
Hart knew the clinicians knew this and
would fear for their lives. Thus, use of the
Ryder truck was a true threat. Like the
poster format here, the Ryder truck in Hart
was a symbol of something beyond the
vehicle: there, a devastating bomb; in this
case, murder.
The Nuremberg Files are somewhat
different. Although they name individuals,
they name hundreds of them. The avowed
intent is collecting dossiers on abortionists
in anticipation that one day we may be able
to hold them on trial for crimes against
humanity." [... ] However, offensive or
disturbing this might be to those listed in
the Files, being offensive and provocative is
protected under the First Amendment. But,
in two critical respects, the Files go further.
In addition to listing judges, politicians and
law enforcement personnel, the Files
separately categorize "Abortionists" [...].
Also, names of abortion providers who
have been murdered because of their
activities are lined through in black, while
names of those who have been wounded
are highlighted in grey. As a result, we
cannot say that it is clear as a matter of law
that listing Crist, Hem, and the Newhalls
on both the Nuremberg Files and the
GUILTY posters is purely protected,
political expression.
ACLA also contends that the district court
employed the wrong standard of intent,
allowing the jury to find in physicians' favor
regardless of ACLA's subjective intent. The
court instructed: "A statement is a 'true
threat' when a reasonable person making
the statement would foresee that the
statement would be interpreted by those to
whom it is communicated as a serious
expression of an intent to bodily harm or
assault." This language is taken from
Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1265, is an
accurate statement of our law, and is
faithful to the objective standard we use for
determining whether a statement is a true
threat. [...]
Finally, we note that the jury was instructed
that "even speech that is coercive may be
protected if the speaker refrains from
violence or from making a true threat.
Moreover, the mere abstract teaching of the
moral propriety or even moral necessity for
resort to force and violence is protected
speech under the First Amendment." [... ]
Accordingly, the court did not abuse its
discretion in formulating the instructions
[ ... I
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Having concluded that "threat of force"
was properly defined and that no trial error
requires reversal, we consider whether the
core constitutional fact -- a true threat --
exists such that the Crist and Deadly Dozen
Posters, and the Nuremberg Files as to
Crist, Hern, and the Newhalls, are without
First Amendment protection. [... ]
The posters are a true threat because, like
Ryder trucks or burning crosses, they
connote something they do not literally say,
yet both the actor and the recipient get the
message. To the doctor who performs
abortions, these posters meant "You're
Wanted or You're Guilty; You'll be shot or
killed." This was reinforced by the
scorecard in the Nuremberg Files. The
communication was not conditional or
casual. It was specifically targeted. [...]
Physicians' fear did not simply happen;
ACLA intended to intimidate them from
doing what they do.
This is the point of the statute and is
conduct that we are satisfied lacks any
protection under the First Amendment.
V
After trial, the district court found that each
defendant used intimidation as a means of
interfering with the provision of
reproductive health services and acted with
malice and with specific intent in
threatening physicians. It found that
physicians remain threatened by ACLA's
threats, and have no adequate remedy at
law. [...] Accordingly, it permanently
enjoined each of the defendants, their
agents, and all persons in active concert
with any of them [from threatening, or
using the posters or their equivalent with
the specific intent to threaten, the
plaintiffs.] [... ] The court also ordered
ACLA to turn over possession of materials
that are not in compliance with the
injunction.
ACLA complains principally about the
restraint on possessing the posters. Pointing
to Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567, 22
L. Ed. 2d 542, 89 S. Ct. 1243 (1969), where
the Court observed that "the State may no
more prohibit mere possession of obscene
matter on the ground that it may lead to
antisocial conduct than it may prohibit
possession of chemistry books on the
ground that they may lead to the
manufacture of homemade spirits, "ACLA
contends that the injunction treats the
posters worse than obscenity. However, the
posters in this case are quite different from
a book, the "wanted"-type posters
themselves -- not their ideological content -
are the tool for threatening physicians. In
this sense the posters' status is more like
conduct than speech. [Citation omitted.]
The First Amendment interest in retaining
possession of the threatening posters is de
minimis, while ACLA's continued
possession of them constitutes part of the
threat. [... ] [W]e cannot say that the turn-
over order was broader than necessary to
assure that this particular threat will not be
used again.
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, with whom
KOZINSKI, KLEINFELD, and
BERZON, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting:
[...] I write separately to emphasize one
point: the majority rejects the concept that
speech made in a political forum on issues
of public concern warrants heightened
scrutiny. See Majority Op. at 7116. This
rejection, if allowed to stand, would
significantly weaken the First Amendment
protections we now enjoy. It is a
fundamental tenet of First Amendment
jurisprudence that political speech in a
public arena is different from purely private
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speech directed at an individual. [Citation
omitted.] Political speech, ugly or
frightening as it may sometimes be, lies at
the heart of our democratic process. Private
threats delivered one-on-one do not. The
majority's unwillingness to recognize the
difference is extremely troublesome. For
this reason alone, I would be compelled to
dissent.
KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge, with whom
Circuit Judges REINHARDT,
O'SCANNLAIN, KLEINFELD and
BERZON join, dissenting [This opinion
was amended July 10, 2002, 2002 U.S. App.
Lexis 13829. Relevant changes have been
noted, Ed.]:
In this case, none of the statements on
which liability was premised were overtly
threatening. On the contrary, the two
posters and the web page, by their explicit
terms, foreswore the use of violence and
advocated lawful means of persuading
plaintiffs to stop performing abortions or
punishing them for continuing to do so.
Nevertheless, because context matters, the
statements could reasonably be interpreted
as an effort to intimidate plaintiffs into
ceasing their abortion-related activities. If
that were enough to strip the speech of
First Amendment protection, there would
be nothing left to decide. But the Supreme
Court has told us that "speech does not lose
its protected character ... simply because it
may embarrass others or coerce them into
action." NAACP v. Gaibome Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982) (emphasis
added). [...]
The record reveals one instance where an
individual--Paul Hill, who is not a
defendant in this case--participated in the
preparation of the poster depicting a
physician, Dr. Britton, and then murdered
him [some seven months later.] All others
who helped to make that poster, as well as
those who prepared the other posters, did
not resort to violence [...] There is
therefore no pattern showing that people
who prepare wanted-type posters then
engage in physical violence. [... ]
The majority tries to fill this gaping hole in
the record by noting that defendants "knew
the fear generated among those in the
reproductive health services community
who were singled out for identification on a
'wanted'-type poster." Maj. op at 7121. But
a statement does not become a true threat
because it instills fear in the listener. * * *
In order for the statement to be a threat, it
must send the message that the speakers
themselves--or individuals acting in concert
with them--will engage in physical violence.
Even assuming that one could somehow
distill a true threat from the posters
themselves, the majority opinion is still
fatally defective because it contradicts the
central holding of Claiborne Hardware:
Where the speaker is engaged in public
political speech, the public statements
themselves cannot be the sole proof that
they were true threats, unless the speech
directly threatens actual injury to
identifiable individuals. Absent such an
unmistakable, specific threat, there must be
evidence aside from the political statements
themselves showing that the public speaker
would himself or in conspiracy with others
inflict unlawful harm. 458 U.S. at 932-34.
The majority cites not a scintilla of
evidence--other than the posters
themselves--that plaintiffs or someone
associated with them would carry out the
threatened harm.
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BERZON, Circuit Judge, with whom
REINHARDT, KOZINSKI, and
KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges, join, and
O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge, joins as to
Part III only, dissenting:
In a rare instance, a threat uttered in the
course of a public political protest might
conceivably exceed the bounds of protected
speech. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d
1020 (2d Cir. 1976), is illustrative. [... ] In
Kelner, a member of the Jewish Defense
League stated at a press conference held in
New York just before Yassir Arafat was
scheduled to be in the city that "We have
people who have been trained and who are
out now and who intend to make sure that
Arafat and his lieutenants do not leave this
country alive .... We are planning to
assassinate Mr. Arafat .... Everything is
planned in detail .... It's going to come off."
Id. at 1021. The press conference was
broadcast on television that evening. Id.
The Second Circuit upheld the defendant's
conviction for uttering the threat, over the
objection that the speech was simply an
extreme statement of opposition to Mr.
Arafat, protected under the First
Amendment as hyperbolic public discussion
of a public issue. Id. at 1024-28.
[ ... ] The criteria the Second Circuit
suggested to police the dividing line were
that "the threat on its face and in the
circumstances in which it is made is so
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and
specific as to the person threatened, as to
convey a gravity of purpose and imminent
prospect of execution." Id. Measured
against these criteria, Kelner held that,
although politically motivated and designed
to convey a public position of protest to
Mr. Arafat's policies, the speech in question
was not protected speech. Id. at 1028.
Kelner's criteria for adjudging the
protection accorded alleged threats uttered
in the course of public communications on
public issues seem [, for the most part,]
appropriate to me[...]
This case, I repeat, is uniquely difficult
because to perceive a threat, one must
disregard the actual language used and rely
on context to negate the ordinary meaning
of the communication. Further, the actual
language is, in its own right, core First
Amendment speech, speech that to a naive
reader communicates protected information
and ideas. So the crux of the plaintiffs'
cause of action (once one accepts that only
statements that evince an intention by the
speaker or his or her agents to carry out the
threat can be actionable) is really an
assertion that the [.. ] context in which the
speech must be viewed provides the
necessary evidence of the defendants' true,
albeit coded, meaning.
The first set of contextual evidence involves
the poster/[... ]murder/poster/murder
pattern the majority principally relies upon.
Had the murders -- or any murders, or any
serious violence -- been committed by the
defendants and had the plaintiffs known
that, the inference from the poster/murder
pattern that the publication by them of
posters similar to those previously followed
by a murder might be a strong one. The
inference would be stronger had the
defendants also put out the earlier posters
and had the plaintiffs known that. Neither
is the case.
Plaintiffs' main submission to fill this gap
was extensive evidence concerning the
defendants' opinions condoning the use of
violence against medical professionals who
perform abortions, including general
statements to that effect and particular
statements concerning the people who
murdered the doctors depicted on the
previous posters, stating that their actions
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were justified and that they should be
acquitted. [... ]
This evidence is certainly of some
pertinence as to what the defendants may
have intended to do. [... ] Individuals who
believe in violence are not only more likely
to threaten to commit it but also actually to
commit it, and so defendants' views might
well influence plaintiffs' perception of their
speech. And since the defendants would
know that, defendants' public statements
approving the use of violence against
doctors who perform abortion are relevant
to whether reasonable speakers in
defendants' position would expect their
communications to be understood as
threats.
At the same time, heavy reliance on
evidence of this kind raises profound First
Amendment issues of its own. [...] [W]hile
advocacy evidence may make both an .intent
to threaten and a perception that there was
a threat more likely, that is not
unequivocally so. [... ][P]ermitting that
protected speech to be the determinative
"context" for holding other facially
protected, public protest speech -- the
posters and website in this case -- to be a
"true threat" seems to me simply
unacceptable under the First Amendment.
Finally, I note that the approach I've
outlined here fully comports with Claiborne
Hardware. Claiborne Hardware applied an
"extreme care" standard in determining
"liability on the basis of a public address --
which predominantly contained highly
charged political rhetoric." 458 U.S. at 926-
927. [...] As I read the opinion, it held,
essentially, that the supposed threats were
not on their face unequivocal and were not
made unequivocal by any contextual
factors. So here.
I would therefore hold that under the
special rules I would apply to public protest
speech such as that in this case, plaintiffs'
judgment cannot stand because, after a
proper review of the record, we would have
to conclude that there was no unequivocal,
unconditional and specific threat.
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Abortion Foes Are Ruled a Threat; Court: 'Wanted' Posters Labeling Doctors 'Baby
Butchers' Are Not Protected by the 1" Amendment, U.S. Appellate Judges Find
Los Angeles Times
May 17, 2002
Henry Weinstein
An Internet Web site and "wanted"
posters created by militant abortion foes
were real threats to doctors and the clinics
where they worked and are not protected
by the 1st Amendment, a federal appeals
court ruled Thursday.
"While advocating violence is protected"
under the 1st Amendment, "threatening a
person with violence is not," Judge
Pamela A. Rymer wrote for the sharply
divided court.
The 6-5 decision came in a closely
watched case that has been seen as a test
of how far courts will permit anti-abortion
activists to go. The ruling is binding in
California and eight other Western states.
In 1999, four doctors who had been
pictured on Wild West-style wanted
posters that labeled them "baby butchers,"
along with Planned Parenthood and a
clinic in Portland, Ore., won a $107-
million jury verdict and an injunction
against anti-abortion activists.
The injunction barred the activists from
continuing to put up the posters. Also at
issue in the case was a Web site called "the
Nuremberg Files" that contained a list of
doctors who provided abortions,
including in some instances their photos,
address, car license plate numbers and
names of family members.
The doctors were the first to win damages
and an injunction under the 1994
Freedom of Access to Clinics Act, which
bars the use of force or threats of force to
prevent access to abortion clinics.
The four doctors filed suit after three
other abortion providers who had been
named in wanted posters were shot and
killed.
The Web site featured the murdered
doctors on a list of people guilty of crimes
against humanity. The names of doctors
who had been murdered were shown
crossed off the list. The names of those
who had been shot and wounded were
grayed.
The defendants--13 individuals and two
organizations, the American Coalition of
Life Activists and Advocates for Life
Ministries--denounced the ruling for
restricting their free speech rights and said
they would appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
"I think this is another stop on the
continuing exodus from the 1st
Amendment in this nation," said Paul
deParrie, one of the defendants.
DeParrie used to edit the magazine
published by the Portland-based Life
Ministries group, which carried articles
defending the murder of abortion
providers as a tool to protect the unborn.
DeParrie said the organization had been
forced to shut down after the huge
damage judgment in the Portland case,
but he said he continues to protest at
clinics where abortions are performed.
Neal Horsley, a Carrollton, Ga., computer
programmer who operates the Nuremberg
Files Web site, was anything but cowed.
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"It strikes me that I am going to have to
make some changes. I am going to have to
add six more bloody baby butchering
judges to the Nuremberg Files list,"
Horsley said.
A day after the jury verdict in 1999, an
Internet service provider in Atlanta shut
down the site. But Horsley has kept the
site running, using a server in South Africa
and four others in places he declined to
name.
Horsley is not a named defendant in the
case, and it is unclear how the ruling will
affect him.
Supporters of abortion rights, meanwhile,
hailed the decision, saying it would afford
protection to abortion providers.
"The anti-choice people had reason to
know the doctors would feel threatened
by the posters," said James F. Newhall,
one of the plaintiffs who said he has been
performing abortions in Oregon since
1989.
Newhall said he became very frightened in
1994 when he learned from an FBI agent
"a wanted poster had gone up with my
name on it.
By then, he said, four doctors whose
names had appeared on prior posters had
been murdered.
"I got involved in the lawsuit because I
wanted to stop the violence, and it
appears that this has been successful. Not
one doctor has been murdered since the
trial," he said.
The last slaying of an abortion provider,
that of Dr. Barnett Slepian who was killed
by a sniper near Buffalo, N.Y., came a few
months before the Portland trial began.
Vicki Saporta, president of the National
Abortion Federation, said she thought a
variety of factors--including the Portland
lawsuit and a task force launched by Atty.
Gen. Janet Reno and maintained by Atty.
Gen. John Ashcroft--had contributed to a
reduction in violence at abortion clinics.
"I think this decision is important for the
continued protection of abortion
providers throughout the country," she
said.
The case has been in the appeals process
for several years. In March 2001, a three-
judge panel of the U.S. 9th Circuit Court
of Appeals overturned the jury verdict,
ruling that the anti-abortion materials
were protected speech.
That ruling caused an outcry by
supporters of abortion rights, including 40
members of Congress. In October, the
full 9th Circuit, based in San Francisco,
decided to reconsider the case, setting the
stage for Thursday's ruling.
Thursday's decision upheld the injunction
against the anti-abortion groups. But the
9th Circuit majority sent the case back to
District Judge Robert E. Jones to
reexamine the size of the punitive damage
award.
The ruling in Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Willamette vs. American
Coalition of Life Activists featured an
unusual ideological division.
Rymer, who was appointed by the first
President Bush, was joined in the majority
by one appointee of President Carter and
four appointees of President Clinton.
The dissenters, who argued that the anti-
abortion posters and Web site were
protected by the Constitution's free
speech guarantees, included two of the
court's most liberal judges and three of its
more conservative members.
"The defendants have not murdered
anyone," wrote Judge Marsha Berzon, one
of the dissenters.
"Neither their advocacy of doing so nor
the posters and Web site they published
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crossed the line into unprotected speech,"
she added.
"If we are not willing to provide stringent
1st Amendment protection ... to those
with whom we as a society disagree as well
as those with whom we agree ... the 1st
Amendment will become a dead letter."
Berzon, a Clinton appointee, was joined
by Judge Stephen Reinhardt, a Carter
appointee, and three judges appointed by
presidents Reagan and Bush--Alex
Kozinski, Diarmuid O'Scannlain and
AndrewJ. Kleinfeld.
Defining a 'True Threat'
The central issue dividing the judges is
what constitutes an illegal "true threat," as
distinct from vociferous advocacy that is
protected by the 1st Amendment.
Rymer said the definition of a true threat
is a statement that the maker of the threat
would know would be perceived by the
recipient "as a serious expression of intent
to inflict bodily harm to that person."
Rymer said there was considerable
evidence that the wanted posters were an
attempt to intimidate doctors.
The evidence showed a pattern in which
after three wanted posters appeared, the
physicians on them--David Gunn, George
Patterson and John Britton--were shot
and killed. After these murders, Rymer
said, the American Coalition of Life
Activists published "guilty" posters in
essentially the same format naming the
four doctors who sued.
Kozinski, in dissent, said he had no
quarrel with that definition of a true
threat. But the majority failed to apply its
own definition, he said.
"Neither Dr. Gunn nor Dr. Patterson was
killed by anyone connected with the
posters bearing their names," Kozinski
said.
The man who killed Dr. Britton
participated in making a poster naming
Britton but was not a defendant in this
case, he added.
"All others who helped to make that
poster, as well as those who prepared the
other posters, did not resort to violence,"
he wrote.
"A true threat warns of violence or other
harm that the speaker controls," Kozinski
wrote, and that was not the case here, he
said. Past U.S. Supreme Court decisions
have said that a threat must be explicit and
likely to cause "imminent lawless action,"
he added.
The ruling marked the first time that the
9th Circuit had ever found that a
statement made in a public forum
constituted a "true threat" that was not
entitled to 1st Amendment protection,
Kozinski added.
Reinhardt also stressed that point. "It is a
fundamental tenet of First Amendment
jurisprudence that political speech in a
public arena is different than purely
private speech directed at an individual,"
he wrote.
"Political speech, ugly or frightening as it
may sometimes be, lies at the heart of our
democratic process. Private threats
delivered one-on-one do not. The
majority's unwillingness to recognize the
difference is extremely troublesome," he
wrote.
Copyright @ 2002 Los Angeles Times
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43 in Congress Ask Court to Revisit Clinic Threat Issue;
Abortion: They Say a Web Site and Posters Calling Doctors Butchers' Aren't
Protected Free Speech
Los Angeles Times
April 13, 2001
Henry Weinstein
In a highly unusual move, 43 members of
Congress said Thursday they will ask the
federal appeals court in San Francisco to
revisit a recent ruling holding that an
Internet site and "wanted" posters
identifying abortion providers as "baby
butchers" deserving punishment are free
speech.
In a friend-of-the-court brief to be filed
today, 12 U.S. senators--including
California Democrats Barbara Boxer and
Dianne Feinstein--and 31 House
members--mostly Democrats, including
eight from - California--warn that the
March 28 decision could spawn renewed
violence at abortion clinics.
The lawmakers assert that the ruling
permitting the "Deadly Dozen" poster,
which accused abortion doctors of
"crimes against humanity," and the Web
site titled "the Nuremberg Files,"
undermined the legislative intent of the
1994 Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act.
The law bars the use of force or threats of
force to prevent access to reproductive
health services. The statute was passed in
the wake of more than 400 incidents of
violence at abortion clinics in 1993, as well
as the murders that year of two doctors
who provided abortions.
Sen. Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.), who
co-wrote the law, is spearheading the
lawmakers' effort. Other participants
include Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.),
a key sponsor of the law in the Senate,
and two Republicans: Sen. Susan Collins
of Maine and Sen. James M. Jeffords of
Vermont.
Schumer said the ruling by the U.S. 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals threatened to
erode the impact of the statute, which he
said had "played a major role in
dramatically reducing the number of
crimes and threats against women and
doctors."
The lawmakers' brief asserts that the
legislative intent of the statute was meant
to cover threats such as those on the
"Nuremberg Files" Web site, which listed
doctors who provide abortions, including
in some instances their photos, addresses,
car license plate numbers and names of
family members.
The names of doctors murdered by
abortion foes were lined out on the Web
site and those wounded were marked in
gray.
According to the brief, the three-judge
panel of the 9th Circuit "disregarded
Congress' intent that the statute be
construed as broadly as possible to
achieve Congress' remedial purpose of
eradicating violence and intimidation."
The lawmakers announced their action a
day after the Planned Parenthood
Federation of America, one of the primary
plaintiffs in the case, filed papers in the
9th Circuit asking the court to grant a
rehearing in the case.
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For that to happen, a majority of the 9th
Circuit's 25 active judges would have to
vote for a new hearing. Court officials said
that in a typical year, the 9th Circuit grants
review by a larger panel of judges--known
as an en banc hearing--in less than 1% of
all of its cases.
The lawmakers contend that the case
meets all the relevant cntena for an en
banc hearing. Their brief--filed by former
federal appeals court Judge John J.
Gibbons of Newark, N.J.--asserts that the
ruling conflicts with prior 9th Circuit
decisions, conflicts with decisions of other
federal appeals courts, and "presents an
issue of exceptional importance."
In addition to the lawmakers' brief, the
Anti-Defamation League and the Feminist
Majority Foundation already have
informed the 9th Circuit that they intend
to file friend-of-the-court briefs seeking
reversal of the unanimous decision.
The plaintiffs in an Oregon case--four
doctors, Planned Parenthood and a clinic
in Portland--were the first to win a jury
verdict under the 1994 law: a $ 107-
million damages judgment in February
1999. Consequently, the appeal has been
closely watched as a sign of what kinds of
restraints courts will impose on abortion
foes.
The 9th Circuit ruling, written by Judge
Alex Kozinski, overturned the Portland
verdict in which a jury concluded that the
posters and Web site were a real threat to
four abortion doctors and the clinics
where they worked.
Held liable were 13 militant anti-abortion
activists--including one who had written a
book defending people who had
murdered doctors who provided
abortions--and two anti-abortion groups:
the American Coalition of Life Activists
and Advocates for Life Ministries.
U.S. District Judge Robert E. Jones, who
presided at the Portland trial, had told
jurors that they could find the defendants
liable based on the Web site and the
posters if they determined that "a
reasonable person making the statement
would foresee that the statement would be
interpreted by those to whom it is
communicated as a serious expression of
an intent to do bodily harm or assault."
In addition to reversing the massive
damages judgment, 9th Circuit Judge
Kozinski--joined by Judges Andrew J.
Kleinfeld and William W. Schwarzer--also
overturned an injunction issued by Jones,
which held that the posters and Web site
were "a blatant and illegal communication
of true threats to kill, assault or do bodily
harm."
Staunch abortion foes described the 9th
Circuit decision as a vindication of their
1st Amendment rights. But the ruling was
immediately condemned by abortion
rights activists and the doctors as giving
license to fanatics.
In his opinion, Kozinski wrote that the
defendants "can only be held liable if they
authorized, ratified or directly threatened
violence."
"If defendants threatened to commit
violent acts, by working alone or with
others, then their statements could
properly support the verdict. But if their
statements merely encouraged unrelated
terrorists, then their words are protected
by the 1st Amendment," the judge added.
Moreover, Kozmski wrote, "political
speech may not be punished just because
it makes it more likely that someone will
be harmed at some unknown time in the
future by an unrelated party."
The 9th Circuit decision undermined
Congress intent in three important ways,
according to the lawmakers' brief.
"Congress' specifically articulated concern
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that Wanted'-style posters, precisely like
those in this case, be prohibited by the
statute," the brief states.
The brief makes no reference to a 1982
U.S. Supreme Court decision that
Kozinski cited as the primary
underpinning of his opinion. In that case,
NAACP vs. Claiborne Hardware Co., a
group of white-owned businesses sued the
NAACP and others who organized a civil
rights boycott against certain stores in
Mississippi.
Local NAACP leader Charles Evers had
warned blacks at a rally that "if we catch
any of you going in any of them racist
stores, we're gonna break your damn
neck."
The high court acknowledged that Evers'
statements could be interpreted as inviting
violent action, but held that the
statements were constitutionally protected
because there was insufficient evidence
that Evers had "authorized, ratified or
directly threatened acts of violence."
Kozinski said that the same rationale
applied in the current case--Planned
Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette
Inc. et al vs. American Coalition of Life
Advocates.
However, in legal papers filed this week,
Planned Parenthood attorneys said that
the 9th Circuit misapplied the Claiborne
decision, stressing that the plaintiffs in
that case "were white merchants not
targeted by Evers' statements and who
sued not for any threatened violence
against them, but for profits lost during a
seven-year economic boycott."
Lawyers for the defendants in the Oregon
case did not return calls seeking comment
Thursday.
Copyright @ 2001 Los Angeles Times
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Free Speech Is Nothing to Fear
The Wall Stwet Journal
April 3, 2001
Eugene Volokh
The "Nuremberg Files" case, reversed last
week by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, has been hailed as a victory
for pro-life advocates. But the case raises
a broader question, one that isn't confined
to any particular movement: Just when
may the law punish menacing political
speech?
In the mid-1990s, the American Coalition
of Life Activists posted on the Web
dossiers on abortion providers and some
prominent abortion-rights supporters.
The site, called the Nuremberg Files,
contained strident antiabortion advocacy,
plus photographs and addresses of people
whom ACLA believed to be "war
criminals." This information, ACLA said,
would be used in "perfectly legal courts
once the tide of this nation's opinion turns
against the wanton slaughter of God's
children."
Naturally, the people listed on the site felt
threatened, given past attacks on abortion
clinics and assassinations of abortion
providers. Indeed, just last week
authorities arrested in France an
antiabortion activist charged with the
sniper killing of a New York doctor. The
menace was exacerbated by the site's
specially marking the names of those who
had already been murdered or wounded.
Moreover, past antiabortion violence had
sometimes been preceded by similar
posters.
The abortion providers sued, claiming the
Web site and related print materials were
constitutionally unprotected threats, and a
jury awarded them over $100 million. This
is the award the Ninth Circuit reversed (in
an opinion by Judge Alex Kozinski, for
whom I clerked eight years ago).
Many U.S. political movements --
abolitionist, labor, civil-rights, antiwar,
animal-rights, or environmentalist -- have
had violent fringes. And in each
movement, even those who didn't stoop
to violence have sometimes condemned
their enemies in harsh, militant terms.
These words, against a backdrop of
violence, may easily carry an implied
message of threat.
In fact, 20 years ago, the Supreme Court
confronted a case, NAACP vs. Claiborne
Hardware, involving this very question.
Civil-rights leader Charles Evers helped
organize a black boycott of white stores,
aimed at securing equal treatment for
blacks in Claiborne County, Miss.; the
boycott was mostly peaceful, but not
entirely so. Shots were fired into some
boycott violators' houses; others were
beaten or had their property vandalized.
They were also publicly exposed; "store-
watchers" recorded which blacks shopped
at white-owned stores, and announced
their names in a local newspaper and in
church.
And there was speech that, given the
violence, was threatening: Mr. Evers said
that the sheriff wouldn't be able to protect
boycott violators and, allegedly, that "if we
catch any of you going in any of them
racist stores, we're gonna break your
damn neck" Despite this, the Supreme
Court unanimously held that his speech
was constitutionally protected.
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The Ninth Circuit was thus faced with a
controlling precedent. Both the
Nuremberg Files and Mr. Evers's speech
could be seen as threatening, especially
given the context of violence. Of course,
the Web site included people's addresses,
but in the black community in Claiborne
County, where many people knew each
other, listing boycott violators' names was
likely tantamount to including addresses.
And if anything, Mr. Evers's speech was
somewhat more explicitly threatening than
the Nuremberg Files.
The ideology was different -- but that's
one distinction the First Amendment
prohibits the government from drawing.
Pro-life speech is as protected as pro-civil-
rights speech.
So the Ninth Circuit had to decide the
case in favor of the speakers; and this is
one of the great advantages of our
precedent-based legal system. Judges
know the rules they create will ultimately
cover both those with whose message
they sympathize and those whose message
they loathe. Protection for civil-rights
protesters led to protection for pro-life
protesters. Likewise, the Nuremberg Files
case will be cited to protect still other
political movements.
But the tougher questions are the ones the
Ninth Circuit, which was bound by the
Supreme Court's decision, couldn't fully
confront: Was Claiborne right? Should
Mr. Evers's talk of "necks being broken"
have been protected? Or should the law
protect victims of threatening speech
more than the speakers?
This is a genuinely difficult issue, but I
think Gaiborne got it basically right; the
alternative is too restrictive. Whenever
words are said against a backdrop of
violence, listeners can read threats into
statements. Harshly condemning
strikebreakers or polluters several months
after the shooting of a strikebreaker or an
ecoterroist attack may be reasonably seen
by many as an implied threat.
But such statements are an inevitable part
of political debate, especially -- as with
abortion -- when speakers see the issue
literally as a matter of life and death. It's
important for us to hear this speech,
partly because some aspects of it may be
right, and partly because the very fact that
people feel so strongly about an issue is
itself important to know. If a jury's finding
that the speech is implicitly threatening
can lead to a $100 million verdict, many
people (except perhaps the most
irresponsible) would be unwilling to
express their honest views. We need to
punish the violence, but protect the
speech.
There are, of course, necessary limits on
all speech, and courts recognize that some
threats are constitutionally unprotected.
As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, explicit
threats of violent acts are indeed
punishable.
But as with all First Amendment
exceptions, it's important to keep this one
narrowly limited. When statements made
in public contain no explicit threat of
violence, or merely warn about the risk of
violence by unrelated third parties, the
Ninth Circuit held they must be protected.
A harsh rule, but necessary -- not just for
the protection of pro-life speech but of
speech on all topics that make people's
blood run hot.
[Eugene Volokh is a law professor at
UCLA]
Copyright ( 2001, Dow Jones &
Company, Inc.
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A Civil Action Becoming Doctors' Defense Weapon;
Abortion: Providers Are Turning to the Courts for Relief.
Current Case Raises Internet 1st Amendment Issues
Los Angeles Times
January 13, 1999
Kim Murphy
When Dr. Warren Hem walks into a
restaurant, he heads for a seat with its
back to the wall. He installed bulletproof
glass on his office windows and $ 1,400
worth of blinds at home. He varies his
route to work. At public meetings, he
wears a bulletproof vest.
"I felt like a hunted animal .. . like I could
be shot at any time," the Boulder, Colo.,
physician said of his life after being listed
on a "wanted poster" and an Internet site
launched by anti-abortion groups. "The
message is, 'Do what we tell you to do, or
we will kill you'--and they do."
Across a federal courtroom here--and on
the other side of one of America's deepest
political divides--defendant Andrew
Burnett set out to erect a moral
framework to counter Hem's fear. "If the
child in the womb--who I believe is a
human being--could be defended in a way
I would defend my own child who is
born, it's possible there's even a legal
argument for committing violence . . . to
save the life of the child," he said.
After more than two decades of clinic
violence, the abortion-rights movement
now is fighting its radical opponents in a
way that law enforcement hasn't been able
to--by filing lawsuits that seek millions of
dollars in damages, as well as an end to
veiled threats against abortion providers.
At issue in the trial unfolding here this
week before U.S. District Judge Robert
Jones is an Internet site that invites
readers to send in names, addresses and
personal details about abortion providers,
then crosses their names off a list when
they are attacked or killed. A similarly
themed poster offered a $ 5,000 reward
for information about a "deadly dozen"
doctors allegedly "guilty of crimes against
humanity."
The lawsuit, which seeks $ 200 million in
damages, is the first private civil case to go
to trial under the 1994 federal law that
prohibits force or threats of force against
clients and providers of reproductive
health services.
Touchy Subject for the ACLU
Pushing the boundaries of 1st
Amendment protection on the Internet,
the suit--filed by the local Planned
Parenthood chapter and several other
abortion providers--also seeks a
declaration that the Web site and various
"wanted posters" are illegal threats not
protected by the Constitution.
Never before have anti-abortion forces
been targeted for the kinds of understated
messages--a doctor's photo and address
on a poster, a comparison of abortion
providers to Nazi war criminals--that
could inspire as much fear as a direct
threat.
The American Civil Liberties Union,
recognizing the fine line that divides free
speech and illegal intimidation, has
weighed in guardedly, arguing that the 1st
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Amendment does not shield those who
make threats of imminent bodily harn.
"The challenge, therefore, is to distinguish
between a 'true threat' . . . and statements
that are protected--and must be protected
if we are not to chill vigorous and spirited
political debate about important and
controversial matters," the group said in a
friend-of-the-court brief.
Michael Bray, another defendant in the
case, who had served nearly four years in
prison in the 1980s for clinic bombings,
said in an interview Tuesday, "The history
of this case is the plaintiffs have failed to
discover any real violation of the law, so
now they've stretched it to make it
somehow that our words become
threatening."
If someone who sees a poster elects to
shoot a doctor whose picture is shown, "I
suppose there's an inevitable connection
to be drawn, but one need not make our
speech culpable for someone else's
deeds," said Bray, against whom a default
judgment already has been entered in the
case, after he refused to answer questions
about his past criminal activities. "When
someone rails against a politician and
another one comes up and shoots him,
that doesn't mean someone's speech
should be restricted because someone else
acts on his invective."
At issue is the fringe element of the anti-
abortion movement that has moved a step
beyond the protests and harassment
targeting abortion clinics to a series of
violent attacks on abortion providers and
clinic workers.
Since 1977, there have been 153 incidents
of arson, 39 bombings and 99 acid attacks
against abortion providers, according to
the National Abortion Federation. Seven
physicians and clinic workers have been
killed in the last five years, with 16
attempted murders since 1991.
The most recent--and most brazen--attack
was the Oct. 23 murder of New York
abortion provider Barnett A. Slepian, who
died while standing in his kitchen with his
wife and son when a sniper fired a bullet
through the window.
Defendants in the civil suit--which targets
the American Coalition of Life Activists,
the Portland-based Advocates for Life
Ministries and such prominent members
of the anti-abortion movement as Burnett,
Bray, Charles Roy McMillan and Donald
Treshman--have on occasion advanced
the argument that killing abortion
providers may constitute "justifiable
homicide" in the defense of unborn
children.
"Abortionists are serial killers. They're
paid, contract serial killers," Burnett said
in an interview read in court this week.
Burnett was one of the founders of
Operation Rescue in the 1980s, before
helping found the American Coalition of
Life Activists.
Call for Information, Not Violence
Attorneys for the defendants have argued
that none of the posters or Web site
materials suggest violence--the deadly
dozen poster offers its reward "for
information leading to arrest, conviction
and revocation of license to practice
medicine"--and that none of the plaintiffs
named in the material has been the target
of any violent attack.
During cross-examination, Christopher
Ferrara of the American Catholic Lawyers
Assn. also confronted Hern--one of the
few physicians in the country who
performs third-trimester abortions--with a
statement from Hem's own Web site
about families who request an intact fetus
in order to bury it and proceed in the
grieving process.
" 'For many of these patients, it's not a
fetus, it's a baby,' " Ferrara read from
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Hem's Web site. "Can you not see how
something like this would prompt some
people to condemn what you do? You
don't see that some people would look at
that and say, 'Look, doctor, you're killing
babies?' "
"No," Hem replied.
The defense is attempting to show that
the physicians bringing the suit have been
the targets of public scom for years, and
therefore have no reason to see the
posters and Web site as particularly
onerous.
Message of Violence Loud and Clear
The plaintiffs must show that, even
though the materials did not specifically
threaten violence, they were intended to
be threatening and were perceived as real
dangers in the climate of fear and
intimidation in which these physicians
live.
As evidence, the plaintiffs cited earlier
posters, not prepared by the defendants in
this case, that preceded the 1993 murders
of doctors David Gunn, John Britton and
George Patterson in Pensacola, Fla.
They also provided testimony from the
FBI and U.S. Marshal's service, whose
agents said they immediately offered
protection to doctors named in the deadly
dozen poster, which they regarded as
threatening.
"When understood in this context, and
taken either individually or together, the
intended message of the defendants'
posters is unmistakable: If you do not
stop providing access to reproductive
health care, you will be injured or
murdered," Planned Parenthood said in its
complaint.
Lawyers and parties in the case have been
prohibited from talking to the press. But
other organizations say its outcome could
be crucial to future battles against anti-
abortion activists in the civil courts. Until
now, private groups such as the National
Organization for Women have been
limited to state and federal racketeering
statutes, which require proof of overt
extortion and a concerted pattern of
activity.
The U.S. Justice Department has used the
1994 abortion clinic law in criminal and
civil courts, but has been reluctant to
bring suit in cases that do not involve
open threats of violence, said Priscilla
Smith of the Center for Reproductive Law
and Policy in New York.
"This case is the first one that challenges
this kind of activity, putting information
out there that feels threatening to the
doctors, but somebody isn't coming up
and saying, 'I'm going to kill you,' " she
said.
Smith said it is also important to raise
challenges to threats posted on the
Internet, because of its potential for rapid
and wide dissemination.
Bray denied that any of the defendants in
the case were responsible for the
"Nuremberg Trials" Web site, which is
operated by a Georgia computer
programmer not named in the case--
although the site originally listed the
American Coalition of Life Activists as a
sponsor. Bray did say, however, that the
posters targeting abortion physicians are a
legitimate way of bringing public scorn on
them.
"It's a way of saying, 'You ought to be
ashamed of what you do,' " Bray said.
"One thing would be to persuade the
public, why should you want to consult
with such a person, why would you want
to have such a person in your
neighborhood? It's an exposing of evil."
Copyright ' 1999 Times Mirror Company
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Kasky v. Nike
Ruling Below: (Kasky v. Nike, Cal. Sup. Ct., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 45 P.3d 243, 2002 Cal. Lexis
2591, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296, 2002 Cal. Daily Op. Service 3790, 2002 DailyJournal DAR
4757)
Plaintiff alleged that the corporation, in response to public criticism, and to induce
consumers to continue to buy its products, made false statements of fact about its labor
practices and about working conditions in factories that made its products. Because the
messages in question were directed by a commercial speaker, the corporation, to a
commercial audience, and because they made representations of fact about the corporation's
own business operations for the purpose of promoting sales of its products, the court
concluded that these messages were commercial speech for purposes of applying state laws
barring false and misleading commercial messages.
Question Presented: Whether Nike's allegedly false statements were commercial or
noncommercial speech for purposes of constitutional free speech analysis under the
California and United States Constitutions.
Marc KASKY, Plaintiff and Appellant,
V.
NIKE, Inc., et al., Defendants and Respondents
Supreme Court of California
Decided May 2, 2002
KENNARD, J:
The issue here is whether defendant
corporation's false statements are
commercial or noncommercial speech for
purposes of constitutional free speech
analysis under the state and federal
Constitutions. Resolution of this issue is
important because commercial speech
receives a lesser degree of constitutional
protection than many other forms of
expression, and because governments may
entirely prohibit commercial speech that is
false or misleading.
Because the messages in question were
directed by a commercial speaker to a
commercial audience, and because they
made representations of fact about the
speaker's own business operations for the
purpose of promoting sales of its
products, we conclude that these
messages are commercial speech for
purposes of applying state laws barring
false and misleading commercial
messages. Because the Court of Appeal
concluded otherwise, we will reverse its
judgment.
Beginning at least in October 1996 with a
report on the television news program 48
Haws, and continuing at least through
November and December of 1997 with
the publication of articles in the Financial
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Times, the New York Times, the San
Francisco Chronicle, the Buffalo News,
the Oregonian, the Kansas City Star, and
the Sporting News, various persons and
organizations alleged that in the factories
where Nike products are made workers
were paid less than the applicable local
minimum wage; required to work
overtime; allowed and encouraged to
work more overtime hours than applicable
local law allowed; subjected to physical,
verbal, and sexual abuse; and exposed to
toxic chemicals, noise, heat, and dust
without adequate safety equipment, in
violation of applicable local occupational
health and safety regulations.
In response to this adverse publicity, and
for the purpose of maintaining and
increasing its sales and profits, Nike and
the individual defendants made statements
to the California consuming public that
plaintiff alleges were false and misleading.
Specifically, Nike and the individual
defendants said that workers who make
Nike products are protected from physical
and sexual abuse, that they are paid in
accordance with applicable local laws and
regulations governing wages and hours,
that they are paid on average double the
applicable local minimum wage, that they
receive a "living wage," that they receive
free meals and health care, and that their
working conditions are in compliance with
applicable local laws and regulations
governing occupational health and safety.
Nike and the individual defendants made
these statements in press releases, in
letters to newspapers, in a letter to
university presidents and athletic
directors, and in other documents
distributed for public relations purposes.
Nike also bought full-page advertisements
in leading newspapers to publicize a
report that GoodWorks International,
LLG, had prepared under a contract with
Nike. The report was based on an
investigation by former United States
Ambassador Andrew Young, and it found
no evidence of illegal or unsafe working
conditions at Nike factories in China,
Vietnam, and Indonesia.
Plaintiff alleges that Nike and the
individual defendants made these false
and misleading statements because of
their negligence and carelessness and
"with knowledge or reckless disregard of
the laws of California prohibiting false and
misleading statements."
For purposes of categorizing Nike's
speech as commercial or noncommercial,
it does not matter that Nike was
responding to charges publicly raised by
others and was thereby participating in a
public debate. The point is illustrated by a
decision of a federal court of appeals
about statements by a trade association
denying there was scientific evidence that
eating eggs increased the risk of heart and
circulatory disease. ( National Conrission on
Eg Nutnition u Federal Trade Corrsion
(7th Cir. 1977) 570 F.2d 157, 159, cert.
den. (1978) 439 U.S. 821, 58 L. Ed. 2d
113, 99 S. Ct. 86.) The court held that
these statement were commercial speech
subject to regulation by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) to the extent the
statements were false or misleading, even
though the trade association made the
statements "to counteract what the FTC
described as 'anti-cholesterol attacks on
eggs which had resulted in steadily
declining per capita egg consumption.'
(Id at p. 159.) [... ]
Here, Nike's speech is not removed from
the category of commercial speech
because it is intermingled with
noncommercial speech. To the extent
Nike's press releases and letters discuss
policy questions such as the degree to
which domestic companies should be
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responsible for working conditions in
factories located in other countries, or
what standards domestic companies ought
to observe in such factories, or the merits
and effects of economic "globalization"
generally, Nike's statements are
noncommercial speech. Any content-
based regulation of these noncommercial
messages would be subject to the strict
scrutiny test for fully protected
speech.[...]
We also reject Nike's argument that
regulating its speech to suppress false and
misleading statements is impermissible
because it would restrict or disfavor
expression of one point of view (Nike's)
and not the other point of view (that of
the critics of Nike's labor practices). The
argument is misdirected because the
regulations in question do not suppress
points of view but instead suppress false
and misleading statements of fact. As we
have explained, to the extent Nike's
speech represents expression of opinion
or points of view on general policy
questions such as the value of economic
"globalization," it is noncommercial
speech subject to full First Amendment
protection. Nike's speech loses that full
measure of protection only when it
concerns facts material to commercial
transactions--here, factual statements
about how Nike makes its products.
Moreover, differential treatment of speech
about products and services based on the
identity of the speaker is inherent in the
commercial speech doctrine as articulated
by the United States Supreme Court. A
noncommercial speaker's statements
criticizing a product are generally
noncommercial speech, for which
damages may be awarded only upon proof
of both falsehood and actual malice. (See,
e.g., Bose Cop. v Corsurmus Unmon of US.,
Ic, stpra, 466 U.S. at p. 513 [so treating
unflattering statements in a consumer
magazine's review of high fidelity
speakers].) A commercial speaker's
statements in praise or support of the
same product, by comparison, are
commercial speech that may be prohibited
entirely to the extent the statements are
either false or actually or inherently
misleading. (In m R.M.J., stpm, 455 U.S. at
p. 203.) To repeat, the justification for this
different treatment, as the high court has
explained, is that when a speaker
promotes its own products, it is "less
necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements
for fear of silencing the speaker" because
the described speech is both "more easily
verifiable by its disseminator" and "less
likely to be chilled by proper regulation." (
Va. Pharricy Bd u Va. Corsunr Gu4
szpra, 425 U.S. at p. 772, fn. 24, 96 S. Ct.
at pp. 1830-1831; accord, Loriard Tohakc
Ca u Relly supra, 533 U.S. at p. 576 ['121
S. Ct. at p. 2433.)
[CHIN, J., dissenting:]
While Nike's critics have taken full
advantage of their right to " 'uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open' " debate (Ganson,
supra, 379 U.S. at p. 75), the same cannot
be said of Nike, the object of their ire.
When Nike tries to defend itself from
these attacks, the majority denies it the
same First Amendment protection Nike's
critics enjoy. Why is this, according to the
majority? Because Nike competes not only
in the marketplace of ideas, but also in the
marketplace of manufactured goods. And
because Nike sells shoes--and its defense
against critics may help sell those shoes--
the majority asserts that Nike may not
freely engage in the debate, but must run
the risk of lawsuits under California's
unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof.
Code, 5 17200 et seq.) and false
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advertising law (Bus. & Prof. Code, 5
17500 et seq.), should it ever make a
factual claim that turns out to be
inaccurate. According to the majority, if
Nike utters a factual misstatement, unlike
its critics, it may be sued for restitution,
civil penalties, and injunctive relief under
these sweeping statutes. (Maj. opn., ante, at
pp. 6-8.)
Handicapping one side in this important
worldwide debate is both ill considered
and unconstitutional. Full free speech
protection for one side and strict liability
for the other will hardly promote vigorous
and meaningful debate. "Debate on public
issues will not be uninhibited if the
speaker must run the risk that it will be
proved in court that he spoke out of
hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred,
utterances honestly believed contribute to
the free interchange of ideas and the
ascertainment of truth." (Garnson, supra,
379 U.S. at p. 73.) The state, "even with
the purest of motives, may not substitute
its judgment as to how best to speak for
that of speakers and listeners; free and
robust debate cannot thrive if directed by
the government." ( Rdey v National
Federation cf Blind (1988) 487 U.S. 781, 791,
101 L. Ed. 2d 669, 108 S. Ct. 2667 (Riley).)
In its pursuit to regulate Nike's speech--in
hope of prohibiting false and misleading
statements--the majority has unduly
trammeled basic constitutional freedoms
that form the foundation of this free
government. ' "Where . . . suppression of
speech suggests an attempt to give one
side of a debatable public question an
advantage in expressing its views to the
people, the First Amendment is plainly
I take no sides in this public debate. Who is right
and who is wrong is not for me, or the majority, to
decide. It is for the public--fully informed as the
First Amendment guarantees--to judge. ( Genz v
Rdert Wekh, Inc, supra, 418 U.S. at pp. 339-340.)
offended." ( Firt National Bank ofBaston u
Bellati (1978) 435 U.S. 765, 785-786, 55 L.
Ed. 2d 707, 98 S. Ct. 1407 (BeAlott), fn.
omitted.)
Here, Nike's statements regarding its labor
practices in China, Thailand, and
Indonesia provided vital information on
the very public controversy concerning
using low-cost foreign labor to
manufacture goods sold in America.
Nike's responses defended against adverse
reports that its overseas manufacturers
committed widespread labor, health, and
safety law violations. Far from promoting
the sale of its athletic products, Nike did
not include this information through
product labels, inserts, packaging, or
commercial advertising intended to reach
only Nike's actual or potential customers.
Rather, Nike responded to the negative
publicity through press releases, letters to
newspapers, and letters to university
presidents and athletic directors. (Cf.
Bdger, supra, 463 U.S. 60 [contraceptive
manufacturer's informational pamphlets
included with advertisements deemed
commercial speech].) To the extent Nike
may have been financially motivated to
defend its business and livelihood against
these attacks, this motivation is not
dispositive in identifying speech as
commercial. (Bdger, supra, 463 U.S. at p.
67.) "Viewed in its entirety, [Nike's
speech] conveyed information of potential
interest and value to a diverse audience . .
(Bigdozg supra, 421 U.S. at p. 822.)
Indeed, characterizing Nike's speech here
as commercial speech is inconsistent with
the high court's constitutional
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jurisprudence for yet another reason.
The high court has stated that traditional
commercial speech is speech that " 'does
"no more than propose a commercial
transaction." ' " (Va. Phamcy Bd, supra,
425 U.S. at p. 762; Blger, supra, 463 U.S. at
p. 66; see also Bard of Trstas, State Univ
jfN. Y v Fax (1989) 492 U.S. 469. 473,
106 L. Ed. 2d 388, 109 S. Ct. 3028;
Zaudewr v Cffw of DIscilinary Couisel
(1985) 471 U.S. 626, 637, 85 L. Ed. 2d
652, 105 S. Ct. 2265; but see Central
Hudson Gas & Ele v Public Seru Corm'n,
supnz, 447 U.S. at p. 561 [commercial
speech is "expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its
audience"].) In this case, Nike's speech
here went beyond proposing a
commercial transaction. It provided
information vital to the public debate on
international labor rights and reform. As
the Court of Appeal below observed,
"information about the labor practices at
Nike's overseas plants .. . constituted data
relevant to a controversy of great public
interest in our times."
2 While the majority correctly observes that in this
constitutional analysis, "the very first question is
whether the speech that the law regulates is
entitled to First Amendment protection at all"
(maj. opn., ante, at p. 31), it conflates this question
with the issue whether commercial speech may be
regulated, the latter a foregone conclusion. (Bdger,
supra, 463 U.S. at p. 65.) Advocating what it calls a
"limited-purpose" definition of commercial speech
(maj. opn., ante, at pp. 20, 29), the majority
proposes that a company's factual statements
about its products or services are commercial and
subject to regulation if these statements are "false
or misleading." (Id. at p. 31.) In other words, the
majority concludes "a law that prohibits only such
unprotected speech cannot violate constitutional
free speech provisions." (Ibid.) Whether a
company's statements are allegedly false or
misleading does not determine the threshold
question at issue in this case--whether the speech
is commercial or noncommercial. (See Cerrral
Hdson Gas & Ela: v Public Seru Cam'n (1980)
447 U.S. 557, 566, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341, 100 S. Ct.
2343.)
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Boardrooms Fret over Nike Ruling: Will U.S. Supreme Court Hear the Appeal?
National La wJoumal
May 13, 2002
Gary Young
A decision by the California Supreme
Court concerning public statements made
by Nike Inc. has raised alarms in the
corporate world and among First
Amendment scholars.
On May 2, the Supreme Court ruled, 4-3,
that public statements made by the
sportswear manufacturer in defense of its
overseas labor practices were entitled to
no more freedom from regulation than
the companys advertisements explicitly
touting its products.
The decision in Kasky v. Nike Inc., No.
S087859, clears the way for a state trial
court to determine if Nike's public
statements-which included press releases,
newspaper advertisements and letters to
editors, university presidents and athletic
directors-violated California's unfair
competition and fair advertising laws. The
latter statute outlaws not only false
statements, but also true statements that
have "a capacity, likelihood or tendency to
deceive or confuse the public." If found
liable, Nike could be forced to surrender
all profits attributable to the statements.
Corporate specialists warn that it has the
potential to sweep up any and all
statements made by corporations and
other organizations, such as labor unions,
with little regard for geographic
boundaries.
Steven G. Brody, a partner in the New
York office of Atlanta's King & Spalding,
warned that it will have a chilling effect
not limited to California, noting that one
of the statements that landed Oregon-
based Nike in a California court was a
letter to the New York Times.
On the other hand, Alan M. Caplan of
San Francisco's Bushnell, Caplan &
Fielding, who represented Marc Kasky,
the person who sued Nike, said, "I don't
think corporations have a reason to be
upset. All the court said was that they
have to tell the truth."
Jim Carter, Nike's general counsel for the
U.S. and Americas, said that it will now be
much more difficult for Nike to
participate in the policy debate over
globalization, leaving the public with a
lopsided view of the issue. He added that,
"We are optimistic that the U.S. Supreme
Court will take review of the case."
The case began when Kasky, a California
resident, sued Nike under a California law
allowing private citizens to seek
enforcement of state laws on behalf of the
general public. Kasky alleged that Nike
lied or misled its audience when it said
that its overseas subcontractors respected
applicable standards for wages and
working conditions. When the trial court
dismissed his complaint on First
Amendment grounds, Kasky appealed.
The California Court of Appeals agreed
with the trial court that Nike's statements
on an issue of public policy were
"noncommercial" and thus were entitled
to the highest degree of First Amendment
protection (unlike product promotions
and other forms of "commercial speech,"
which the U.S. Supreme Court has given
only an intermediate level of protection).
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Supreme court reverses
The California Supreme Court rejected
that reasoning in an opinion written by
Justice Joyce L. Kennard. Nike's
statements were commercial, she
reasoned, because Nike is a commercial
entity, because it directed its message at
potential customers (most emphatically in
its letters to athletic directors, but also in
statements reaching the general shoe-
buying public); and because it was making
factual representations about its own
business practices. Kennard was not
moved by Nike's arguments that it entered
the marketplace of ideas to defend itself
against accusations that had already
received a public airing and that
intermediate protection would put a chill
on only one side of the debate. Nor did
she agree with dissenting Justice Ming W.
Chin's argument that Nike's statements
were entitled to maximum protection
because their commercial elements were
"intextricably entwined" with
noncommercial public-policy opinions.
Kennard wrote: "No law required Nike to
combine factual representations about its
own labor practices with expressions of
opinion about economic globalization,
nor was it impossible for Nike to address
those subjects separately." Kennard said
that Nike and other commercial speakers
have so great a financial stake in getting
their message across that they are unlikely
to fall silent at the prospect of
government regulation.
As a result of the decision, Brody believes
that any corporation that does a minimum
of business in California now could be
haled into court for statements it makes in
the media that reach California. In an
amicus brief he filed on behalf of the
Product Liability Advisory Council, a
manufacturer's advocacy group, Brody
urged the California Supreme Court to
give Nike the same hands-off treatment
accorded to private citizens and other
participants in the public debate over
globalization and overseas labor.
Professor Robert Post of the Boalt Hall
School of Law at the University of
California has been critical of the U.S.
Supreme Court's recent trend toward
greater protection of commercial speech,
but nonetheless said, "The California
Supreme Court's logic is troubling and far-
reaching." He argues that while the court
set limits on what sorts of corporate
speech will be considered commercial,
"The limits of the doctrine are arbitrary
and thus unstable." That instability may
push the courts toward sweeping up all
corporate speech, he warns: "What does a
corporation ever say that doesn't
somehow serve its financial interests?"
Post also fears that labor unions could be
swept up by the decision, since policy
statements about the North American
Free Trade Agreement, for instance,
might be construed as a bid to gain new
members.
"Organized labor disagrees with the good
professor," said Donald C. Carroll of San
Francisco's Carroll & Scully, who filed an
amicus brief against Nike on behalf of the
AFL-CIO's California affiliate. He refused
to elaborate.
Kasky's attorney Caplan feels that the
California Supreme Court's decision is in
line with U.S. Supreme Court precedents
dealing with commercial speech. Even if
the high court were inclined to overturn
the decision, however, he sees an obstacle.
Kasky brought the Nike suit under an
unusual California law that does not
require him to prove that he suffered any
injury; in essence, he was acting as a sort
of "private attorney general." For just that
reason, Caplan claims, the case presents
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Beware Clever Metaphors! Eliminate Humor! California Supreme Court Opinion
Tells Businesses: Anything You Say Can And Will Be Used Against You!
The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel
June 2002
Thomas H.Clarke, Jr.
Every company might puff a bit when it
comes to describing their products or
services. Consumers are rarely confused
when they see the resulting advertisements
or PR blitzes, but the California Supreme
Court seems to be and it means bad
news for companies promoting their
wares in California.
In its May 2 opinion in Kasky v. Nike,
Inc. (Docket 5087859), the court said that
all sorts of company promotions and
communications might have a "tendency
to confuse" even if the communications
are true. So long as the speech is
"commercial," then California's Business
and Professional Code Section 17500
applies, meaning that California residents
can file suit against a company and force it
to defend its advertising materials, PR
announcements, brochures, web sites,
business cards, letterhead and news
conference content. So long as any part of
whatever was said, printed or conveyed
reaches a California resident, then a
lawsuit may be filed on the grounds that
the speech has a tendency to confuse.
Anyway a business looks at this
development, it's a bizarre version of a
Brave New World.
Why Rely On The Truth?
The Kasky v. Nike lawsuit arose in
California's lower courts as part of the
controversy surrounding Nike's purported
reliance on underpaid foreign labor to
produce its goods. When Nike publicly
responded that these allegations were
false, a lawsuit was filed under Section
17500.
The suit claimed Nike's denials about its
foreign labor practices were false and thus
provided grounds upon which to sue in
California. "...advertising which, although
true is either actually misleading or which
has a separate tendency, likelihood or
tendency to deceive or confuse the
public" is subject to suit. Yes, the
California Supreme Court is saying that a
mere tendency to confuse is enough.
Oddly, this is not the only example of
ideologues and extremists at work within
the judicial system, hoping to enforce
their agendas. For example: The California
Milk Advisory Board is being sued
because its cheese ads state that California
cows are "happy". The plaintiffs allege
that this is a false statement because cows
"suffer" on dairy farms. Reason appears to
be thrown to the wind. Beware clever
metaphors and personifications!
An Extremist's Paradise
Not surprisingly, plaintiffs have a financial
incentive to file lawsuits like these. Rarely
economic dummies, they are aware that
companies will buy peace rather than
defend lengthy and public litigation. The
reward is a settlement in which plaintiffs
are awarded substantial attorney's fees as
well as a skewed ability to say they are
acting in the public's interest to enforce
the law.
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On a broader level, they turn the key in a
Pandora's Box of future litigation, which
neither protects consumers from false or
misleading advertising nor promotes any
public interest other than their own. Until
a higher court finds the wisdom to strike
down the "tendency to confuse" standard
which is not the standard applied by the
U.S. Supreme Court - businesses would be
smart to take several precautionary steps.
Waiting For A Iigher Court's Wisdom
Certainly, if a California consumer
assumes the role of private attorney
general as is allowed under Section
17500 and files a "tendency to confuse"
lawsuit, the wise company defends the
spurious action. Until lawsuits like these
go the way of the dinosaur, companies
should also assess the risk its advertising,
media and promotional materials might
pose.
Some reasonable precautionary steps
might include:
* Review materials (print and electronic)
for statements of objective fact and
confirm that there is laboratory data to
support any claims made. For example, a
statement that a product contains a
specified percentage of a certain
ingredient, which yields various desirable
characteristics, should be confirmed as to:
The percentage of the ingredient
present; and
* The interrelationship between ingredient
and desirable attributes.
* If statements of product quality are
made, then quality assurance and quality
control procedures should be undertaken
to assure that the requisite quality does
indeed exist and the error rate is
statistically insignificant.
* If statements of "puffery" of any sort
are made, ("the best", "the most", "less
work"), they should be supported by valid
surveys of consumers. The "puff" should
not have any tendency to mislead or
confuse.
Thomas H.Clarke, Jr. is a Senior Partner
with the law firm Ropers Majeski Kohn &
Bentley. He helps businesses ensure fact-
based statements in their promotional
materials and defends lawsuits brought by
ideologues and extremists that seek to
challenge business communications. He
also defends lawsuits on unfair business
practices, false advertising, toxic torts,
Proposition 65 and environmental
contamnation.
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Just Sue It
The Golden Gate Xprss Magazine
Corbett Miller
At Niketown on San Francisco's Union
Square, the employees seem happy. Clean
and well groomed in their Nike uniforms,
these workers enjoy working in this huge,
shiny, architecturally-pleasing shrine to
modern consumerism. They are blessed
with optimal working conditions,
including access to health care, good food,
and a harassment-free environment.
Many other employees that work for Nike
do not enjoy the same benefits as the ones
on public-view at Niketown. The third-
world sweatshops where Nike products
are made do not even remotely resemble
the shiny, happy Niketown in San
Francisco.
Instead, these contract factories are unsafe
and hostile places to work. According to
at least two Nike-comnissioned reports
and numerous other independent
investigations, employees in Nike's South
East Asian sweatshops endure physical
and verbal abuse, sexual-harassment,
forced overtime, and exposure to toxic
chemicals. This is not the picture that
Nike wants the American public to see.
Not at Niketown and not in full-page ads
in Sports Illustrated or the San Francisco
Chronicle.
But back in San Francisco, that's exactly
what Mark Kasky and Alan Caplan would
like to see.
Kasky is a veteran San Francisco activist
who, with the help of lawyer Alan Caplan,
has filed a lawsuit in California against
Nike for breaching California's Consumer
Protection laws. The lawsuit claims that
Nike's recent public relations campaign,
which promotes itself as a leader in labor
reform, violates false-advertising laws and
thus is not protected by the First
Amendment.
"We cannot make Nike change their
sweatshops, turn them into acceptable
places to work. But we can stop them
from misrepresenting the factory
conditions or misrepresenting anything
else in the promotion of their product in
California," says Caplan.
However, Nike officials claim the press
releases and editorials that Caplan has
brought up in the lawsuit are "part of a
public dialogue, and protected by the First
Amendment." Robert Johnson, an
advertiser for CreativeWerks in San
Francisco thinks Nike has a case. "This
sounds more like public-relations than
advertising, which is covered under the
First Amendment," says Johnson. "They
are doing damage control, which is their
job. Nike has every right to defend
themselves."
In an interview with Damien Carrick on
ABC Radio's The Law Report, Nike's
Communications Manager, Vada Manager
defended his company's role in
sweatshops. "This lawsuitSraises no new
claims and although we take the matter
seriously and have always been concerned
about the health and safety and wage
levels of our workers, we will defend
ourselves in this particular suit."
So far, two lower courts in California have
agreed with Nike. The case was first
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dismissed from San Francisco Superior
Court in 1999 and again by the appellate
court last March. Now, the California
Supreme Court has agreed to hear the
case.
Nike's defense in the first two court
battles has been that the public messages
are protected by the First Amendment,
not the actual content of the messages.
Manager reiterated this point in a recent
phone interview. "We don't concern
ourselves so much that the claims in the
lawsuit are true, we try to continually
improve our processes every day."
San Francisco lawyer James Wagstaffe
believes this case could have important
ramifications on free-speech.
"Commercial speech receives limited First
Amendment protection. If it is a false
statement of fact, designed to advance
their product then it is not protected,"
says Wagstaffe. "This case will be a very
interesting one to watch."
Josh Karliner, Executive Director of
CorpWatch, a San Francisco based
watchdog group is not so reserved with
his evaluation of the issue. "If this case is
successful, it will serve as a significant
deterrent to other corporations who
promote socially and environmentally
sound images through media and
advertising, when they are often at the
root of these problems." This type of
image advertising has a name--
greenwashing. Karliner points to the oil
industry as being notorious for
greenwashing. "Corporations like
Chevron and Shell spend millions of
dollars in projecting a positive image."
In the heart of San Francisco's Financial
District, smashed between two high-rises,
there is a building that looks like it missed
the City's recent real estate gold rush. This
building has no doorman, and not much
of a lobby. On the sixth floor are the law
offices of Bushnell, Caplan & Fielding.
One look at the spartan, cramped offices
and it is apparent that clients of these
lawyers are not the big, wealthy
corporations that occupy many of the
surrounding buildings. Just the opposite.
Only two clues give away the fact that
these are law offices at all. One being the
volumes upon volumes of law books
lining the walls. The other being the huge
framed story on the wall of the waiting
room. From the magazine California
Lawyer, the story is about a lawyer who
brought down the "Joe Camel" ad
campaign for Camel cigarettes. After
reading the story of the famed lawyer, it is
no wonder why Mark Kapsky called Alan
Caplanthat dayin November.
Caplan's office handles mostly false-
advertising suits. He has one pending now
against WebTV for not delivering
everything they promised. But the Nike
suit, this is the one that people are paying
attention to.
Of course there have been thousands of
false-advertising lawsuits in the past, but
this is unique. If this case is successful it
could set a precedent in regards to what
Caplan calls "image advertising." By image
advertising, Caplan means the trend in
advertising a product by promoting a way
of life, instead of actually what a product
does or is about. "The judge will have to
look at what has been happening in
advertising for the last 10 to 15 years, and
decide if what Nike has done is truthful or
not," says Caplan.
Nike's sweatshop woes began in the late
1990s, in particular when a Nike
commissioned audit by Ernst & Young
was leaked to media outlets. This 1996
audit details unsafe work conditions in
numerous Nike contract-factories in
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Vietnam. Included in the audit were
reports of forced overtime (after already
working 10 to 12 hour days) while using
the toxic chemicals toluene and acetone
without proper ventilation or protective
clothing.
The audit was completed just three
months before another Nike
commissioned investigation began. This
second report, conducted by Andrew
Young, a former U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations, reflects favorably on
Nike. The Young report, released willingly
by Nike, missed nearly all of the
misgivings the Ernst & Young had found
just months before.
Not surprisingly, the Ernst & Young
report was never released by Nike. It was
finally leaked to media outlets by a
disgruntled employee after the Young
report had been released and cast Nike in
a favorable light. Before the audit was
leaked, Nike CEO Phil Knight had taken
the opportunity through press releases
and editorials in major newspapers to tout
Nike's improvements for sweatshop labor.
In November 1997, after the Ernst &
Young audit had been leaked to the
media, Mark Kasky was at home reading a
copy of the New York Times. On the
front page was a story about Nike's,
sweatshops. Kasky was outraged and
decided to call Caplan.
California is a very good place to take a
corporation to task for false advertising.
The consumer protection laws are very
broad, and specifically do not require a
plaintiff (Kasky) to prove that they were
harmed or damaged in anyway. So, acting
on behalf of the public of the state of
California, Mark Kasky brought a private
attorney general action against Nike Inc.
Since the lawsuit was first filed almost
four years ago, Nike has experienced
several setbacks regarding sweatshops. As
recently as February of this year, another
Nike commissioned report was released
detailing physical, verbal, and even sexual
abuse in its Indonesia factories. The
investigation was conducted by Global
Alliance; a group of transnational
corporations, non-profits groups, and
non-governmental organizations. Nike is a
member of Global Alliance, along with
Gap Inc. and the World Bank, both of
which have had their own share of labor
issues in third world countries.
"Nike has made very limited changes in its
factories over the past two to three years,"
says Jason Mark, of San Francisco's
watchdog group Global Exchange. "They
have two pressing issues in their
sweatshops right now. paying their
workers a living wage, and allowing them
the ability to form unions. Until these
issues are resolved, their factories remain
sweatshops," says Mark. Nike's website
addresses the Global Alliance report.
"The Global Alliance report raised some
disturbing issues about the workplaces in
Indonesia where some Nike products are
made. No worker should be subjected to
some of the working conditions reported
in this assessment," said Nike's Vice
President for Corporate Responsibility
Dusty Kidd.
In court documents, Caplan lists labor
infractions documented by various
investigations, followed by Nike's false
public statements. The list is long, but a
few stand out, particularly one about a
living wage.
On October 27, 1997, Nike issued a press
release with quotes from Kathryn Reich,
Nike Manager of Women's Sports Issues,
regarding living wage policy. "Nike is
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fulfilling our responsibility as a global
corporate citizen each and every day by
guaranteeing a living wage for all
workers."
However, on September 28, 1997, one
month before the press release, Dusty
Kidd, whose title at the time was Director
of Nike's Labor Practices department
wrote a letter to Prema Mattai-Davis,
Ph.D., CEO of YWCA of America. In the
letter he addressed Nike's concerns about
a living wage for employees. "I am fully
cognizant of the call on the part of some
for a 'living wage.' That is generally
defined as sufficient income to support
the needs of a family of four. We simply
cannot ask our contractors to raise wages
to that level-whatever that may be-while
driving us all out of business, and
destroying jobs, in the process."
Caplan doesn't get fired up when talking
about the case, probably because it's been
going on since 1997 and won't even be
heard by the California Supreme Court
until sometime late this summer. But his
eyes do light up when he talks about what
he and Kasky want from Nike.
There are three things: First, an injunction
where the judge orders Nike to stop all
misrepresentations in California. Second,
that Nike institute a corrective advertising
campaign in California, funded by Nike.
And third, that Nike "disgorge" all profits
made from the misrepresentations. This
money would be offered to consumers in
the form of refunds, while the court
would decide which charities would get
whatever is left.
The last two points on Caplan's wish list:
how much did they make because of the
misleading advertising, and what
constitutes "corrective advertising"; will
have to be decided upon by experts from
both sides. However, no matter what the
outcome is in the end, Kasky gets nothing.
Acting as a private attorney general for the
public, having not been harmed or
damaged at all, he will receive no payment
if he wins.
[Corbett Miller is a senior staff reported
for the Golden Gate Xpress Magazine, a
publication of the San Francisco State
UniveristyJournalism Department.].
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Gagged by the Left
The New York Post
June 23, 2002
George Will
WHEN the history of today's liberalism is
written, the writers may marvel at that
political persuasion's remarkable reversal
of convictions regarding persuasion.
Nothing more tellingly illuminates the
contemporary liberal mind than the retreat
from the defense of First Amendment
guarantees of free speech.
This year's enactment of yet more
campaign-finance regulations that expand
government restrictions on the quantity of
political speech is just the latest
confirmation of what professor Martin
Shapiro of the University of Califormia
School of Law at Berkeley noted in 1996.
He wrote that "almost the entire First
Amendment literature produced by liberal
academics in the past 20 years has been a
literature of regulation, not freedom a
literature that balances away speech rights
. . . Its basic strategy is to treat freedom of
speech not as an end in itself, but an
instrumental value."
Perhaps emboldened by the liberal media's
enthusiasm for campaign regulations,
other would-be speech regulators have
brought two lawsuits that suggest the
future direction of liberal attempts to
shrink First Amendment protections.
The Michigan Education Association, a
teachers union, is suing the Mackinac
Center for Public Policy, a free-market
think tank, charging that the center
"misappropriated" the "likeness" of the
MEA's president when it quoted him in a
fund-raising letter. MEA's president,
announcing establishment of a think tank
whose mission would be partly to counter
the center's research and policy work, said:
"Quite frankly, I admire what they have
done."
When the center quoted this, supplying
the center's name for the pronoun, the
MEA filed suit, demanding to be given
the center's mailing list, and that it be
given all funds contributed in response to
the fund-raising letter. It also demanded
that a permanent gag order be imposed to
forbid the center from referring to MEA
officials in future fund-raising letters.
Welcome to the brave new world of
speech regulation in Year One, A.M.F.
anno McCain-Feingold.
One aim of the political class in passing
that campaign regulation which is
heading for a probably chastening
rendezvous with the Supreme Court - was
to restrict when and how issue advocacy
groups can run any ad that so much as
"refers" to a political candidate.
In the same spirit, the MEA is asserting
that a nonprofit public-policy organization
must get an opponent's permission before
quoting him. The center, assisted by the
Institute for Justice, a Washington-based
public-interest organization of libertarian
bent, will easily defeat the MEA's
frivolous claim of "misappropriation."
A real example of that offense would be
Coca-Cola using advertising featuring,
without Michael Jordan's permission, a
picture of him drinking a Coke. But
676
Jordan drinking a Coke is not a
newsworthy public event. The MEA's
president speaking at a press conference
is, and people may report it without being
sued.
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that fund-raising appeals by public-
interest organizations are not unprotected
commercial speech. They enjoy full First
Amendment protection because
"solicitation is characteristically
intertwined with informative and perhaps
persuasive speech."
Another attempt to abridge First
Amendment protections is being mounted
by critics of Nike's overseas-labor policies.
Nike responded by changing some
policies but defending others in
advertisements, press releases and letters
to newspapers and athletic directors.
Critics sued, saying that some Nike
statements were false and were
commercial speech punishable under the
law proscribing false "advertising."
California's Supreme Court sided 4-3 with
the critics, saying: "Speech is commercial
if its content is likely to influence
consumers," and some consumers are
concerned about labor practices.
But the U.S. Supreme Court may side with
the dissenters. They, and the American
Civil Liberties Union, reject the idea that
there should be asymmetrical protections
of different sides in public-issue debates.
That is, they reject the doctrine that
because a business' self-defense may have
the incidental effect of helping it sell its
product, the business' self-defense is
commercial speech and hence, unlike the
speech of its critics, can be regulated and
can provoke costly lawsuits.
This doctrine will have a chilling effect on
debate, pressuring businesses to forgo
self-defense in order to avoid the threat of
lawsuits. Thus do liberals constrict public
debate to further their purposes.
When the history of todays liberalism is
written, the writers may . .. tread lightly.
Otherwise they may be sued by liberals
demanding subordination of the
historians' rights of freedom of expression
to some greater social good that
supposedly would be impaired unless the
historians' speech is regulated.
You say it can't happen here? Notice what
already is happening.
[George F. Will is a nationally syndicated
columnist.]
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